

MODERN LANGUAGE NOTES

LANCASTER TESTIMONIAL NUMBER

CONTENTS

	PAGE
ALONSO, AMADO.—The Stylistic Interpretation of Literary Texts, -	489
ARMSTRONG, EDWARD C.—Old-French 'Le chief d'une montagne,' -	496
BALDENSPERGER, FERNAND.—Goethe Historien littéraire, -	500
CASTRO, AMÉRICO.—La palabra 'titere,' -	505
CHINARD, GILBERT.—Notes sur une Pensée de Pascal, -	510
COHEN, GUSTAVE.—Un Recueil de Farces inédites du XV ^e siècle, -	520
†CONS, LOUIS.—Five Notes on the Text of Villon, -	520
FRANK, GRACE.—The Distant Love of Jaufré Rudel, -	528
LEWENT, KURT.—Father and Son in Provençal Poetry, -	534
MORLEY, S. GRISWOLD.—"Pozos de nieve," -	541
MULLER, HENRI F.—The Beginnings of French Fixed Word Order, -	546
NITZE, WILLIAM A.—Pascal and the Medieval Definition of God, -	552
PEYRE, HENRI.—André Gide et les Problèmes d'influence en littérature, -	558
SALINAS, PEDRO.—La espada y los tiempos de la vida en 'Las mocedades del Cid,' -	568
SCHINZ, ALBERT.—Les Dangers du Cliché littéraire: Le Dr. Johnson et Jean-Jacques Rousseau, -	573
SHAW, J. E.—"Per l'altre" 'Convivio,' III, xiv, 15, -	580
SINGLETON, CHARLES S.—Machiavelli and the Spirit of Comedy, -	585
SMITH, HORATIO.—Sainte-Beuve on Science and Human Nature: Jouffroy, Le Play, Proudhon, -	592
SPITZER, LEO.—Eng. 'diamal' = O. F. 'dism-al,' -	602

MODERN LANGUAGE NOTES

A Monthly Publication with intermission from July to October (inclusive)

Edited by H. CARRINGTON LANCASTER

WILLIAM KURRELMAYER

KEMP MALONE

RAYMOND D. HAVENS

HAZELTON SPENCER

C. S. SINGLETON

Advisory Editors

E. Feise, Grace Frank, J. C. French, E. Malakia, R. B. Roulston, Pedro Salinas, L. Spitzer

The Subscription Price of the current annual volume is \$5.00 for the United States and Mexico and \$5.50 for other countries included in the Postal Union. Single issues, price seventy-five cents.

Contributors and Publishers should send manuscripts and books for review to the Editors of Modern Language Notes, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., indicating on the envelope whether the contribution concerns English, German, or Romance. Every manuscript should be accompanied by a stamped and addressed return envelope. In accepting articles for publication, the editors will give preference to those submitted by subscribers to the journal. Foot-notes should be numbered continuously throughout each article; titles of books and journals should be italicized; titles of articles enclosed in quotation marks. Quotation marks are *not* used in verse quotations that form a paragraph. Write II, 3, not vol. II, p. 3. The following abbreviations are approved: *DNB.*, *JEGP.*, *MLN.*, *MLR.*, *MP.*, *NED.*, *PMLA.*, *PQ.*, *RE.*, *SP.*, *EES.*, *TLS.* Proof and MS. should be returned to the editors with an indication of the total number of reprints desired. Subscriptions and other business communications should be sent to The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland.

ADVENTURES OF A LITERARY HISTORIAN

A collection of his writings presented to H. Carrington Lancaster by his former students and other friends in anticipation of his sixtieth birthday, November 10, 1942.

The volume includes a portrait of Professor Lancaster by Stanislaw Rembski, a foreword by Charles I. Silin of Tulane, an Introduction by Louis Cons of Harvard, and a list of persons and institutions subscribing to the book.

The main portion of the volume is divided into two parts entitled *Open to the Public* and *For Scholars Only*.

The first of these is made up of addresses, anecdotes, material of various kinds in prose and in verse, written for a larger public than that of specialists. Considerably over half of this portion of the book has not been previously published.

For Scholars Only consists of articles that have appeared in American, French, and English scholarly journals. When necessary, these articles are brought up to date. They illustrate the various fields of a literary historian's activities: the discovery and identification of documents, the study of sources and influences, criticism, interpretation, literary biography, etc.

The volume contains xxxi + 392 pages and a frontispiece. Octavo. Cloth. \$5.00.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS • BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Entered as Second-Class Matter at the Baltimore, Maryland, Postoffice
Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103,
Act of Congress of July 16, 1894.

pituer

ditore
on the
script
rticles
to the
les of
Quo-
3, not
MP.,
ditions
business

ser

ors
the
ript
cles
the
of
no-
not
MP,
tors
mens

Modern Language Notes

Volume LVII

NOVEMBER, 1942

Number 7

THIS NUMBER IS DEDICATED

TO


HENRY CARRINGTON LANCASTER

ON

THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY

NOVEMBER 10, 1942

AB IGNE IGNE



THE STYLISTIC INTERPRETATION OF LITERARY TEXTS¹

In order to avoid useless polemic, let us begin by granting that every study which contributes to the better comprehension and interpretation of a literary work is legitimate. Every kind of study is welcome if it adds to our knowledge of a literary work or if it permits us to feel and enjoy it better.

The traditional study of literature has dealt with many important aspects such as the ideologic, historic, folkloric, linguistic, biographic, social, religious; the only thing which had been neglected by traditional criticism is the specifically *poetic* values. Criticism has decided whether a work is of great, average, or scant literary value. But in most instances such evaluation amounts to no more than a faint underlining in a vague system of academic classifications, and, in the best of cases, our great philologists give us rapid, isolated glimpses of the *true* poetic content of the work, without submitting this aspect to a systematic study.

In every poetic production, however (and, of course, I call poetic production not only verse compositions but also every artistically valuable literary creation) the only thing essential—as a poetic production—is its poetic kernel. In the *Quijote* there are represented thoughts, ideas, cultural European currents of the time, national forces and ambitions, a profound personal vision of life; all this could very well have been set forth in the form of a treatise, intellectually ordered and justified—but then it would not constitute a poetic creation. There is also in the *Quijote* a critical portrayal of social life, common wisdom, geographic references, and literary criticism; and all of this could have been presented as topics of information—but then the work would not constitute a poetic creation. And one may go further: it will be readily admitted that if Cervantes had intended primarily to inform us concerning the geography of Spain he would have given us facts in greater quantity, and more precise and better integrated than they appear in the *Quijote*; if he had intended to write a treatise on the cultural ideas which interested him, he would have developed such ideas in

¹ Abridged version of an address made at the 1942 MLA convention at Indianapolis, which may interest the readers of *MLN* (and Professor Lancaster) as a report on one branch of philological activities in Argentina.

greater detail and would have shown us explicitly his own point of view; if he had wished to record the customs and social forces of his time, he would have provided us with more detailed and exact information than is to be found in his work. In short, each one of the aspects of the literary work except the poetic would, if considered as a subject in itself, have turned out better if treated by itself, systematically, and according to its own exigencies. And yet, in this piecemeal, unsystematic and partial form in which these subjects appear in literary master works, their power to vitalize the human heart is incomparably greater. And this is because the power they possess belongs to the poetic architecture in which the social or historic or ideologic themes (the so-called contents) enter as materials of construction. That architecture is of a specific type which *in lato sensu* we call 'artistic' and, in reference to literature, 'poetic'—and the character of which, as such, is revealed in the aesthetic pleasure which is produced in us. Traditional philological criticism methodically studies contents and the value thereof; but is it not also the duty of literary history and of literary criticism to attempt the *methodical* understanding of the poetic in literary works? My two-fold proposition is, first, that the poetical represents not only one but the basic aspect for studies of literary criticism, and, secondly, that it is incumbent upon the new philological discipline, usually called stylistics, to seek out, to appraise, and to rectify the methods suitable for a systematic and rigorous analysis of this aspect of literary works.

Stylistics is style-study. As regards 'style,' this is generally understood to mean an author's particular use of language, his idiomatic mastery and virtuosity, as representing an *additional part* of the literary construction; there have been a number of doctoral dissertations which have attacked the question of style from this point of view. I grant the occasional desirability of such a conception of style; I grant likewise the usefulness of some of these theses as contributions to the study of the style of the authors in question. But the term 'style' has another meaning which is more suitable to the purposes of stylistics: *style is the expressive system of a work, of an author, of an epoch.*

According to this definition stylistics must study the literary work as a poetic structure, taking into account the *two* essential aspects: the manner in which it is constructed, both as a whole and

in its elements, and the sort of aesthetic delight which it produces, — in other words the work must be considered both as a created product and as a creating force—as *ἔργον* and as *ἐνέργεια*. Whether the work in question be a small poem, a novel, or a tragedy, the investigator of style seeks to perceive the *modus operandi* of the psychic forces which form the composition of the work, and to penetrate deeper into the aesthetic pleasure which derives from the experience and contemplation of the poetic structure. After that, and only after that, each one of the elements is studied and viewed in its structural rôle within the poetic creation: what does this diminutive express or suggest? how is the rhythm achieved, what does it reveal concerning the act of poetic creation, and what aesthetic effects does it produce? What are the special characteristics of the metaphors, of which elements are they made, and what are the particular procedures of artistic condensation employed by the author? }

Stylistics is concerned, then, with the expressive system of a work, an author, or a group of related authors. An expressive system embraces everything from the internal constitution of the work to the suggestive power of the words and the aesthetic efficacy of rhythmical interplay. And by 'internal constitution' I am referring to that world which, in his poem, in his tragedy, or in his novel, the poet shapes out of his sentiments and his thoughts. What is essentially poetic consists precisely of this created structure or architecture; this does not mean, however, that the so-called contents lose their importance for study—indeed these have a qualitative interplay in the form or construction itself. For it is impossible to think of the very same form with different contents; the contents, with their characteristic nature, are formative in themselves.

To clarify this point I should like to adduce an example from another art. In a painting the form or artistic construction is made up of lines and colors and the counterbalance of the two. But these are not the only compositional elements: the construction is made up also of the very materials represented. The wise distribution of cloth, stone, human flesh, vegetable life, sky and water, produces in the painting a harmony of the sensations that are evoked. Notice the formative rôle played by the white and rose-colored tints of feminine flesh against the red and violet velvets; should the pieces of cloth be replaced by other materials of the same color—by stone, for

example, or by vegetation—the composition itself would be thereby altered; that is, the ‘form’ would change. It is well-known that a painting provokes in us not only visual sensations but, particularly, those which are tactile and thermal—as well as various associations of all degrees. These tactile and thermal sensations, these associations, are provoked by the materials depicted (by the contents); thus the contents, with their characteristic material quality, are elements of form. If in a painting an apple is replaced by a clay ball, there will be produced a profound alteration in the harmony of sensations, in the form, even though the clay ball be of the same size, the same form and the same color as the apple. Every work of art is essentially the creation of a structure, of a form; but it is always a structure made up of *something*, a form extracted from *something*. Considered in this way, complementary concepts of matter and form are subordinated to the one all-important concept of form. Our poet likewise creates first and foremost, with his sentiments and his thoughts, a *form*. The thoughts play a rôle in the poetic structure by virtue of their specific qualities; this is why stylistics must study thoughts and ideas as well as feelings. But the former should not be studied *in and for themselves*, as a system rationally justified, but only as expressive elements, as an indirect expression of a (deeper) ‘thought’ of a poetic nature: an intuitional vision of the world and of life, felt, lived, and objectified in the poetic creation.

The great critics of past generations have often dealt with the *Weltanschauung* of a poet whenever the poet (a Dante, a Sophocles, a Cervantes) has been thought to have a world outlook of his own, and his works to possess a philosophical, religious, social or moral content. Knowledge of this sort is a precondition for stylistic studies, but the particular characteristic of stylistic treatment consists in considering the poet’s vision of the world also as a *poetic creation*, as a construction basically aesthetic. It was not Cervantes’ main concern in the *Quijote* to depict the world wherein he had lived, as an ordinary citizen in real life; in his work of art, the vision of the world which is the basis of the life of the citizen Cervantes has been evaluated, sifted and purified; certain tendencies have been emphasized, others subordinated; his own clear vision has given form to the significance of this world; it has become organized, reduced to artistic forms, to an ideal pattern. This

reduction to form belongs to poetic creation. Stylistics, then, interests itself in this creative character of an author's vision of the world, but only with the aesthetico-poetic consequences of this vision—not with its philosophico-rational aspects *in se*. This can be seen most easily in the case of lyrical poems, in which the vision of the world is ordered according not to rational knowledge but to a personal vision of factual elements which have been adapted to the emotional unity of the moment.

Although feeling and sentiment are present in every literary creation they acquire their highest constituent importance in lyric poetry. The emotional attitude which is crystallized in a lyric poem may be derived from real events in the poet's life, as, for example, in the *Coplas por la muerte de su padre* of Jorge Manrique or in the love ballads of Lope de Vega; again, as in the serene poetry of Fray Luis de León, this attitude may be 'achieved' by the poet, as a refuge from the disquieting anxieties with which the world torments him; there may even be a question of a dramatization of sentimental attitudes, as in Espronceda's *Canción del pirata* or the *Romances gitanos* of García Lorca. In all cases, even when an autobiographical basis is present, the poet has shaped and adjusted his sentiment, in the same manner that he has crystallized his vision of the world. The emotion which the poet has experienced in real life may perhaps have been trivial and vulgar; but when his spirit acquires that privileged creative tension which we call inspiration, then there appear in his work of art splendors and forces by which the raw material has been qualitatively transformed and given the universal value of an ideal pattern. And it is with this transfigured sentiment, not with the raw material of emotion, with which stylistics deals; the poem should not be treated as a biographical document nor as a monument of a moral attitude which may have been underlying the original experience.

And here we arrive at the capital point of our subject: since sentiment and personal *Weltanschauung* are communicated in poetry not directly but only by means of the suggestive, evocative procedures employed by the poet, the task of stylistics must be to study the *expressive system* of an author. Thus everything that has an efficacious value for suggestion must be studied and this, not by dissection but by evoking the 'biological' forces at work in the poem. We must seek to discover how the poem developed as an

objective construction, i. e., how the 'form' of the poem developed, and how the original reality has been especially prepared to serve as the expression of the sentimental substance intuited by the poet. Stylistics must also study rational thoughts insofar as these have been transformed into poetry; the particular manner in which fantasy operates in its own inventions; the secret order of the poem underlying its apparent whimsicality; the poet's exploitation of the possibilities of his idiom; the expressive intentions with which he has filled out and renewed common syntactical formulae, the expressive procedure to which he has subjected the meaning of words and phrases. Finally the rhythm must be considered: that is, the aesthetico-suggestive construction to which the poet has subjected the phonetic material, the organic activity developed in actualizing the sounds, the aesthetical organization of the given language.

Of course in every literary creation the essential is always that which the poet has succeeded in creating—not what he may have attempted, and failed, to create; we can interpret only what is contained in the poem before us. This, however, does not mean that it is possible completely to exclude the poet: what meaning could a poem have if one were to pretend that it has not come forth from the spirit of a poet? Every poem is an intentional construction and thus may be understood and enjoyed only if the reader grasps the intention around which the poem has been organized. It is precisely what is objectivized in the poem that allows us to discern this prime intention; by the same token, the reader should not consider any intention which he may know to have existed in the poet's mind, but which has not been objectively realized.

The only way to perceive the meaning of a poem is to accept it, and recreate it, word by word, verse by verse, in accordance with its rhythmic imagery: to imagine it, I might say, as the work must have developed, shaped by the intention of a concrete human being. And I am not simply recommending this as one way of reading a poem; I maintain that this is the *only* way possible. Each new reading of a poem carries us, willy-nilly, to the moment of the poetic creation which has been perpetuated in the poem. The expressive system of an author can be understood only as a living functioning process, as an efficacious manifestation of that privileged activity which is called poetic creation. This expressive system of a poem, of an author, of an epoch can be the object of

systematic study; and it is this alone which is deserving of stylistic treatment.

Let us then remove the existing taboo against studying the poetic in poetry; for this last is nothing recondite or *ineffabile*. The poets who have made excursions into criticism (Goethe, Lessing, Coleridge, Sidney, Wordsworth, Juan Ramón Jiménez, T. S. Eliot) have all raised problems which were *poetic*; indeed it has been the poetic aspect of literary works, even when these were dedicated primarily to other ends, with which the great body of English critics has constantly and lovingly dealt; in our own time, there are critics like John Middleton Murry and I. A. Richards who, each in his own way, are seeking and finding the poetic values of literature. This is likewise the way of Croce, Dilthey, Simmel, Santayana and Ortega y Gasset who often couple their historical and philosophical interests with elucidations of the poetic side of literary works.

We philologists, too, and we philologists especially, must cooperate in this search for poetic understanding, but we must do so in our own way: carrying out our studies with a method capable of improvement and progress. We can and we must shape a discipline, a tradition of research, by ever anew rectifying and extending our poetico-literary knowledge, which knowledge will pass to successive investigators. The method which we can develop must be based on our particular professional competence, that is, on our professional knowledge of linguistic phenomena and their values. Our point of departure must be the recognition that, just as each idiomatic expression has a meaning fixed by language, so it has also a complex of suggestive powers, likewise, but not as firmly, fixed by language. The meaning of a word is better established by tradition than is the suggestion emanating from the word, although both are *somewhat* fixed (neither completely so; and both are fixed in a particular manner in each language). To use the phenomenological terminology of Edmund Husserl, an expression is the *sign* of the object signified and an indication (or 'connotation') of all that is implicitly meant by the expression—especially of the complex psychic reality from which this expression is derived. There are, then, two types of contents for words and phrases: signified or denoted, and indicated or connoted. The possibility of stylistic studies is based on the fact that the indicated or connoted content, though not

so firmly fixed as is the signified content, is, nevertheless, far from arbitrary: at least it is oriented in a certain direction by linguistic, and at times by literary and historical, tradition. We already possess some brilliant studies of this aspect of language; the Geneva professor, Charles Bally, is a pioneer in this type of study. The idea of starting from the idiomatic peculiarities of an author in order to make a short-cut to his soul has been set forth, clarified and magnificently exemplified in the works of Karl Vossler, who has been followed by Leo Spitzer, Dámaso Alonso, Ernst Robert Curtius and others; with Albert Thibaudet, too, who excels in literary criticism, the method occasionally follows the same trend: from the external linguistic traits of an author toward his interior being. The philological training of such writers assures the most solid basis for a scholarly handling of the discipline of stylistics.

Instituto de filología
Buenos Aires

AMADO ALONSO

OLD-FRENCH *LE CHIEF D'UNE MONTAGNE*

In the *Roman d'Alexandre* a substantive *chief* qualified by *d'une montagne* or by *de la montagne* occurs three times, all three occurrences being in passages interpolated by Alexandre de Paris.¹ In Branch II 954-69 Emendius, in spite of a grave wound received in the battle of the Greeks with the Gadrans, spurs wrathfully through the "vaucel d'une plaigne" (968) and the duke Betis de Gadres, who had seen the wounding of Emenidus, descends upon him from the "chief d'une montaigne" (969):

Ireement chevalche le vaucel d'une plaigne,
Et Betys li descent du chief d'une montaigne.

Later on (II 1635-58) when Betis, perturbed by the intervention of Alexander and the main Greek army, retreats through the plains in search of some position better adapted to defensive tactics, he comes to a stop in the "chief d'une montaigne" and orders his army to make a stand (*s'alit*, sbj. of *aloier*) and to close ranks (*s'estraigne*, sbj. of *estraindre*); the Gadrans give battle in the

¹ II 969, 1646, 1650. See *The Medieval French Roman d'Alexandre*, Vols. II (for the text), IV (for the authorship of the passages in question), V (for the critical apparatus).

"chief de la montaigne"; protected by high peaks and precipitous gorges save where their position opens out toward a plain, the best troops post themselves as a rear guard and battle furiously against the pursuing Greeks in the *val de Guisterain* (1658). The *chief* appears twice in 1646-50:

Li dus s'est arestés *el chief d'une montaigne*
Et commande a sa gent que s'alit et s'estraigne.
Tels vait entr'aus joster qui en son sanc se baigne;
Molt se set bien garder qui ne muert ou mehaigne.
El chief de la montaigne josterent li Gadrain.

The Tobler-Lommatzsch *Wörterbuch*, which does not cite these three examples of *chief*, though they are all present in the Michelant text (127, 12; 163, 7; 164, 11), does give (under *chief*, col. 385) an example of *chief de la montaigne* (*Roman de la Rose*, ed. Langlois 6079) and defines the *chief* as 'Spitze,' just as Langlois had defined it in his *Glossaire* as 'sommets,' but the narrative which follows RAl ix 1646-50 shows clearly that the *chief de la montaigne* where Betis posts his army is not a mountain top.² In the context, when the battle has continued for a time and Betis has been unhorsed, he summons his forces to the rescue and the Gadrans come out from the mountains and rally to his aid (1659-1731). The twelve Greek peers thereupon execute a flanking movement, pass between the hostile army and the mountains and seize the defiles, thus cutting the Gadrans off from the possibility of retreat (1732-34). The further fighting ends quickly in the collapse of Betis and his forces and the disorganized flight of the survivors to the city of Gadres (1735-1811).

The natural deduction to be drawn from the above narrative is that the location chosen by Betis for his stand was a 'repli de montaigne,' a hollow starting from an open valley in the plains and penetrating up into the mountains, which offer protection against attack from any side except from the outlet where the *repli* opens into a broad valley in the midst of more nearly level territory. The definition 'repli de montaigne' also applies to the *chief* in line 969, already mentioned above: Betis can hardly have been perched atop of a mountain while his troops were battling down in the vale, but

² In this connection note that to render the idea 'sommets de montaigne' the normal Old-French expression was *en son un mont* or *en son une montaigne*. See for example the three occurrences of *en sum le munt* in the *Lai des dous amanz* of Marie de France (lines 91, 158, 171).

he could readily have been a bit higher up than the open valley and so not too far distant to observe the wounding of Emenidus.

There remains for our consideration the occurrence of *chief* in the only other known passage where it is found in association with *montagne*: the *Roman de la Rose*, line 6079 of the Langlois edition. Here Jean de Meun in describing Fortune's domicile says that high up in the *chief de la montaigne*—on the declivity and not in the plain—Fortune's dwelling slopes downward ever threatened with collapse. The text reads (6079-83):

En haut ou *chief de la montaigne*,
Ou pendant, non pas en la plaigne,
Menaçant toujourz trebuchance,
Preste de recevoir cheance,
Descent la maison de Fortune.

Here again the location is evidently no mountain top but a 'repli de montagne' with a slope which loses its abruptness when the hollow smooths down and broadens out into a plain. The description of Fortune's house forms part of a passage (5921-6118) where Jean de Meun is not merely imitating but is actually translating a corresponding passage in the *Anticlaudianus* of Alain de Lille.³ The Latin text underlying 6079-83 is as follows:

Rupis in abrupto suspensa minansque ruinam
Fortune domus in preceps descendit . . .

The "Fortunae domus in abrupta suspensa" which "in praeceps descendit" serves to confirm that Jean de Meun's *chief de la montaigne* consisted of a rapidly sloping terrain, such as is characteristic of a 'repli de montagne.'

Once we grant that "chief de montagne" means 'repli de montagne,' it is manifest that in this expression the word *chief* is akin to Latin *cavare* and *cavus*. The verb *cavare* lived on in the Old French as *chever*, with stem-accented forms of the type *chieve* (pr. 3 sing.), but *chever* was subjected to rather constant learned influence, so that *caver* is the modern French form and that *chaver* and *caver* are frequent even in early texts. The adjective *cavu*, *cava* should in popular development give *cho* (cf. Prov. *cau*), *chieve*, but the learned *cave* is the only recorded form for the masculine of the

³ *Anticlaudianus*, Book VII, chapter VIII, and Book VIII, chapter I. The passage in question is quoted in full by Langlois in his note to *Rose* 5921-6118).

adjective.⁴ Nor do the dictionaries record a feminine *chieve*, but none the less this feminine exists. In the *Roman d'Alexandre* we find (III 1039-42):

D'eau du ciel pleüe contre une henepee
En une chieve pierre a Zephirus trovee,⁵
Grant talent a de boire, n'en a goute adesee,
Ains la geut en son elme, le roi l'a presentee.

Lines 1039-42 go back to Lambert le Tort and form part of an episode where Lambert closely adheres to the text of the *Epistola Alexandri ad Aristotelem*, which has (ed. Kuebler, p. 195): *miles Zephirus inventam mihi in lapide concavo aquam galea pertulit*; this leaves no room for doubt that Lambert's text spoke of 'a hollow stone.' A second example of *chieve*, again in an early text, is to be found in Ivor Arnold's edition of the *Roman de Brut* (lines 7519-20):

Al funz ad dous draguns dormanz
En dous pierres chieves gesanz,

where for *chieves* the editor is following the spelling of his basic manuscript (*P*). In sum, there is substantial evidence for early popular developments of the *cavare-cavus-cava* group and for a substantive *chief* 'concavité' as a member of this group. The *chief* 'concavité' may have been built on the stem-accented forms of *chever* or, in case *chieve* adj. fem. had given rise to a *chief* adj. masc., the *chief* 'concavité' may be a substantivized adjective formed on *chief* 'concave.'

The whole Old-French group was subject to the competition of partly or wholly learned forms (*chaver*, *caver*, *cave*) and to the equally strong competition of the French adjective *crués* (*creux*) and verb *crueser* (*creuser*). The substantive *chief* 'concavité' had an added handicap in its phonetic collision with the substantive

⁴ When von Wartburg (*FEW* II, p. 559) mentions a thirteenth-century hapax *chief* 'caverne' and states that it is derived from *cavu*, he presumably has in mind the *chief* cited in the Tobler-Lommatzsch (II, col. 390), but Charles H. Livingston (*MLN* 54 [1939], pp. 290-91) has shown that the line as there cited is based on a misreading and that the *chief* therein has its commonplace meaning 'tête.'

⁵ The basic manuscript (*G*) has altered *chieve* to *dure* but *D* and *T*, which belong to the same family, have *chieve* and *A* has *cheva*; *FY* have *chave*; *RPQJIK* have *cave*; *M* has *cruese* and *L* has *Ens u crués d'une roche*; *CENH* alter. The Italian scribe of *B*, with *clive pirre*, has seemingly equated the *ch* of *chieve* with *cl*.

chief 'tête,' and the cumulative effect of these three factors fatally destined it to extinction. Thus it need awaken little surprise that no trace has been found of *chief* 'concavité' save in the specialized meaning of a geological concavity and even then only when it is accompanied by a qualifier ("d'une montagne" or "de la montagne") serving as an aid to distinguish it from *chief* 'tête.' This somewhat fragile prop was insufficient to save the "*chief de montagne*" and, so far as at present recorded, the first and last preserved occurrences are the three of Alexandre de Paris and the one of Jean de Meun, all four examples being applied to a gorge or set of gorges penetrating up into a mountain side.

Princeton University

EDWARD C. ARMSTRONG

GOETHE HISTORIEN LITTÉRAIRE

Sainte-Beuve, on le sait, appelait Goethe "le roi de la critique" (21 octobre 1850) ou "le plus grand des critiques" (12 avril 1858): cet éloge d'un maître par un autre maître était surtout fondé sur les *Entretiens avec Eckermann*, dont avait été émerveillé l'auteur des *Causeries du Lundi*. Une souplesse infinie d'intelligence se jouant sur un fonds stable de discernement et de goût, nulle prévention pour barrer le chemin à une œuvre nouvelle, la tradition de l'hellénisme assurant seule quelques normes applicables à une variété d'intérêts à peu près parfaite: le sage de Weimar semblait avoir préfiguré l'attitude finale d'un autre critique, "rompu à toutes les métamorphoses" par tant de curiosités suivies de déceptions, par des enthousiasmes variés auxquels avaient succédé d'apparentes apostasies. La formule critique de Sainte-Beuve, "montrer ce qu'un auteur a voulu dire, et comment il l'a dit," avait été proposée avant la lettre par Goethe:

Was hat sich der Autor vorgesetzt? Ist dieser Vorsatz vernünftig und verständig? Und wiefern ist es gelungen, ihn auszuführen?¹

* * *

Or, si l'historien littéraire doit payer, à un immense devancier, un tribut tout semblable, c'est pour des raisons plus complexes, qu'un

¹ W. A., Bd. 42¹, p. 161. Un des traducteurs français d'Eckermann,

livre entier épuiserait à peine : ce livre, s'étonnera-t-on de constater que la bibliographie démesurée de Goethe ne le renferme toujours point ? Ou bien observera-t-on qu'une fois de plus, comme si souvent dans l'histoire de la renommée et de l'action de cet écrivain, ses compatriotes n'ont pas toujours su apercevoir des supériorités que leur cachaient en eux-mêmes d'autres tendances ? La formule "Goethe et Schiller," ou même "Schiller et Goethe," comme disait Nietzsche, a par bonheur été moins opérante en France qu'en Allemagne. Et les vues fort claires de l'auteur de *Poésie et Vérité* en matière d'histoire littéraire ont rejoint ou devancé sans effort celles qui se faisaient jour en France en particulier : d'où des commencements d'enquête auxquels on voudrait ajouter ici.²

Il va de soi que pour Goethe, héritier et "augmentateur" de l'idéologie amorcée par les philosophes grecs, la connaissance des choses par leur *devenir* est la norme même de l'esprit attentif à la réalité. Il suffit de voir par exemple, après 1815 et dans le trouble des temps aussi bien que par ses inquiétudes personnelles, le "sage de Weimar" préoccupé des indices favorables ou contraires à ces vues, et de comprendre à quel point lui tiennent à cœur les

Emile Délerot, m'a encore affirmé, après la publication de mon *Goethe en France*, l'intérêt passionné, et comme personnel, témoigné par Sainte-Beuve au sujet des *Entretiens*. En ce qui concerne le sujet abordé ici, un simple rudiment apparaît dans O. Harnack, *Ueber literarhistorische Methode* dans *Essays und Studien zur Literaturgeschichte* (Braunschweig, 1899), et rien dans E. Menke-Gluckert, *Goethe als Geschichtsphilosoph* . . . (Leipzig, 1907). W. Dilthey dans *Erlebnis und Dichtung* (Leipzig, 1906) ne touche qu'à la partie *biographique* de la question. Inversement, "le passé en général" fait surtout l'objet d'E. Cassirer, *Goethe und die geschichtliche Welt* (Berlin, 1933).

² Cf. I. Rouge, *Goethe critique : l'acheminement à la méthode génétique*, dans *RLC.*, XII (1932), 99, et—intéressant à cause de la jeune personnalité de l'auteur, fils d'un biologiste renommé qui a défini son attitude en matière d'évolution zoologique,—Claude Cuénot, *Une application de la morphologie goethéenne à l'histoire littéraire en Allemagne* (*RLC.*, XIV (1934), 241). Goethe, qui visiblement déplore (42^e, 151) "dass die Deutschen sämtlich transcendiren," se rencontre exactement sur ce point—si nécessaire à la constitution des saines sciences de l'esprit—avec Guizot, qui sera probablement, avant J.-J. Ampère, son préféré des "globistes," et qui écrivait à Fauriel après un séjour à Goettingue, le 24 juin 1811 : "La raison en Allemagne me semble honteuse du peu de succès de ses efforts, et elle se réfugie dans le mysticisme pour échapper au sentiment de son impuissance."

explications "génétiques" des choses, pour saisir l'importance du problème. Que ce soit dans ses conseils à son débile fils Auguste ou dans ses objections à Creuzer et à bien d'autres, un souci permanent se manifeste. "C'est toujours en suivant la genèse des choses, avait-il écrit à Jacobi le 2 janvier 1800, que je suis le mieux parvenu à une vue intuitive." Les créations de l'esprit ou du sens artiste n'échappent en rien à l'application d'une telle méthode, puisque le 4 août 1803 il avait formulé dans une lettre à Zelter la grave vérité qu'il est nécessaire de citer dans le texte, pour mieux la rapprocher de vues semblables exprimées par Pétrarque, par Montaigne, Descartes et bien d'autres :

Natur- und Kunstprodukte lernt man nicht kennen, wenn sie fertig sind: man muss sie im Entstehen aufhaschen, um sie einigermaßen zu begreifen. . . .

"Einigermassen": c'est-à-dire que l'appréciation esthétique doit compléter ce qui, chez un analyste ou un chroniqueur, demeurerait une morne énumération si l'"histoire," en art et en littérature, devait s'en tenir à des juxtapositions de faits, de dates, de noms, et même de sujets, qui ne décident rien d'essentiel, ne considèrent que la matérialité ou l'apparence d'un effort de création, et ne rendent justice qu'à l'accessoire. Ce sont des aide-mémoires que les chronologies qui se donneraient pour des histoires; des bibliographies ne sauraient s'offrir à elles seules comme des présentations historiques. Même la *thématologie*, cette *Stoffgeschichte* dont certains travailleurs ont pu croire que c'était une méthode acceptable pour établir des enchaînements authentiques, ne satisfait pas l'attente d'un lecteur avisé. Preuve en est l'insuffisance d'un ouvrage réputé cependant, les *Conférences* d'A. W. Schlegel sur *l'Art et la Littérature dramatique*. Le 28 mars 1827, Goethe prononce sur cet ouvrage un jugement qui peut s'appliquer à d'autres précieuses et inertes constructions, et Benedetto Croce n'aura qu'à ajouter, dans un article célèbre de la *Critica* (II (1904), 483) son exigence de logicien à la condamnation de Goethe pour déprécier à jamais—du moins le pouvait-on croire—des études de ce type, braquées sur une identité fallacieuse des *sujets* pour passer en réalité à côté des réels problèmes :

Sa critique est complètement unilatérale, parceque dans toutes les pièces examinées Schlegel considère seulement le squelette du sujet traité et sa disposition, en signalant uniquement de menus points de ressemblance avec

de grands prédécesseurs, et sans se préoccuper le moins du monde de ce qu'un auteur peut avoir à manifester de grâce, de vie, des mérites d'esprit d'une grande personnalité.

C'est surtout à propos de Molière, médiocrement rattaché à des "sources" par l'acrimonieux critique, que Goethe inflige rétrospectivement à ce dernier un blâme significatif. C'est que—il l'a dit ailleurs (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, II, 6)—"une source ne peut se concevoir que coulante," et cette formule prédit trop exactement les prédilections de l'évolution créatrice pour n'être pas saluée au passage : correctif à toute étude folklorique oublieuse des conditions auxquelles sont soumises les fictions traditionnelles ; memento donné à tout historien littéraire qui négligerait la fluidité inévitable des "thèmes" acceptés, transmis, recréés par les collectivités successives.

Si encore la "thématologie" était sûre de la continuité de ses illustrations, et de la suite, sans défauts, des textes qu'elle peut alléguer ! Mais Goethe, sachant bien que toute transmission verbale a des "trous," et que la littérature orale en particulier est loin d'être une sorte d'*emmaillage* sans défaut, a dépassé les nomenclateurs de son temps par une vue d'avenir, à laquelle l'auteur de ces lignes a demandé l'épigraphe de sa *Littérature*, et qui prend souci d'un phénomène important, quoique négatif en apparence, de l'histoire littéraire : non pas seulement les destructions matérielles d'une part importante des créations de l'esprit, mais les faits courants de simplification, d'unification, d'absorption en des ensembles légendaires, qui obligent, dira Sainte-Beuve, à "briser la glace pour retrouver le courant." A plusieurs reprises, dans le *journal de Makarie* des *Années de voyage*, dans les *Maximes* et dans *Art et Antiquité*, Goethe a insisté sur le caractère normalement fragmentaire des littératures :

Combien peu de chose, de ce qui s'est passé, a été écrit ; combien peu de ce qui a été écrit a été sauvé !

Comme en même temps il raillait les flaireurs d'"emprunts," qui "définiraient aussi bien un Hercule en additionnant les bœufs et moutons qui lui fournirent sa force" (16 décembre 1828), et les "philologues" sans goût qui font des gloses purement verbales et formelles sur les textes (W. A., Bd. 42², 175 ; *Eckermann*, 11 février 1831), mais comme il admettait d'autre part, pour les autres comme pour lui-même, la nécessité d'aider les fonctions

créatrices, son point de vue accepte sans difficulté, vers 1828, celui que l'histoire littéraire, si vivante à ce moment, lui offrait en France: les Fauriel et les Boissonnade d'une part, les Sainte-Beuve d'autre part, jetaient en effet les fondements sur lesquels—à part quelques déviations—tout un siècle n'a eu qu'à bâtir, à égale distance de la rhétorique bavarde et de la minutie érudite.

Tandis que l'excès de "transcendance" de ses compatriotes l'inquiète en ces matières, il voit que le défaut français de l'excès logique est en train de céder à plus de *relativité* et de vie. Que ce soit dans ses lectures du *Globe*, ou dans sa découverte personnelle d'un J.-J. Ampère ou d'un A. Stapfer, le weimarien juge en bonne voie la méthode française de l'histoire littéraire. Elle part de l'écrivain dans son individualité, dans sa vérité artistique, conditionne l'oeuvre par l'homme et détermine l'originalité foncière, en quelque sorte *vitale*, d'un auteur qu'influencent ensuite—comme lui-même reconnaît avoir été influencé—les actions de la vie et du monde. Elle ne se laisse pas impressionner par la soi-disant inspiration anonyme qu'animerait l'âme collective chère aux romantiques: "toute poésie individuelle tient d'extrêmement près à ce que nous appelons poésie populaire." La littérature comparée, comme de juste, vient au secours de l'histoire littéraire nationale: non seulement pour des temps propices à la "littérature universelle," mais parce qu'aucune nation ne s'est formée toute seule," et que seule "l'assimilation de trésors étrangers suscite de grandes choses" (Chancelier Müller, 17 décembre 1824).

Même si le "démoniaque" échappe à l'analyse, à l'explication *causale*, à l'étude "génétique," ce résidu n'en sera que plus précieux à l'historien ou au biographe, puisque là sera une sorte de point vital (aussi irréductible que l'*intraduisible* en traduction) inhérent à l'individu, inexplicable par le détail des influences subies et exercées, lequel risquerait de nous égarer en séparant à l'excès la cause et l'effet, alors que le phénomène est immédiat et un. . . .

* * *

Etendues à des "périodes," l'histoire littéraire selon Goethe souffrait évidemment de quelque subjectivité, lorsque dans *Poésie et Vérité* il caractérisait les *dominantes* des lettres allemandes du XVIII^e siècle, ou lorsque, dans des *Etudes sur la Littérature universelle*, il cherchait les épithètes les plus propres à en définir les

périodes 1750-70, 1790-1810, 1810-20: il semble que la lecture de Villemain et de Guizot ait révélé à cet individualiste la complexité du XVIII^e siècle et de sa civilisation. En tout cas, il s'est toujours gardé du périlleux sophisme qui verrait un "développement" autonome, "du dedans au dehors," dans des phénomènes aussi complexes: une collectivité est amenée à manifester ses "potentialités" sous des influences intellectuelles qui peuvent aller du plagiat et de la servile imitation à l'émancipation, de l'action des grandes personnalités à un progrès moyen des goûts et des lumières.

Méritoire curiosité, chez l'historien, que la détermination de tout cela! Et quelle absurdité de prétendre placer l'activité de l'enquêteur habile du passé au-dessous de celle de l'artiste dit *créateur*! On croit entendre Emile Zola ne voyant pas de différence essentielle entre Balzac extrayant d'une société actuelle ses linéaments organiques et Taine (sauf pour l'*a priorisme* de telles de ses vues) faisant de même pour des ensembles du passé, lorsqu'on réfléchit à la boutade de Goethe, attribuant "sa couronne propre" à l'historien aussi bien qu'au poète, engagés dans une compétition "aussi méritoire quoique aussi différente que celle du coureur et celle du boxeur." (W. A. Bd. 42^e, 144.)

FERNAND BALDENSPERGER

University of California, Los Angeles

LA PALABRA "TÍTERE"

Los diccionarios etimológicos nada dicen acerca de este vocablo, usual en español y portugués, y que no creo se haya escrito antes del siglo XVII: "Mi bisavuelo tuvo *títeres* en Sevilla, los más bien vestidos y acomodados de retablo que jamás entraron en aquel pueblo. Era pequeño, no mayor que del codo a la mano, que de él a sus títeres sólo había diferencia de hablar por cerbatana o sin ella. . . . Dava tanto gusto el verle hazer la arenga titerera, que por oírle se ivan desvalidas tras él fruterías, castañeras y turroneiras."¹ El *Tesoro* de Covarrubias, 1611, consigna interesantes datos, s. v. *retablo* y *títtere*: "Algunos *extrangeros* suelen traer una caxa de títeres, que representa alguna *historia sagrada*, y de allí les dieron el nombre de retablos." "Títeres, ciertas figurillas que

¹ *Pícara Justina*, 1605, edic. Puyol, I, 80.

suelen traer *extrangeros* en unos retablos, que, mostrando tan solamente el cuerpo dellos, los gobiernan como si ellos mismos se moviesen; y los maestros que están dentro, detrás de un repostero y del castillo que tienen de madera, están silvando con unos pitos, que parece hablar las mismas figuras." En 1613 trata Cervantes por vez primera de nuestros muñecos animados en *El licenciado Vidriera*:² "De los titereros decía mil males: decía que era gente vagamunda y que trataba con indecencia de las cosas divinas, porque con las figuras que mostraban en sus retablos volvían la devoción en risa, y que les acontecía envasar en un costal todas o las más figuras del Testamento Viejo y Nuevo, y sentarse sobre él a beber en los bodegones y tabernas; en resolución, decía que se maravillaba de cómo quien podía, no los ponía perpetuo silencio en sus retablos, o los desterraba del reino."

Cervantes aprovecha los títeres para insistir una vez más sobre la distinción entre lo divino y lo humano, categorías tan mezcladas y confundidas en el arte de su tiempo; sus razones parecen anticipar algunas de Don Nicolás Ferrández de Moratín en sus *Desengaños al teatro español* (1763), obra que tanto contribuyó a que dejaran de representarse los autos sacramentales.³ Pero lo que inmortalizó a las insignificantes figurillas fué el papel que desempeñan en el "retablo de Maese Pedro" (*Quijote*, 1615, II, 25): "Este es un famoso titerero, que ha muchos días que anda por esta Mancha de Aragón." Aquel mismo año habla también de los títeres Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa (*Plaza universal de todas las ciencias*, 1615, discurso xcii): "No es razón se olviden otros *extrangeros* manejadores de títeres, ministros de particular entretenimiento, a quien hazen dezir y hazer lo que quieren, metiéndolos en campaña, donde peleando se vencen unos a otros; industrias todas, antes ganzúas generales para las bolsas."

Esos primeros años del siglo XVII fueron, a juzgar por los ante-

² Edic. "Clásicos Castellanos," t. 36, pág. 63.

³ Los autos sacramentales fueron prohibidos en 1765 por Carlos III, y en la Real Cédula dada al efecto se dice: "Deben prohibirse por ser los teatros lugares muy improprios y los comediantes instrumentos indignos, desproporcionados para representar los sagrados misterios de que tratan" (Ap. E. Cotarelo, *Iriarte y su tiempo*, pág. 47). El poder público había tardado ciento cincuenta años en ponerse a tono con las opiniones de Cervantes acerca de la mezcla indebida de lo sagrado y lo profano, perfectamente normal para los contemporáneos de Cervantes, pero no para él.

riores textos, el momento de novedad y apogeo para los muñequitos actores. Son también los años en que la comedia inaugurada por Lope de Vega llegaba al auge de su popularidad, cuando a los modos del vivir exaltado se sustituye la vivencia de sus representaciones. Vivir comienza a ser un "como si" se viviera; y ese choque entre los anhelos y la no posesión de las realidades es lo que tensa prodigiosamente el conflicto vital de la comedia. Buena sazón para hacer su agosto los titereros venidos de más allá del Pirineo, junto con los amoladores de cuchillos y tijeras, y los buhoneros cargados de fuelles, ratoneras, peines y alfileres,³ que trocaban su técnica por el oro mágico venido de las Indias. Técnica para el vivir práctico, y técnica para dejar volar el ensueño.

Ya se ha visto que algunos de los textos anteriores notan los títeres como importación extranjera, y se refieren al carácter religioso de sus representaciones ("historia sagrada," Covarrubias; "figuras del Testamento Viejo y Nuevo," Cervantes). Pues bien, *títtere* es el francés *titre*, fr. ant. *titele*, lat. *titulum*, en el sentido especial de 'iglesia, monumento.'⁴ Tan gran salto semántico requiere alguna explicación.

El francés moderno ha olvidado el sentido antiguo de *titre*, que todavía era normal para Calvino: "Le Seigneur non seulement a deffendu de forger des statues pour le figurer: mais aussi de consacrer *tiltres* ou pierres, où on feist révérence."⁵

Antes se encuentra el mismo vocablo en una traducción de la Biblia de fines del siglo XIII: "Absalon a son vivant avoit drecié un *titele* en la valee roial en l'onneur de son nom."⁶

³ Quevedo, *La hora de todos*, XXXI

⁴ "Apud scriptores ecclesiasticos sunt oratoria, vel aedes sacrae, quibus presbyter aliquis assignabatur ad sacra peragenda" (Forcellini). En inscripciones *titulus* vale a veces 'sepulcro,' acepción derivada de *titulus sepulcri* 'epitafio.'

⁵ *Institution de la religion chrétienne*, edic. de 1541, en el fascículo 176 de la "Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes," pág. 132. El texto latino (edic. de 1539) dice: "Hac ratione, Dominus non statuas modo erigi ad se effigiandum fabrefactas, sed *titulos* etiam quoslibet et lapides consecrare vetuit" (*Inst. Relig. Christ.*, III, 29 en "Corpus Reformatorum," vol. XXIX).

⁶ *Regum* II, xviii, 18, en Guiart Desmoulins, Bible, apud Godefroy. El texto de la Vulgata es: "Absalom erexerat sibi, cum adhuc viveret, *titulum* qui est in valle regis." La Biblia de C. de Valera tradujo "columna."

El nombre se generalizó, y fué aplicado al templo, al monumento, al "castillo" como dice Covarrubias, en que ocurrían las peripecias de los muñecos, que debieron tener carácter religioso antes que profano. El teatro de figurillas, lo mismo que el de los actores de carne y hueso, fué primeramente religioso. Es lo que descubre el proceso semántico del fr. *marionnette*, en fr. ant. *mariotte*, *mariole* 'imagen de la Virgen María, persona que la representaba.'⁷ *Marionnette* es diminutivo de *Marion*.

No poseo texto francés que demuestre que *titre* se aplicó al teatro de "marionnettes," pero el hecho de la adopción de la palabra en España lo hace evidente. Es muy probable que tal vocablo, lo mismo que el objeto que designaba, tuviese vida sólo popular. Con todo, incluso con textos franceses puede también sostenerse que *titre* se refería al arte escénico, porque Godefroy menciona la acepción de "farsa," o sea 'representación cómica':

"Au dieu Bacchus ne levez les pupitres ['tablados']
Pour deschanter tragedies et *tiltres*""⁸

El texto de las *Geórgicas* a que se refiere ese pasaje es: "et ueteres ineunt proscaenia ludi," 'se llevan a la escena los antiguos espectáculos,' es decir, los himnos a Baco, origen tanto de la tragedia como de la comedia.

La palabra española designó, por consiguiente, el teatrillo ambulante, y luego los muñecos actores. *Títire* puede ser o pronunciación francesa arcaica conservada dialectalmente (comp. *titele*), o simple desarrollo de *titre*. Sea como fuere, *titre* 'teatro de muñecos,' pertenecería a la lengua más baja, que dejó tantos reflejos en español, cuya tierra desde antiguo estuvo invadida por peregrinos, vagabundos y truhanes de toda laya, atraídos por Santiago de Compostela.⁹ Al parecer, fr. *titre* 'teatro de muñecos' no fué

⁷ "Mariolae dicebantur sacerdotes vel clerici, qui die sancto Paschae trium Mariarum personas agebant," en el *Glossarium* de Du Cange, que cita este texto: "Interim in revestuario parantur tres Mariolae, quarum duae indutae sunt casulis albis, et tertia dalmatica alba, coopertis capitibus amictu, tenentes in manibus poma aurea in signum aromatatum."

⁸ Guillaume Michel, *Deuxième livre des Géorgiques*, en "Oeuvres de Virgile," edic. de 1529.

⁹ V. mis *Glosarios latino-españoles*, pág. 369. Aun en 1614 el jesuita Pedro de Guzmán escribe en los *Bienes del honesto trabajo y daños de la ociosidad*, que más de sesenta mil peregrinos entraban en el reino al cabo del año; aunque tal cifra fuese exagerada, su número debía ser muy

usado por la lengua escrita, que prefirió *marionnettes* en el siglo XVI, como se ve en un pasaje de *Les Serées* de Guillaume Bouchet (1526-1606): ¹⁰ "On trouvoit toujours aux badineries, bateleries et *marionnettes*, Tabary, Jean des Vignes,¹¹ et Franc à tripe toujours boiteux, et le badin ès farces de France, etc." El primer ejemplo de *marionnette* en el *Dictionnaire Général* es de 1517.

En suma, *títtere* fué primero 'retablo de muñecos,' luego el muñeco mismo. En medios aldeanos y rurales, *títeres* vino a significar cualquier diversión pública consistente en ejercicios de circo: volatines, acróbatas, etc. Realmente hoy *títtere* es sólo sinónimo de "botarate," o sea 'persona frívola e irresponsable.' El antiguo *títerero* ha sido sustituido por *titiritero* por haberse cruzado con *titirimundi* 'cosmorama portátil, figuras de movimiento exhibidas en un cajón,' es decir algo parecido a los antiguos retablos de muñecos. Pero a su vez *titirimundi* es cruce de *tutilimondi* (ital. *tutti li mondi*) con *títtere*.

En cuanto al antiguo retablo de títeres, su nombre literario ha variado según la influencia italiana o francesa que haya prevalecido; y en la lengua popular tiene nombres regionales no usados en la lengua escrita, entre los que sólo recuerdo ahora el de "cristobica" en Granada, "os cristobos" en Galicia, porque Don Cristóbal es el personaje principal de la función. Federico García Lorca ha dado fijeza literaria al tema del retablo popular en su "Retablillo de Don Cristóbal. Farsa para guiñol."¹² Se ve que para García Lorca la palabra literaria era *guiñol* (fr. *guignol*); antes lo fué *polichinela*, aun usado, lo mismo que *fantoche*, ambos extranjerismos.

El español literario, por consiguiente, no tuvo nunca palabra propia para el teatro de muñecos. *Títtere*, de origen francés, es como

crecido. La vida y el lenguaje de la ralea española debió recibir mucho influjo gálico: *bigardo*, *belitre*, *gallofo*, *jaque*, *jerigonza*, *picaro*, *truhan*. Ahora añadimos *títeres*.

¹⁰ *Les Serées*, edic. 1874, III, 177, ap. H. Clouzot, *L'ancien théâtre en Poitou*, 1901, pág. 284.

¹¹ Aun se menciona en Andalucía a "Juan de las Viñas," sin duda supervivencia de aquel personaje de retablo. L. Montoto y Rautenstrauch lo describe así en *Personas, personajes y personillas, que corren por las tierras de ambas Castillas*, Sevilla, 1911, II, 63: "Dícese del hombre ridículo y estafalario, a quien todos traen y llevan como si fuera un pelele, y de quien todos se burlan." He visto citado a Juan de las Viñas en obras del siglo XVII, pero no recuerdo dónde.

¹² *Obras Cómicas*, Buenos Aires, 1938, vol. I, pág. 191.

un resto de remotas influencias medioevales. Desde el siglo XVI comenzaron a prevalecer los vocablos italianos referentes a diversiones públicas a base de la persona humana y sus habilidades físicas: *saltimbanqui*, *volatin*,¹³ *payaso*; más tarde, los circos en España fueron importación extranjera, lo mismo que antes lo fué la escenografía, inaugurada en realidad por el italiano Cosme Lotti, ingeniero florentino que en el siglo XVII ideó trazas y tramoyas escénicas. *Tramoya* es el ital. *tramòggia*. El extranjerismo de todos estos y otros vocablos afines confirma lo que ya se sabe: la escasa aptitud española para la técnica, y su falta de gusto para aquellos ejercicios en que la persona humana se convierte en el espectáculo o en el hazmereir de los demás. El español representa su propio papel en la vida, a veces noblemente, a veces en forma excesiva y hasta ridícula; pero no representa bien el "papel" de otro. De ahí que el teatro español haya sido siempre pobre en grandes actores, y ni aun posea un canon escénico para la técnica de la representación, como un arte culto y consagrado por maneras tradicionales. La gente de lengua española posee hoy escasísimos grandes actores, en el drama, en la ópera o en el cinematógrafo. La ópera ni siquiera puede cantarse en español. Los "anunciadores" de la radio en los países hispánicos no se expresan casi nunca correcta y naturalmente. En el siglo XVII causa profunda sorpresa el contraste entre la riqueza creadora de Lope de Vega y sus sucesores, y la falta de interés y de originalidad para inventar y aplicar formas adecuadas de representación. La historia de las palabras lleva siempre,—debiera llevar siempre,—a contemplar tras ellas aspectos esenciales de la historia humana.

AMÉRICO CASTRO

Princeton University

NOTES SUR UNE PENSÉE DE PASCAL

"*Mien, tien*. Ce chien est à moi, disaient ces pauvres enfants; c'est là ma place au soleil.—Voilà le commencement et l'image de l'usurpation de toute la terre." (*Pensées*, éd. Brunschvicg, n° 295). Ces quelques lignes de Pascal ont déjà suscité bien des discussions et semblent avoir considérablement embarrassé la plupart de ses éditeurs. Certains ont fait preuve d'une ingéniosité extra-

¹³ Véase A. Castro, *RFE* XXII, 55.

ordinaire pour absoudre Pascal d'un " radicalisme " bien imaginaire; d'autres ont simplement avoué leur gêne extrême. Il est fort à craindre qu'ils n'aient tous justifié une pensée de leur auteur: " Pourquoi on aime mieux la chasse que la prise." Après s'être lancé sur une fausse piste, ils ont pris le leurre pour la proie. Il est temps de revenir au texte, de le considérer en lui-même et d'essayer d'en pénétrer le sens en le replaçant dans son milieu et dans son cadre exacts.

Résumant la question, ou plutôt la confusion, M. Léon Brunschvicg avoue son inquiétude:

Le texte de cette pensée est assez incohérent: cela paraît tenir, d'après l'examen du manuscrit, à ce que Pascal aurait en écrivant ajouté à sa première phrase: *ce chien est à moi*, qui était d'abord suivie de celle-ci: *voilà le commencement*, un second membre: *c'est là ma place au soleil*. L'incohérence disparaîtrait si on substituait au mot *chien* le mot *coin*; mais l'auteur de cette très ingénieuse conjecture, M. Salomon Reinach, a le premier reconnu qu'en l'état du manuscrit l'éditeur de Pascal n'avait pas le droit d'opérer une telle substitution."

Nous l'avons échappé belle! Encore un peu, et nous aurions eu un Pascal corrigé et amendé par Salomon Reinach. Par malheur, l'auteur des *Pensées* ne semble avoir songé ni à Salomon Reinach, ni à M. Brunschvicg, ni aux nombreux commentateurs qui devaient pâlir sur son texte. S'il a pensé à ses lecteurs, c'est pour les prévenir avec une désinvolture où l'on retrouve l'ami du chevalier de Méré: " J'écrirai ici mes pensées sans ordre, et non pas peut-être dans une confusion sans dessein; c'est le véritable ordre, et qui marquera toujours mon objet par le désordre même." (Brunschvicg, n° 373.)

En fait, il n'y a ni incohérence, ni contradiction dans ces quelques lignes, mais simplement juxtaposition de deux petites scènes empruntées à la vie, deux vignettes, ou pour emprunter le mot de Pascal, deux " images," illustrant la pensée elle-même. Pascal, ce contemplatif et ce mystique, n'a été ni un reclus, ni un solitaire. Il aimait à se mêler au petit peuple et ne dédaignait pas de s'arrêter pour voir passer le cortège des magistrats se rendant à la cour, le roi allant à Notre-Dame ou le défilé du régiment des Suisses de la garde. Il n'aurait pu, en tout cas, sortir de sa maison sans avoir sous les yeux le spectacle de Paris, et nous savons combien de tableaux, souvenirs de flâneries dans la grande ville, sont semés en abondance dans les *Pensées*. " Un homme se met à sa fenêtre pour voir les passants " (Brunschvicg, n° 323); " Le bec du

perroquet qu'il essuie, quoiqu'il soit net" (B., n° 343); "Le chancelier est grave et revêtu d'ornements" (B., n° 307); "*Talon de soulier*.—Oh! que cela est bien tourné!" (B., n° 117). Il serait facile de multiplier ces exemples et d'ajouter encore aux listes dressées par M. Charles Droulers dans son livre pittoresque sur *La Cité de Pascal* (Paris, 1928). Ici même, il est facile d'imaginer Pascal, au détour d'une rue étroite et sombre, observant une bande de gamins de Paris se querellant autour d'un malheureux chien perdu, peut-être pour le torturer ou aller le noyer, et commençant à réfléchir sur l'origine de la propriété. Au moment même où il se met à écrire, un autre souvenir lui revient à l'esprit: deux pauvres hères se disputant au coin d'une ruelle la flaque de lumière et de soleil où ils pourront se réchauffer, ou encore, plus probablement, un mendiant, sous le porche d'une église, défendant contre un nouveau venu la place devenue sienne, par droit du premier occupant et par une longue possession.

L'emploi du mot "usurpation" lui-même pourrait d'ailleurs appeler quelques réserves. Il n'est pas certain qu'il ait toujours eu au dix-septième siècle un sens aussi fort que de nos jours. On pourrait aisément y voir un souvenir du sens courant latin, "prendre possession par l'usage," devenu "prendre possession contrairement à la loi," chez les juristes seuls. Cayrou, dans son *Lexique de la langue du dix-septième siècle* (Paris, 1923), cite Furetière qui donne comme sens déjà vieilli d'usurper, "employer, en matière de mots et de phrases." Cayrou ajoute en note: "Il tient ce sens favorable du latin *usurpare* (contraction de *usu rapere*), 'prendre en se servant,' 'faire usage de, se servir de.'" *Usurper des mots* = 'employer' (attesté par Littré p. ex. chez Calvin) évidemment reflète le latin *usurpare vocem* = *nuncupare* (Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. étym.*). On trouve encore chez Montesquieu un curieux exemple de cette bivalence:

Il y avait un homme qui possédait un champ assez fertile, qu'il cultivait avec grand soin: deux de ses voisins s'unirent ensemble, le chassèrent de sa maison, occupèrent son champ; ils firent entre eux une union pour se défendre contre tous ceux qui voudroient l'usurper; et effectivement ils se soutinrent par-là pendant plusieurs mois. (*Lettres Persanes*, XI).

Il serait difficile ici de donner à "usurper" son sens moderne courant, puisque les deux occupants n'avaient en droit aucun titre au terrain dont ils avaient dépouillé leur voisin. Le sens peut être, tout au plus, s'emparer par la force, et il paraît en tout cas

synonyme de "occuper," qui est employé dans la même phrase. Je n'aurais point donné cette indication, si un récent commentateur de Pascal, M. Charles Droulens (*op. cit.* p. 89) n'avait trouvé "usurpation un peu dur," et n'avait ajouté "nous avons déjà remarqué cette propension de Pascal à forcer parfois les mots." En fait, ici, il ne faut accuser que l'usage moderne qui a intensifié et restreint le sens maintenant courant, mais encore un peu flottant au dix-huitième, et à plus forte raison au moment où Pascal écrivait. Si cette explication était admise, la pensée de Pascal perdrait beaucoup de cette hardiesse qui a troublé tant de ses commentateurs dont il nous faut maintenant examiner les scrupules et les hésitations.

Il ne semble pas qu'avant Chateaubriand cette théorie pascalienne de "l'usurpation de toute la terre" ait particulièrement attiré l'attention. Mais quand dans le *Génie* (Troisième partie, liv. II, ch. VI) Chateaubriand entreprit de prouver qu'il n'y avait point d'idée, si avancée qu'elle fût, qui n'eût été déjà exprimée par les penseurs et moralistes du dix-septième siècle, il trouva là une splendide occasion de faire un rapprochement qui lui semblait s'imposer :

Une des choses les plus fortes que Rousseau ait hasardées en politique, se lit dans le Discours sur l'inégalité des conditions : "Le premier, dit-il, qui, ayant enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire : *Ceci est à moi*, fut le vrai fondateur de la société civile." Or, c'est presque mot pour mot l'effrayante idée que le solitaire de Port-Royal exprime avec une toute autre énergie : "*Ce chien est à moi. . .*" Et voilà une de ces pensées qui font trembler pour Pascal. Que ne fût point devenu ce grand homme, s'il n'avait été chrétien !

Si Chateaubriand a rendu un grand service aux études pascaliennes en signalant le premier l'angoisse déjà toute moderne du tourment de l'infini, cette fois il a été moins heureux et s'est indéniablement et majestueusement fourvoyé. En bonne critique, comme en bonne justice, il est désirable d'éviter les lois ou les accusations rétroactives. Dans son horreur pour le babouvisme récent, Chateaubriand rend Jean-Jacques responsable d'un mouvement qui remonte en fait au *Code de la Nature* de Morelly, faussement attribué par Babeuf et ses amis à Diderot, alors que Rousseau n'avait fait qu'exprimer un simple lieu commun de droit civil. De même, il rend Pascal responsable de la trop fameuse phrase de Rousseau. Il est fort dommage qu'il ne soit pas remonté plus haut, car, nous le verrons plus loin, c'est ici ou jamais le cas de remonter au déluge.

Ernest Havet, donnant son édition des *Pensées* au lendemain de la Révolution de 1848 (1852), la revisant après la Commune de 1871, partagé entre son admiration pour Pascal et son horreur du communisme, a augmenté de toute son autorité la confusion créée par l'auteur du *Génie*. En ce sens, la note qu'il a écrite pour le "Fragment 50" de l'article VI est un modèle du genre. En voici les parties essentielles, dont nous retranchons la citation de Chateaubriand et celle du texte de Rousseau :

L'effrayante hardiesse de cette pensée a été relevée par l'auteur du *Génie du Christianisme* dans le chapitre sur Pascal. Il a raison de dire que Rousseau, en s'en inspirant, ne l'a pas égalée. . . . Rousseau fait bien moins peur, en criant et en s'agitant, que Pascal dans son analyse froide et méprisante. L'un s'indigne contre l'usurpation et la menace, il appelle sur ceux qui possèdent toutes les colères qui ont si fort éclaté depuis; l'autre n'a point de colère contre les possesseurs, il ne les voit pas, il ne voit que ces pauvres enfants qu'il prend en pitié. . . . On se demande comment les éditeurs de P. R. ont osé conserver un tel passage; n'en auraient-ils pas compris toute la portée, que nous sentons si bien aujourd'hui? Cependant ne nous troublons pas: des esprits bien lumineux ont porté du jour dans ces ténèbres où le *tien* et le *mien* ont leurs origines; ils ont montré que l'homme s'approprie les choses en mettant dans les choses une part de lui-même qui les fait siennes, son activité libre et son travail. Oui, ce chien peut être à cet enfant, si cet enfant s'est fait suivre de ce chien, s'il l'a apprivoisé et dressé. Cette place au soleil sera bien sa place, si c'est lui qui l'a trouvée, ménagée, rendue commode, ou si ses camarades la lui défont un jour qu'il se sera battu pour eux. Ce n'est pas dans une note que nous pouvons creuser ces problèmes; mais tant qu'on dira *toi* et *moi*, nous croyons qu'il faudra dire aussi *tien* et *mien*. Qui veut supprimer la propriété devra supprimer la personne.

Il n'est pas besoin de reprendre dans le détail cette argumentation dans laquelle Havet, se plaçant à un point de vue tout contemporain [*aujourd'hui*], ne se demande même plus ce que Pascal a voulu dire, et, encore moins, ce qu'ont pu dire ou faire "ces pauvres enfants." Il apparaît, sans autre démonstration, que l'éditeur a bâti de toutes pièces un petit roman sociologique, tant était grand son désir, louable mais portant à faux, d'atténuer les conséquences désastreuses que pourrait avoir pour la société de son temps la théorie que gratuitement il prête à Pascal.

Arrivons maintenant à M. Léon Brunschvicg qui est allé un peu plus loin et dont l'analyse est moins imagée, mais presque aussi fantaisiste :

Quant au fond, Chateaubriand y a vu avec raison le germe des idées développées par Rousseau dans le *Discours sur l'inégalité des conditions*

humaines (sic.) . . . Mais il faut prendre garde aussi que ce rapprochement ne nous entraîne à forcer la pensée de Pascal: Rousseau s'indigne contre une injustice préméditée; Pascal, avec plus de profondeur sans doute, constate une nécessité sociale; pour lui la propriété n'est pas de droit absolu, mais elle est liée inévitablement à la condition humaine, puisque les plus misérables commettent cette "usurpation" de vivre et d'avoir leur place au soleil; elle naît spontanément par le développement spontané de la société humaine, et c'est là, comme Pascal le montre dans les pensées qui suivent, le plus solide fondement qu'on puisse invoquer en sa faveur. Il est à noter que cette pensée figure dans l'édition de Port-Royal.

Malgré cet essai de justification, la gêne de l'éditeur est évidente. Une fois de plus, on attribue arbitrairement à Pascal une théorie qu'il n'a nulle part exprimée ni même indiquée. Plus récemment, M. Victor Giraud, qui connaît admirablement à la fois Pascal et Chateaubriand, se bornait à reproduire sans commentaire rectificatif le trop fameux passage du *Génie* (Pascal, *Œuvres choisies*, Paris, 1931). Quant à M. Jacques Chevalier, dont le *Pascal* a paru en 1922, peu après la guerre, il a cru devoir indiquer que "cette place au soleil dont les Allemands ont fait un curieux instrument de propagande et ce tiers indifférent [allusion à la pensée suivante] qui pose le principe de la Société des nations, sont peut-être parmi toutes les vues de Pascal, celles qui ont le plus frappé les étrangers, notamment en Amérique. Je pourrais citer, à l'appui de ce dire, de bien curieux témoignages" (p. 235). Il est fort regrettable qu'il ne l'ait point fait. Il aurait été intéressant de connaître les noms de ces pascaliens d'Amérique.

La cause serait jugée depuis longtemps et le malaise se serait dissipé, si les éditeurs des *Pensées* s'étaient préoccupés tout d'abord de rechercher les antécédents des idées de Pascal sur le *tien* et le *mien* et s'ils les avaient rapprochées des opinions contemporaines. Ils auraient pu constater que l'inclusion dans l'édition de Port-Royal de la pensée sur le *mien* et le *tien* n'avait rien de révolutionnaire ni d'étonnant. Par contre, ils auraient pu remarquer que cette pensée a été éliminée de l'édition donnée au dix-huitième siècle par Condorcet, et cette omission n'est pas moins significative que cette inclusion. C'est que, sous l'influence de Locke d'abord et ensuite des Physiocrates, les idées sur l'origine et l'importance du droit de propriété s'étaient singulièrement précisées et avaient pris une force extraordinaire. Mais les Messieurs de Port-Royal, Pascal et encore plus les juristes de son temps auraient été fort étonnés s'ils avaient pu prévoir qu'un jour, en somme assez proche, la propriété serait

comptée au nombre des "droits naturels." A ce propos, il n'est peut-être pas inutile de faire remarquer que la propriété n'est pas comprise dans l'énumération donnée par Jefferson, Adams et Franklin dans la Déclaration d'Indépendance, et qu'en agissant ainsi, les rédacteurs de la Déclaration ne faisaient que suivre Blackstone, qui avait déclaré qu'au point de vue du droit naturel, on ne pouvait justifier l'origine de la propriété.

Sans vouloir refaire ici, ni même esquisser une histoire du droit de propriété, sans remonter à Cicéron, à Saint Augustin, à Saint Thomas, ni même à Grotius, on peut au moins se reporter à un juriste français, ami de Pascal et par surcroît étroitement lié à Port-Royal. Il suffit d'ouvrir et de feuilleter l'ouvrage intitulé: *Les Loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, le droit public et le legum delectus*, par M. Domat, avocat du Roy au Siège Présidial de Clermont en Auvergne (1^{ère} édition 1689), pour trouver exposée, avec force citations, cette théorie qui n'avait rien "d'effrayant" pour les contemporains de Pascal et qui ne faisait trembler personne au dix-septième siècle, que "les Cieux, les astres, la lumière, l'air et la mer sont des biens tellement communs à toute la société des hommes qu'aucun ne peut s'en rendre le maître ni en priver les autres" (*Livre préliminaire*, section I, part 1). Et voici Domat qui invoque l'autorité de la Bible: "*quae creavit Dominus Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus, quae sub coelo sunt*" (*Deut. IV, 19*). C'est par la prise de possession et non en vertu d'un droit antérieur que la propriété a commencé selon Domat: "Ainsi la possession est en un sens la cause de la propriété . . . *Dominium rerum ex naturali possessione coepisse, Nerva filius ait. Ejusque rei vestigium remanere de his quae terra, mari, coeloque capiuntur; nam haec protinus eorum fiunt, qui primi possessione eorum apprehenderint.*"

C'est là exactement, exprimée en langage légal, la théorie illustrée par Pascal et mise en pratique par ces "pauvres enfants" se disputant la possession d'un chien perdu. Il n'y avait là ni rien de nouveau, ni attaque à faire frémir contre la société ou la propriété; mais simplement une affirmation que la propriété a commencé par une prise de possession. "Possession vaut titre," dit le vieil adage juridique, repris d'ailleurs par le Code civil qui est loin d'être un manifeste révolutionnaire. Pascal n'avait point dit autre chose.

Si l'on veut pousser plus loin et préciser la pensée de Pascal, on pourra le faire en se servant des textes même qu'il nous a laissés.

Peu lui importe au fond ces recherches qui intéressent surtout les juristes et cette "usurpation" originelle: "elle a été introduite autrefois sans raison, elle est devenue raisonnable; il faut la faire regarder comme authentique, éternelle, et en cacher le commencement si l'on ne veut qu'elle ne prenne bientôt fin" (Brunschvicg, n° 294). C'est que pour lui, comme pour ses contemporains et ses prédécesseurs, la propriété est d'origine essentiellement humaine et sociale et par conséquent, ajouterait Saint Augustin, imparfaite. C'est par la société, en vertu de conventions variables, qu'elle a été établie et qu'elle est encore réglementée; elle dépend du droit humain et "arbitraire" et non du droit naturel, ce qui n'implique d'ailleurs en aucune façon qu'elle soit injuste ou nuisible, ni qu'il faille l'abolir. C'est l'idée nettement exprimée dans le premier *Discours sur la Condition des Grands* qui, bien que rédigé par Nicole, paraît refléter la pensée pascalienne et exprime en tout cas l'opinion moyenne et courante du temps:

Ainsi tout le titre par lequel vous possédez votre bien n'est pas un titre de nature, mais un établissement humain. Un autre tour d'imagination dans ceux qui ont fait les lois vous aurait rendu pauvre; et ce n'est que cette recontre de hasard qui nous a fait naître avec la fantaisie de ces lois favorables à votre égard, qui vous met en possession de tous ces biens. Je ne veux pas dire qu'ils ne vous appartiennent pas légitimement, et qu'il soit permis à un autre de vous les ravir; car Dieu, qui en est le maître a permis aux sociétés de faire des lois pour les partager; et quand les lois sont une fois établies, il est injuste de les violer.

De même, Domat, tout en proclamant l'existence d'un communisme de base, n'en reconnaissait pas moins la légitimité de la propriété individuelle, en ajoutant toutefois que la jouissance de cette propriété ne pouvait être pleinement exercée sans le concours de la société:

Ainsi en dehors de l'homme, les Cieux, les Astres, la lumière, l'air, nous sont des objets qui s'étalent aux hommes comme un bien commun à tous, et dont chacun a tout son usage. Et toutes les choses que la terre et les eaux portent ou produisent sont d'un usage commun aussi, mais de telle sorte qu'aucune ne passe à notre usage que par le travail de plusieurs personnes. Ce qui rend les hommes nécessaires les uns aux autres, et forme entr'eux les différentes liaisons pour les usages de l'agriculture, du commerce, des arts, des sciences, et pour toutes les autres communications que les divers besoins de la vie peuvent demander. (Ch. II, paragraphe II.)

Il ne s'ensuit pas que la société étant ainsi réglée soit vraiment bonne et juste. "*Veri juris*. Nous n'en avons plus," a dit Pascal

ailleurs (Brunschvicg, n° 297). Il aurait sans aucun doute souscrit au jugement sévère de son ami qui attribue les troubles de la société à la désobéissance de la loi qui commande l'amour de Dieu :

La première loi devoit unir les hommes dans la possession du souverain bien. . . . L'homme ayant violé la première loi, il a recherché le bonheur dans les biens sensibles où il a trouvé deux défauts opposez à ces deux caractères du souverain bien; l'un que ces biens ne peuvent pas être possédés de tous, et l'autre qu'ils ne peuvent faire le bonheur d'aucun. La recherche de ces biens les a divisez. . . . C'est donc le dereglement de l'amour qui a deregulé la société: et au lieu de cet amour mutuel dont le caractère étoit d'unir les hommes dans la recherche d'un bien commun; on voit regner un autre amour tout opposé, dont le caractère luy a justement donné le nom d'amour propre; parce que celui en qui cet amour domine ne recherche que des biens qu'il se rend propres, et qu'il n'aime dans les autres que ce qu'il ne peut rapporter à soy. (*Traité des loix*, ch. IX.)

Revenons maintenant au texte de Pascal. Même si nous donnons au mot 'usurpation' son sens le plus fort, nous voyons que la pensée qui a fait trembler Chateaubriand n'était guère au dix-septième siècle qu'un lieu commun de morale chrétienne et de morale juridique. Quand, dans ce monde qui a été créé par Dieu pour l'usage de tous, un homme entreprend de se réserver la possession exclusive d'une "place au soleil," il commet une véritable usurpation à l'égard du genre humain qui, selon le *verum jus*, en est le propriétaire légitime. Etant donné, d'autre part, que "nous n'avons plus" le sens de cette justice supérieure, et que, pour reprendre les termes de Domat, l'amour propre a remplacé l'amour mutuel, par suite de la faute originelle, il serait vain de rêver un rétablissement de la société primitive. Notre société humaine devra donc être ordonnée suivant des lois que les jurisconsultes qualifient d'arbitraires, *jus arbitrarium*, qui, par opposition avec les lois naturelles, sont "celles qu'une autorité légitime peut établir, changer et abolir selon le besoin," pour citer encore Domat. Quelle que soit l'origine des lois sur la propriété, elles doivent être observées, non qu'elles soient nécessairement justes, mais simplement parce qu'elles permettent d'éviter des troubles et des guerres civiles. "Sans doute, l'égalité des biens est juste," a dit encore Pascal (Brunschvicg, n° 299), "mais ne pouvant faire qu'il soit forcé d'obéir à la justice, on a fait qu'il soit juste d'obéir à la force . . . afin que le juste et le fort fussent ensemble, et que la paix fût, qui est le souverain bien." Veut-on d'autres textes? Voici une phrase bien significative de Nicole (*Nouvelles lettres*, XL), citée par

Sainte-Beuve qui, du reste, n'en a pas saisi la portée et la qualifie de "très joli passage" (*Port-Royal*, III, 416, n.): "Comme les biens du monde étant naturellement communs deviennent propres à ceux qui s'en sont saisis, *occupantis fiunt* . . ." Replacée dans son cadre chronologique et comparée aux autres fragments sur la société, la pensée sur "l'usurpation de la terre" devient une simple constatation historique. C'est ainsi, croit Pascal, en bataillant et en luttant les uns contre les autres, que les hommes ont entrepris de se partager le domaine qu'ils avaient reçu du Créateur. Il n'y a là aucune raison de trembler et encore moins aucune raison de se demander à quelles extrémités la pensée de Pascal l'aurait conduit, s'il n'eût été chrétien. C'est précisément parce qu'il est chrétien et janséniste qu'il est persuadé qu'il nous est impossible, dans notre état de péché, de retourner à cette égalité qui a disparu d'entre nous.

Fils d'un magistrat, ami du juriste Domat, ayant lu les Pères de l'Eglise et au moins Saint Augustin et la Genèse, Pascal aurait pu difficilement parler autrement qu'il ne l'a fait. Il ne pouvait prévoir cette philosophie du dix-huitième siècle qui voulut revêtir de l'autorité de la "loi naturelle," et proclamer "inviolable et sacré," un droit que les jurisconsultes sacrés et profanes avaient jusque-là considéré comme dérivant de la société et comme devant être réglé par des lois "arbitraires." Mais, de là à croire qu'il y ait eu dans l'esprit de Pascal la moindre excitation à la révolte, le moindre appel à une révolution qui tenterait l'entreprise chimérique de rétablir un communisme primitif, il y a toute la distance qui sépare un solitaire de Port-Royal d'un éditeur moderne, hanté par le souvenir des convulsions sociales qui ont troublé notre monde depuis cent-cinquante ans. Il est même probable, les *Pensées* sont là pour l'attester, que Pascal aurait vu sans protester le guet intervenir pour disperser la troupe bruyante de galopins se disputant un chien rogneux au coin de la rue Brisemiche, ou le bedeau imposer silence à deux mendiants se bousculant sous le porche de l'église Saint-Sulpice.

GILBERT CHINARD

Princeton University

UN RECUEIL DE FARCES INÉDITES DU XV^e SIÈCLE

Parmi tant de trésors perdus—livres, manuscrits, clichés—j'en ai sauvé un que j'ai emporté de Paris à mon départ et réussi à amener aux Etats-Unis: une copie complète et exacte, faite sur l'original, d'un recueil de farces inédites du xv^e siècle. Si je parviens à en publier l'édition critique, je veux la dédier à l'érudit que nous honorons aujourd'hui et qui s'est fait un nom illustre comme historien du théâtre français.

Il a montré par ses patientes investigations qu'il y a encore des découvertes à faire, ce que j'enseigne toujours à mes élèves, qui, effrayés par nos formidables bibliographies, croient toujours qu'ils sont venus trop tard dans un monde trop vieux. Or dans tous les domaines il reste plus de besogne à accomplir que de besogne réalisée.

Sept ans se sont écoulés depuis la publication par Eugénie Droz du *Recueil Trepperel* (Paris, E. Droz, 1935, in-8°). Malheureusement il est resté incomplet, seul le premier volume *les Sotties* ayant vu le jour. La diligente éditrice en a promis deux autres, l'un consacré aux Moralités, l'autre aux Farces, mais la guerre n'en a évidemment pas favorisé l'éclosion. En fait de découvertes récentes relatives à notre ancien théâtre comique, je ne veux pas manquer de rappeler celles que fit Aebischer aux Archives de Fribourg et qu'il a publiées dans diverses revues.

Le recueil dont je vais parler a été vu ou plutôt aperçu par Mademoiselle Droz, qui en dit ceci à la page lvii de son Introduction :

Il y a lieu d'intercaler ici trois séries inconnues qui forment un recueil, conservé dans une bibliothèque privée. Ce volume, trouvé en même temps que le *Recueil Trepperel*, est d'un intérêt capital et il sera impossible de parler de la farce, en tant que genre littéraire, avant que ces pièces soient publiées. Je les ai examinées, trop rapidement à mon gré, à une époque où je n'avais pas encore l'espoir de publier le *Recueil Trepperel*, de sorte que je n'ai pu me livrer à aucune identification d'imprimeur, ni copier les textes.

Ce recueil est d'un format un peu plus petit que ceux que nous venons d'énumérer, il est imprimé en caractères gothiques de trois sortes, ce qui permet d'établir trois séries différentes.

Suit une liste très sommaire et pas toujours exacte, qu'il y a lieu de remplacer par celle que j'ai faite sur l'original, qui m'a été laissé

pendant tout le temps nécessaire à la copie (mais non à la collation) par un aimable "connoisseur," le baron Vitta, lequel l'a ensuite vendu à Lardanchet, le libraire de Lyon. La place me manque pour la reproduire ici, d'autant plus qu'elle comporte, comme il convient, une brève analyse des cinquante-trois pièces du Recueil.

On se contentera de déposer ici des conclusions sur trois points importants qui en résultent : I, Chronologie ; II, Localisation ; III, Types.

I. Chronologie. Les pièces paraissent avoir été imprimées vers 1540, mais l'on ne peut rien en conclure quand à leur date, car on sait que certaines farces du Moyen-Age l'ont été jusqu'au début du XVII^e siècle.

Dans la Farce LIII, Maulevault, parlant des gueux qu'il a connus, mentionne La Hire (1390-1443) :

Dictes moy, n'ouistes vous oncques
Parler des beaux faits de La Hire.

Dans la *Résurrection Jenin* celui-ci dit :

J'ay vu tous dis le povre Alain

—vers où il ne peut s'agir que d'Alain Chartier (1386-1449). La mention du *Jeu de Broche en cul* paraît se rapporter à une scène d'un Mystère inédit de la *Résurrection*, (seconde moitié du XV^e siècle) que j'ai publiée dans mon article sur *la Scène de l'Aveugle et son valet* (*Romania*, 1912).

Si, comme le veulent Louis Cons et Richard Holbrook, le *Pathelin* est de 1464, la farce XLIV qui y fait allusion, semble-t-il, est postérieure :

Si tu vieulx et si parleré
Breton ou picard . . .

dit Gaultier, quand, faux prêtre, il se propose de recueillir la confession de Thierry. Le "Je luy feray manger de l'oue" du Savetier de la farce XXXIII pourrait être un autre référence à la célèbre comédie du trompeur trompé.

Une allusion précise à Maistre Henry, c'est-à-dire Henry Cousin (cf. Pierre Champion, *François Villon*, II, 339), qui fut bourreau de Paris entre 1457 et 1479, nous reporte pour la farce XLII peu après la mort de celui-ci :

Si maistre Henry ne fust mort,
Nous fussions piéça despechés

dit Coquillon (allusion aux Coquillards dont fit vraisemblablement partie l'auteur du *Testament*), le maraud, prisonnier de Justice.

La Farce xiv présente une mention explicite de la bataille de Montlhéry livrée par le futur Charles le Téméraire à Louis XI le 16 juillet 1465:

Pensez qu'il en fist plusieurs rendre
La journée Mons le Hery.

Toutes ces allusions à des événements qu'il est possible de dater ou à des personnages dont la biographie nous est suffisamment connue nous ramènent à la deuxième moitié du xv^e siècle et en serrant les faits de plus près dans les années 80 à 90. Ceci nous est confirmé par des références à des pièces du *Recueil Trepperel*, par exemple, *Le Temps qui court*, dans II, et surtout dans notre même première farce, à Maître Mouche et à Triboulet:

Est ce point Maistre Mouche?

.....

J'ay beu une quarte d'ung traict
Aussi bien que fist Triboulet.

Une autre référence, cette fois dans la pièce xxviii, à Dando Maréchal nous renvoie au même recueil. Trubert, le mari trompé, y dit:

Et certes je suis bien Dando,
Dando, mais plus que Dandinastre.

D'autres allusions à Thenot (cf. *Répertoire*, p. 121) dans la farce iv, au povre Jouan dans la farce xxv, à Grantgosier le buveur, type qu'adoptera Rabelais et dont je découvre ici la première mention, ne permettent pas de datation aussi précise.

II. Deuxième point: Localisation.

Dans la farce iv les mots "Irons-nous sur Navarricus?" ne peuvent guère se rapporter qu'au Collège de Navarre à Paris; la librairie des Augustins, nommée dans ix, est parisienne aussi, mais la pièce LIII est à cet égard décisive. Lisez plutôt:

MAULEVAULT

.....

..... se l'aventure

M'avenoit et mon ancestrure

Seroit du tout renouvelée

Et seroit Greve relevée

Saint Innocent et Petit Pont.

PAIN PERDU

D'où je vien? Je vien d'Avignon.

POU D'ACQUEST

Or devisons mes mignons
Qu'on dit de beau parmy Paris.

MAULEVAULT

On le vent à chariotées
En Greve et aussi aux Halles.

POU D'ACQUEST

Et je vy passer ung bateau
Auprès de l'isle Nostre Dame.

PAIN PERDU

Car le maindre est com je suppose
Beaucoup plus grosse qu'ung groseil
Ne la *pierre de Mauconseil*
Ou du Palays lyez ensemble.

.
Où en chacune a ung clocher
Grant comme les tours Nostre Dame.

PAIN PERDU

Où trouverons-nous au Chasteau?

MAULEVAULT

Y a il ame?

POU D'ACQUEST

Je cuyde que lui [le clerc] et la dame
Comptent ensemble du Chasteau.

POU D'ACQUEST

Tu me dis pas se les sergens
Passent par cy qu'ilz nous trouvassent
J'auroye grant peur qu'ilz nous menassent
En Chastellet sans arrester.

POU D'ACQUEST [au Clerc du Château]

Or ne te chault se je te treuve
De cest an ne de l'autre en Greve

.
Cuide-tu estre bourgeois de la cité
Ou escollier de l'Université?

.
Je vous feray par les sergens
Au Chastellet mener tout droit.

PAIN PERDU

Nous sommes d'une nation
Tous trois et si me font cecy.

Ce pourrait être une exception, mais la pièce précédente, la *LIII* nous ramène aussi au centre de Paris.

ROLHIART [mendiant]

Je te jure par saint Martin
Que aujourd'hui à ce matin
Allé m'en suis à la grant sale
Du grant Palais et puis aux Halles
Vu que trouver ne te povoye
Et en passant parmy la voye
Arté(?), me suis emmy la place
Icy tout droit dessus me masse
Querant pour povre loqueteux

Le nomme le célèbre cabaret de La Pomme de pin, le *Champ Gaillard*, et "les enfans de Beauvais," c'est-à-dire le Collège. *XLIX* joue sur la *table de marbre* qui est celle du Palais et parle de la Halle et des Quinze Vingt. En *XLVII* Bontemps chemine dans Paris, tandis que dans *XLVI* la Bragarde va à Bagnolet et à Saint Germain des Prés, à Saint-Mery, à Boulogne et la Theologienne à Montmartre, au Pèlerinage de Saint-Maur et à l'Hôtel Dieu. *XLIV* parle des "tours Nostre Dame," du tertre de Mont Valérien, des Quinze Vingt et du Parlement. *XLII* est plus précis encore :

SOUD'OUVRE

Et moy j'estoie encore jeun
Au matin ainsi qu'on se lieve
Entre le Port au fain et Greve,
Entre ses chantiers de busches
Trois sergens estoient en embusches
Qui m'enpoignerent au collet
Et me menerent au Chastellet,
Vela comme je fus prins.

XXXVIII, *XXXIX*, nous orientent aussi vers Paris. *XXXIII* nomme le Petit Pont, *XXIX* Charonne, *XXVIII* Bagnolet, Clamart, Gentilly, Meudon, Baigneux, qui sont ces environs de Paris où nous avons coutume d'aller encore le dimanche. La Farce des Fauconniers (*XXVI*) s'y situe aussi de même que la *XXV*^e à cause des Saints Innocents. Dans *XXII* Bietrix invite Fricquette :

Veulx tu point venir au Palais
Et puis sur le Pont Notre Dame

puis parle ailleurs du Pont de Neuilly, tandis que dans *XX* la Femme invoque devant le Juge l'ordonnance du Prévôt de la Porte

Bodès prescrivant que le mari obéisse à sa femme.¹ L'espace me manque pour prouver, mais mes preuves seraient aussi évidentes, que XVIII, XVII où Guillemette se propose un pèlerinage à Notre Dame des Champs, XVI où Alison déclare avoir étudié aux Jacobins, aux Carmes, aux Augustins, aux Mathurins et aux Cordeliers, et qui parle du Cardinal Lemoine, XV qui mentionne saint Innocent, et X, Saint Gervais, IV qui invoque Notre Dame de Montfort, et III, le Petit Pont, II Charolles, et I le clocher de Saint Jean, ressortissent non moins à *l'inclyte Lutèce*.

III. Les Types.

Ainsi pour la plupart des pièces peu de doutes sur la date 1480 à 1490 et sur leur provenance parisienne, mais il reste à préciser quels milieux elles concernent, pour quels acteurs elles ont été conçues : Enfants sans souci, Clercs de la Basoche, Écoliers des Collèges de l'Université de Paris ou comédiens professionnels.

Les Clercs de la Basoche auxquels H. G. Harvey vient de consacrer un ouvrage² peuvent entrer en ligne de compte pour certaines pièces où la table de Marbre et le Palais sont nommément cités ; pour d'autres l'abondance de références à des collèges parisiens fait pencher pour leurs Écoliers, mais mon attention a été plus attirée par les références à Dando Mareschal (XXVIII), Maistre Regnault (XVI), Alison (XVI) qui subsistera dans la Comédie du XVII^e siècle, Maistre Gonin, qui figure aussi dans le Dialogue II du *Cymbalum Mundi*, Godin Falot, Maistre Aliborum (VI), Thenot (IV, V, XXV), Maistre Mymin (IV), le pédant bravache, Ganache (III), Maistre Mouche (I), Gilbert Cochet (L), Guillaume du Sepulcre (XLIX), Bon Temps (XLVII), le Goguelu (XLV), Turlupin (XVII), le Franc Archer (XIV), Gaultier Gargille (V), Jenin (I), Roger Bontemps (I), povre Jouan (XXV), Triboulet (I).

Autant de noms, autant de types ou plutôt d'"emplois," apparentés à ceux de la Comédie italienne, ou au théâtre comique français du XVII^e siècle (Gaultier Garguille, Turlupin, Alison, Gros-Guillaume), susceptibles de transformations sociales, professionnelles, morales, mais confiées originellement à un acteur unique

¹ "Le Heaume de la Porte Baudet" lit-on dans les Comptes de la Sainte Chapelle, Bibl. Nat. fonds français 2239. 2, cité par Pierre Champion, *op. cit.*, I, 125, note 5.

² Howard Graham Harvey, *The Theatre of the Basoche*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941.

aimé du public, qui tient à applaudir sous divers déguisements son favori.

A cet égard j'insiste surtout sur Dando Mareschal et Maistre Aliboron qui figurent déjà dans la Sottie IX du *Recueil Trepperel*, *Sottie des Sots qui corrigent le Magnificat à cinq personnages* (avant 1488). De son côté Triboulet nommé en corrélation avec Maistre Mouche est ce capitaine des Sots dont on prépare les prétendues obsèques dans les *Vigiles de Triboulet* (vers 1480), x^e sottie du *Recueil Trepperel*, et qui est certainement un farceur célèbre comme Rossignol, autre acteur des *Vigiles*, et quant à Maître Mouche, il apparaît comme le patron de Triboulet.

Ainsi nous sommes amenés par le recueil inédit à reviser notre conception du théâtre comique français au xv^e siècle, à le considérer comme plus professionnel et évoluant nettement vers la création de types analogues à ceux de la comédie italienne à laquelle il a peut-être servi de modèle et à ceux de la comédie française ultérieure dont l'identité des noms (Alison, Gaultier, Garguille, etc.) prouve qu'il a inauguré et déterminé la tradition.

GUSTAVE COHEN

Yale University

FIVE NOTES ON THE TEXT OF VILLON¹

Le Lais xxx: Item, je laisse aux hospitaux
 Mes chassiz tissus d'arignee,
 Et aux gisans soubz les estaux,
 Chascun sur l'œil une grongniee,
 Trembler a chiere renfrongniee,
 Megres, velus et morfondus,
 Chausses courtes, robe rongniee,
 Gelez, murdris et enfondus.

Villon does not express in these lines a "conventional medieval brutality." They reflect instead the poet's own determination to make his way by any means and his contempt for the "gisans soubz

¹ [Professor Cons, who had promised some notes on Villon for this issue, unfortunately had not put them into shape at the time of his death. Through the kindness of Mrs. Cons and of his secretary, Mr. Milton Crane, however, we were given access to part of this material, and we here present it in necessarily inadequate and skeletal form with thanks to them for making it available. The text of Villon used is that of the Longnon-Foulet 4th ed., *CFMA*, 1932.]

les estaux" who lacked the courage and boldness to become criminals like himself.

Le Testament 337-340: Ou est la tres sage Helloïs,
 Pour qui chastré fut et puis moyne
 Pierre Esbaillart a Saint Denis?
 Pour son amour ot ceste essoynie.

Essoynie in this instance has the specific meaning of "mutilation." Cf. Du Cange, s. v. *sunnis*: *exoniare corpore*; see *mehaignast ou exoinast du corps*.

Le Testament LXXXVIII: Je luy donne ma librairie,
 Et le Rommant du Pet au Deable,
 Lequel maistre Guy Tabarie
 Grossa, qui est homs veritable.
 Par cayers est soubz une table;
 Combien qu'il soit rudement fait,
 La matiere est si tres notable
 Qu'elle amende tout le mesfait.

Since the description of Tabarie as "homs veritable" is patently ironic, the contents of this strophe must be viewed with suspicion. In any case the existence of an early "Pet au Diable," assumed by most authorities, must be questioned.

Le Testament CLXVIII: Item, donne aux amans enfermes,
 Sans le laiz maistre Alain Chartier,
 A leurs chevez, de pleurs et lermes . . .

The second line must mean "in addition to the *Lais* of Alain Chartier." MS *O* and Levet read *Oultre*.

Le Debat du Cuer et du Corps de Villon, 41 ff.:
 Veulx tu vivre?—Dieu m'en doint la puissance!—
 Il te fault . . .—Quoy?—Remors de conscience,
 Lire sans fin.—En quoy?—Lire en science,
 Laisser les folz!—Bien j'y adviseray.—

"Science" in the third line means "theology" (cf. Lacurne de Sainte-Palaye and Littré). It is probable that Villon wrote this *Debat* partly in order to curry favor with the ecclesiastical authorities and thus obtain his release from prison. The interpretation of "science" as "theology" would support this theory.

† LOUIS CONS

THE DISTANT LOVE OF JAUFRÉ RUDEL

While it is generally recognized that the ancient biography of Jaufré Rudel is little more than a fanciful and charming pseudo-historical romance, derived in large measure from his own verses, nevertheless many modern students have been unable to resist the temptation—against which Olin Moore long ago warned us (*PMLA*, **xxix**, 1914, 518)—of rejecting the Provençal *vida* only to attempt themselves to reconstruct the poet's life from his works. Thus it has come about that in modern times his fabulous, far-away "comtessa de Tripol" has inspired not only the most lyrical of poets, but also, unhappily, the prosiest of scholars. We find Monaci asserting, for example, that in the space of six short poems Rudel could hardly have been writing to two different women (*sancta simplicitas*!): there must have been only one, and that one for various reasons he would identify with Eleanor of Aquitaine. Jeanroy, on the other hand, believes that two different loves must be involved, one real and accessible, the other ideal and far-away. For Appel, the distant one may even have been a truly *erdenferne Liebe*, none other than the Blessed Virgin Mary herself; for Vossler she may be a literary echo of Ovid's Helen; whereas for Casella this love has a purely spiritual existence, and the lady is "una visualizzazione intensiva, una rassomiglianza . . . del suo stesso amore."¹

Usually the *jeu d'esprit* that consists in trying to identify the ladies of the troubadours is a harmless, albeit fruitless diversion, but in this case I think it has led to a somewhat serious misinterpretation of the poet's meaning and purpose, for the phrase *amors de terra lonhdana* taken by itself and without reference to the *vida* seems naturally to refer not to the Countess of Tripoli, not to Eleanor of Aquitaine, the Blessed Virgin Mary, Helen of Troy, nor

¹ Cf. G. Paris, *Mélanges de litt. fr.*, ed. Roques, 498 ff. (original article, 1893); Monaci, *Rendiconti della Reale Acc. dei Lincei*, serie V, 2, 1893, 927 ff.; Appel, *Archiv* **cvi**, 1901, 338 ff.; Vossler, *Sitz. d. K. Bayer. Ak. der Wissenschaften, Philos.-philog. Kl.*, 1918, 133 ff.; Jeanroy's second ed., *CFMA.*, 1924, iii ff.; M. Casella, *Archivio Storico Italiano*, **II**, 1938, 153 ff. Casella brushes away the realistic elements that others find in the poems by assuming that the poet's dreams result in illusions at times or are filled with objective images (p. 172-3). He even finds evidence (186-7) of an intensive intuition of spiritual love in the line "Que'l cors a gras, delgat e gen" (I, 12).

to a purely spiritual passion, but to the poet's love of a distant land, i. e. the Holy Land, here personified, or represented figuratively, as love of a far-away mistress.

An analysis of the poem, "*Quan lo rius de la fontana*," with this interpretation in mind resolves many of its apparent difficulties. After identifying his song with the spring-time music of brook, budding eglantine and nightingale, the poet tells us that his love of a distant land makes him sad and that he can find no cure for his sadness if, because of the attractions of a more human passion (*ab atraich d'amor doussana*), he fails to heed this love (*si non au vostre reclam*). In other words, his soul will not be saved if desire for a woman of flesh and blood prevent him from going to the Holy Land, a thought that should be compared with that at the end of his "*Quan lo rossinhols el folhos*" where he says that he leaves his lady gladly since he goes seeking his spiritual welfare, nor can he understand how those who do not follow God into Bethlehem will ever achieve salvation. In the third stanza he writes that as the opportunity to satisfy his zeal for the Holy Land is denied him, it is not to be wondered at that he is aflame with desire, for never was there fairer Christian, Jewess or Saracen than his far-away love; a man who gains something from such a love is indeed fed with manna (i. e. those who go on this Crusade shall have the spiritual sustenance of *Exodus* XVI). His heart, he says in his fourth stanza, never ceases to desire that which he most loves, and if lust should now rob him of his love, then, he believes, his will-power would be betraying him, for the grief which is cured by the joys of love is sharper than a thorn; in that case he would not wish others to pity him. The poem concludes with an *Envoi* in which Rudel sends his verses without benefit of parchment to be sung by Filhol (probably a jongleur) to Hugh the Brown of Lusignan, and in which he says it pleases him that the people of Poitou, Berry, Guienne and Brittany delight in his love.²

Now why should this poem have been sent to Hugh of Lusignan

* "*S'esgau per lei (licis)*" is the reading of the seven best MSS and only three poor ones have *lui*, the version adopted by Jeanroy. As Monaci and others have rightly held, *lei* must be the correct version and can only refer to the poet's love. If one adopts *lui*, the reference must be to Hugh, and why four provinces should delight in him is not clear unless Rudel is saying with poetical exaggeration that the dominions of the King rejoice because Hugh has enrolled as a crusader.

and why should a reference to these provinces form its conclusion? We know little of Hugh, but we do know that the members of the house of Lusignan were vassals of the Count of Poitou and that this Hugh VII was among the first to take the Cross at Vezelay in 1146.³ As to the provinces, the only reason which has been advanced for this mention of them is that of Monaci, namely, that they belonged to the domain of Eleanor of Aquitaine. But Berry and Brittany formed no part of her domain until after her marriage to Louis VII, and then of course all four provinces belonged to the King of France.⁴ Indeed it may be that our poet intended nothing more by his words than a fairly inclusive reference to France, such as Marcabrun voiced when he wrote:

Mas Franssa, Peitan e Beiriu
Aclina un sol seignoriu. (XXII, 55-56)

However, it is well known that after the Second Crusade was officially launched at Vezelay on March 31, 1146, the King with his wife began a tour through his estates, collecting funds and attempting to arouse enthusiasm for the projected voyage to Jerusalem. He was especially successful in Poitou and Guienne,⁵ and it would not be surprising if Rudel in addressing a vassal of the Count of Poitou and one who had recently enrolled as a crusader should mention the zeal of this part of the realm. Similarly, the reference to Berry may be attributable to the fact that it was at Bourges, the capital of Berry, that the King first solemnly revealed to his barons his determination to go to the rescue of the Christians in Syria. Brittany's role in the Second Crusade is somewhat obscure, but it is established that St. Bernard through his secretary invited the counts and barons of Brittany to take the Cross, writing: "Nolite deserere solum Regem vestrum, Regem Francorum, imo

³ See Suger, *Vie de Louis le Gros*, etc., ed. A. Molinier, Paris, 1887, p. 159. A letter has been preserved from Hugh to Suger promising to inform him about affairs in Poitou through a certain Wiormand. See *Rec. des hist. de France* xv, 486. On connections between the house of Lusignan and the Counts of Poitou, see A. Richard, *Hist. des Comtes de Poitou*, Paris, 1903, I, 157 ff. and Index.

⁴ Cf. A. Richard, *op. cit.*, II, 52 ff., 57. Appel, *op. cit.*, 339 says that Brittany did not belong to her dominion either before or after her marriage.

⁵ Richard, *op. cit.* II, 84 ff.

⁶ On Christmas Day, 1145. See Lavissee, *Hist. de France* III, 1, 1902, 11 ff.

Regem coelorum," and that St. Bernard's influence was especially potent in the province at this time.⁷

It would seem appropriate therefore that Jaufré Rudel should send a poem about his *amors de terra lonhdana*, his longing to participate in a crusade, to a man who had recently taken the Cross, adding that he was happy certain provinces of the kingdom of France were responding to the call for crusaders. Significantly enough, another poem by Rudel, "Quan lo rossinhols el folhos," has always been recognized as connected with the Second Crusade and indeed as one of the very few surviving poems associated with it.⁸ If the present interpretation of "Quan lo rius de la fontana" is correct, then this poem too was inspired by that undertaking.

Moreover, the famous "Lanquan li jorn son lonc en may" should likewise be placed in this group, in my opinion, for here the re-occurring phrase "amor de lonh," like "amors de terra lonhdana" in "Quan lo rius," can best be understood as a reference to the poet's longing for a distant land translated and personified in terms of a human passion. Thus in the second stanza Rudel says at once: Be tenc lo Senhor per veray / Per qu'ieu veirai l'amor de lonh, "I hold Him indeed for my true Lord, Him through whom I shall see my distant love," and wishes that he had been a pilgrim there where the eyes of his love (the Holy Land) might have beheld his staff and cloak. He desires to be lodged near his love, however far

⁷ Migne, *P. L.* 162, col. 671-2. In the First Crusade, Alain Fergent, Duke of Brittany, had been among the very earliest to take the Cross (B.-A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, "Les Papes et les Ducs de Bretagne," *Bibl. des Ecoles franç. d'Athènes et de Rome*, fasc. 133, Paris, 1928, I, 20). On the rôle of Brittany in the Second Crusade, cf. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, *op. cit.* I, 21 and Watkin Williams, *Saint Bernard of Clairvaux*, Manchester, 1935, 268. St. Bernard had personal relations with Duchess Ermengarde (d. 1147) and her son, Duke Conon III (d. 1148), and it was owing to him that so many and such rich Cistercian abbeys were founded in Brittany. See A. de La Borderie, *Hist. de Bretagne*, Rennes, 1906, III, 42, 189 ff.

⁸ The only poems usually associated with the Second Crusade, besides Rudel's "Quan lo rossinhols," are Marcabrun's *Romanza* ("A la fontana del vergier") and an anonymous French song ("Chevalier, mult estes guariz," ed. Bédier-Aubry, *Chansons de Croisade*, p. 3). Cf. Lewent in *Rom. Forsch.* XXI, 1908, 337, 339, 419. To these Jeanroy (*Poésie lyrique des troubadours* II, 205, 299, 331) would add Marcabrun's "Empereire per mi mezeis" (ed. Dejeanne, XXII), although Boissonnade (*Romania* 48, 1922, 222) and Appel (*ZRP* 43, 1923, 411 ff.) more plausibly date this poem in 1137 or 1138, rather than in 1146.

away he is now, and yet, he tells us, if ever he could see his *amor de lonh*, he would leave this distant love sadly and yet rejoicing. Note that *gauzens* in line 22, "rejoicing," is both courteous and comprehensible if the distant love be a reconquered Jerusalem rather than a human mistress. In the fifth stanza, this *amor de lonh* is said to be better than any other: its worth is so true and pure that for its sake, the poet affirms, he would be willing to be called a captive there in the land of the Saracens. May God give him the strength—as he has the will—to see his distant love truly, in such wise that room and garden may ever resemble a palace to him. (This appears to mean merely that he hopes to be strong enough to reach the Holy Land and to envisage any hardships there as advantages.)

Whether the next ten lines (43-52) belong to the poem in its original form is problematical. I should be inclined to reject them: the last three are in only two of the fourteen manuscripts and the other seven occur together only in these two and two others, although a few of them appear in isolation in three further manuscripts. If authentic, however, they would indicate that no other joy so pleases the poet as his distant love, but that somehow he is prevented from attaining his desire. Whether, as these lines suggest (and cf. "*Quan lo rius*," l. 15), some temporary obstacle prevented a journey to the Holy Land, we do not know. We are fairly certain, however, that he eventually achieved his wish since Marcabrun's poem, "*Cortesianen vuoill comenssar*," is addressed "*a'n Jaufré Rudel outra mar*" and Marcabrun hopes the French will enjoy his verses.⁹

The fact that Rudel is linked by Marcabrun with the crusade and with the French fortifies the hypothesis suggested above. In any case, on the evidence of three of his poems,¹⁰ it would seem that

⁹ Ed. Dejeanne, xv. Boissonade, *op. cit.* 228, who dates this poem in the latter part of 1148, shows that considerable time elapsed between the departure of Louis VII and the arrival of the various crusading units in the Holy Land. It may be that one or another of the delays en route constituted the obstacle of which Rudel seemingly complains.

¹⁰ The three other poems of Rudel (III, IV, VI in Jeanroy's edition) seem to me to have no connection with the Crusade. Although VI is sometimes placed with the poems which sing of a far-away love, its light, jesting tone, so unlike that of I, II and V, recalls rather that of the *Devinalh* ("*Farai un vers de dreit nien*") by Guillaume IX, as G. Paris, Jeanroy and Hoepffner have suggested. (Paris, *Mélanges*, 522 ff.; Jeanroy, ed.

the poet ardently longed to go to the Holy Land and that his far-away love was no lady of flesh and blood, but the ideal of so many men of the Middle Ages who sought, whether as pilgrims or crusaders, eternal salvation there where "on conquiert Paradis et honor et pris et los et l'amor de s'amie." Why the later Provençal biographer interpreted these poems fancifully and, accepting the poet's own words, translated the spiritual longings of the crusader into purely human terms is readily comprehensible: he lived at a time when the spirit of the early crusades was long since dead, but when, as in all times, the romance of a poet dying in the arms of the lady of his dreams was vital and lovely. Playing upon phrases taken from the poems, he wrote an appealing tale, one whose influence has been as potent through the ages as the verses that inspired it.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that most scholars have always been aware of some sort of contrast in Rudel's poetry: between fact and fiction, waking and dreaming, flesh and spirit, the real and the ideal. Perhaps, however, in writing of him and especially of other troubadours, they have not sufficiently remembered that even the "real" loves of the troubadours must be subject to suspicion. Many a modern poet writes love lyrics compounded of emotions that are at once realistic and idealized. With how much more reason must this have been true of mediaeval poets! Wandering from court to court, or sending their verses to be sung by jongleurs before different courtly circles, they had to make their poems acceptable to varying potential patronesses. Moreover, intricate conventions both of form and matter must have imposed heavy restrictions upon them at all times. Whether any residue of "reality" remains in verses written in such circumstances is necessarily difficult to determine. It should also be remembered that the professional poet, however "realistic" or "idealistic" he may have been by nature, might conceivably write more than one type of love-poem. To the

1924, p. vi, note 2; Hoepffner, *Romania* LXIII, 1937, 99-101.) Curiously enough, Casella seems to find no difference of tone in this poem and thinks the poet has here given us "un' imagine spirituale di se stesso" (p. 172). Here, as elsewhere, it is this critic's effort to base all of Rudel's poetry—as well as that of Guillaume IX—upon the philosophy of Augustine, to schematize their works and view their poetry isolated from that of all the other troubadours, which vitiates certain of his otherwise sensitive interpretations.

wife of a noble patron he doubtless had to be reverent rather than intimate. Writing a song for general distribution, he might sing of some lady, real or presumptive, in more fleshly terms, and this with a change of *tornada* or *senhal* might on occasion serve either his own purposes or those of the jongleurs who ever came to him begging for new compositions.¹¹ If then we do not assume a real love-affair for every modern love-lyric, how incredibly naive it is to attempt after the lapse of some eight hundred years, and with only pseudo-historical romances to guide us, to identify the ladies of the troubadours. Similarly doomed to failure, it seems to me, is such an effort as Casella's, that is, to reduce poems written in varying circumstances and by poets as essentially unlike as Guillaume IX and Jaufré Rudel to the same Augustinian formulae. The problem, with the mediaeval as with the modern poet, is not so simple as that. In the case of Rudel's distant love, at any rate, we seem to have good reason for distrusting both the biographical and aprioristic approaches.

GRACE FRANK

Bryn Mawr College

FATHER AND SON IN PROVENÇAL POETRY¹

The object of this study is to deal with one verse in a troubadour poem, the correct explanation of which I failed to find almost forty years ago, and which I have found—or, at least, hope to have found—quite recently.

The verse to which I refer belongs to a Provençal Crusade Song. Its author is Elias Cairel, a far-traveled troubadour, whose restless spirit led him as far as Hungary and Greece; an echo of these wanderings is to be found in our poem (*Gr.* 133, 11). After an exhortation addressed to Christendom in general to reconquer the Holy Land, and even Cairo, the capital of Egypt, he directs the crusaders to go by Hungary and Greece, and, on their way, to help the Empress Yolenta, whose throne, which was that of the Latin Empire, was in danger. He has indicated the same itinerary as that followed, almost 20 years earlier, by the Christian armies who had

¹¹ Cf. also Scheludko, *Neuph. Mitt.* xxv, 1934, 1 ff.

¹ This article reproduces—slightly changed—a paper read at the 1941 meeting of the Modern Language Association in Indianapolis.

started from Venice, on what is called the fourth crusade. In the last stanza the poet turns to one of the most prominent monarchs of that time, Frederick II, Emperor of Germany. Before being crowned, Frederick had promised the Pope to undertake a crusade shortly after his succession to the throne of his father, Henry VI, who himself had died in the midst of gigantic preparations for such an expedition. It is known that Frederick again and again postponed the fulfillment of his promise—for which reason he was anathematized. It is to this promise that the troubadour alludes in the last stanza (vi), which contains the verse in question:

Emperor Frederick, I tell you that a vassal has undertaken to work his own damage if, having promised aught to his liege lord, he abandons him in the great emergency. Therefore, I would ask you and tell you in my song to cross over to the country where Jesus Christ chose to die, and do not disappoint him in this affair, *for it is not good that herein the father should wait for the son.*

The Provençal text of the line in question runs: *E ges lo filh no·i deu atendre·l paire*. When I first edited this poem for my doctor's thesis,² I interpreted the line to read . . . *atendr'e·l paire*, translating: "For the father *and* the son must not wait in this affair." Father and son, of course, were to be understood in the religious sense of God the Father and the Son of God, both of whom were equally interested in the liberation of the Holy Land. But then the text should rather be: *quar ges lo filhs non deu atendre ni·l paire* instead of *e·l paire*; and to substitute *ni* would be to give the line one syllable too many.

A strange explanation of this verse is ventured by Andresen (cf. Wittenberg, *Die Hohenstaufen im Munde der Troubadours*, p. 57, note 6) who interprets it: "for never shall the son (Frederick) herein pay attention to the father (Henry VI)": in this way the attitude of Henry toward crusades is supposedly censured. But there is no historical foundation for such a reproach addressed to Henry VI; on the contrary, as we have just seen, he died while preparing for just such an expedition.

This explanation, however, stands apart; all my critics had agreed with me on the one point that there was a religious meaning involved in this verse. The interpretation offered in the translation of the stanza given above ("It is not good that herein the

² *Das altprov. Kreuzlied*, Erlangen 1905, p. 114.

father should wait for the son") was first suggested by Emil Levy, in a long letter written to me; this was accepted by Schultz-Gora in the "Literaturblatt" XXVII (1906), p. 291, and finally, by the editor of Elias Cairel's poems, Hilde Jaeschke.³ Schultz-Gora added a further explanation: Jesus Christ is the father and his sons are men—in this particular case, the Emperor Frederick. That the 'Father' could refer to Christ is, according to Schultz-Gora, substantiated by the fact that in the Middle Ages Christ is often confused with God the Father (this point is treated at length by L. E. Wels in "Theologische Streifzüge durch die altfranzösische Literatur," Vechta, 1937, ch. II). But the question still remains: why does the poet lay such stress on the Emperor's being a son of God—a title he must share with all other Christians?

In a poem of Bertran d'Alamanon, another troubadour, there might seem to be confirmation of such a title given to the German Emperor; in this poem⁴ which deals with the political conditions of the time (of the German Interregnum) it is proposed that the two competitors for the crown should fight for it in personal combat; the stanza in question ends: "That one will be called Son of God who will have won the victory in the field." But probably the poet meant to say by this only that the ordeal proposed by him would prove that the victor was protected by God—was a true son of God. I have not been able to discover either in imperial documents of that time or in historical books the slightest indication that such a title was actually borne by the German Emperors; the reason is still to be found why, in the poem of Elias Cairel, Frederick should have been represented by a title which every Christian was entitled to bear.

According to a remark in Miss Jaeschke's edition of Cairel's poems, the opinion was held by Appel that some proverb must be at the root of the troubadour's words. In this connection Miss Jaeschke draws our attention to an expression of Cato's: *Parentes patienter vince* which appears in the Old French translation as *Veindre ton pere voilles e sormonter Par suffrance et par mesure*. But I fail to see how this distich can apply to the line in the Provençal crusade song; and Miss Jaeschke herself was forced to confess that she was unable to find a proverb which might explain the verse of her poet.

³ *Der Trobador Elias Cairel*, Berlin 1921, p. 164.

⁴ Ed. Salverda de Grave, Toulouse 1902, p. 54.

In the chronicle of the Albigensian crusade, edited by Paul Meyer (1875-79), there is a passage (ll. 3959 ss.) which will perhaps throw some light upon our problem. It deals with one of those descriptions of warlike activity in which a great number of persons participate, and reads as follows:

Ladoncs viratz sautar e correr e destendre,
laüs d'els evas l'autre e cridar et contendre,
c'anc no-i remas lo paire per lo filh ni pel gendre,
que los murs e las portas van debrizar e fendre.

"Then might you have seen people jumping, running, rushing, shouting to one another and vying together, and never would the father have stayed behind for the son or the son-in-law: they broke and shattered the walls and doors." In a note added to the translation in Vol. II, the editor of the chronicle refers to two similar passages, the first of which is from the same work (ll. 1186-87):

Plus foron de CCC, c'us so par non atent,
ans van a Carcassona qui plus pot plus corrent.

"They were more than three hundred, none of whom waits for his companion, but they rather go to Carcassonne however quickly they can." The second passage occurs in the "History of the Taking of Damiette":

E·l filh non agardava lo payre, ni·l payres lo filh.

"And the son did not wait for the father nor did the father for the son."

The meaning of this expression is obvious: If you say that different persons who are to work at the same task do not wait for one another to begin it, you mean to say that each of them is in the greatest hurry to do his share of the work. This interpretation is corroborated by additional expressions such as are found in the last example: *qui plus pot plus corrent*.

The two examples quoted from the Albigensian chronicle may be matched by others from that epic, which the editor fails to mention:

1)

E·lh baro de Tholoza se son anat garnir,
que l'us no aten l'autre c'armas posca sufrir.

(ll. 7357-8).

"And the barons of Toulouse have gone to arm themselves, and they do not wait for one another to bear weapons."

2)

E li autre s'en eison per miei los pons corrent,
cavalers e borzes, e arquer e sirvent,
e tuit passeron l'aiga que negus no s'atent.

(ll. 7494-96).

"And the others go quickly out over the bridges, knights and citizens, and archers and servants, and all of them cross the water without waiting for one another."

3) The citizens of Toulouse are summoned to construct new fortifications and to strengthen the old:

Ladoncas van a l'obra aisi cominalment
que·ls paires ni las maires ni li filh ni·lh parent,
l'us no espera l'autre ni·l pobres lo manent

"Then they set to work in common, so that none of them—fathers and mothers, sons and (other) relatives—waits for the other, nor the poor man for the rich."

This manner of indicating the hurry and eagerness with which a group of persons set to work was known also to Old French; in Tobler-Lommatzsch I, 631,30 s. v. *attendre* one finds the following quotation from the chronicle of Guillaume Guiart, who is describing a general flight: *A briez moz, nul n'atent la per*: "in brief words, no one waits for his companion." The reader is referred by Lommatzsch to the volume which is to contain the word *per*—as if to suggest that there will be other examples of the same kind of expression (though in Godefroy's dictionary of Old French not a single example is offered).

The following two examples will no doubt also prove helpful:

- (1) Et cil respont: "Il s'en vont la devant;
ja pevent estre siz liuees avant;
il n'i attendent ne cosin ne parent; *
de lor somiers ont laissiés ne sai quans."
Dit Auberis: "Il fuient voiremant . . ."

Garin le Loh., ed. du Mériel, l. 3908

- (2) Li doncel saillent qui orent en la mer,
n'i a celui qui attendist son per.

P. Meyer, Alexandre le Grand I, 246, l. 206 *

* The editor puts commas before each of the two *ne*'s, obviously considering *ne cosin ne parent* as in apposition to *il*. But *ne cosin ne parent* is the object of *attendent*.

* This example was indicated to me by Professor Alfred Foulet of Prince-

Moreover something of the kind still exists in modern French. Littré quotes (I, 232 a, n°. 6) from Corneille's "Le Cid": *Un coup n'attendait pas l'autre*, 'les coups se succédaient sans interruption.' I may add another example from Victor Hugo's "Les Misérables" (II, v, ix): *Un mot n'attendait pas l'autre*.

All these examples, especially those taken from Old Provençal, clearly show, it seems to me, that Elias Cairel, in opposing father and son, was not creating an individual stylistic device, but was using a phrase which was already at hand in his own tongue. Indeed it was a rather frequent procedure among the Provençal poets when making an assertion about a species, to split this, as it were, into two contrasting parts, thus emphasizing that any exception to the assertion is excluded. For example, the fact that all men must die is expressed by Giraut de Bornelh (*Gr.* 242,26 = Kolsen n°. 74; II, 1): *C'oi non es om altz ni bas Que per la greu mort non pas*, "There is no man, high or low, that has not to pass through grievous death." Here the species 'man' is divided into persons of high and low estate, in order to show that neither of these groups (i. e. none of the whole species) can escape death. The use of such an expression makes the assertion more concrete and stronger than would the unimaginative numeral 'all'—in such a sentence as "all men must die." Another poet, Aimeric de Belenoi, in expressing a similar idea, divides mankind into the small and the great (*Gr.* 9, 6 = Dumitrescu, p. 112-III, 5): *Als petitç es als grans Es naisers e morirs e perirs comunals*, "the small and the great have birth and death, salvation and perishing, in common." The author of the Albigensian chronicle, too, avails himself of the same device: *E juro·lh del castel e paubres e manens* (l. 1723); "and those of the castle, the poor and the rich, swore it"; (l. 7853): *E can iran essems li filh e li pairon, Entre·ls brans e las massas farem tal chaplazon . . .*, "and when the sons and the fathers (i. e. all of them) will be going along, we shall make such a carnage with swords and cudgels. . . ."

This example is particularly for our purposes. It shows how this manner of expression has gradually become a merely mechanical

ton University. [Cf. *L'Histoire de Gille de Chyn*, ed. Place, 2457-9: *Fuiant s'en vont tertrez et vaæ. Li uns l'autre n'atendi. A soi garir cascuns tendi*. On O. F. "antithetische Formen der Aufteilung": *li bas et li haut, li juene et li vieil*, cf. Tobler-Lomm. I, p. xiv.—L. S.]

device, devoid of its original sense: it can hardly be supposed that the detachment of the enemy to be attacked should consist only of fathers and sons! Moreover, the example offers the same contrast of father and son that was contained in the line of Cairel, and in the first passage cited from the Albigenian epic.

However the effect which is achieved in these two first examples by the device of 'splitting a group' is quite different from that apparent in the passages just quoted; in the verse of Giraut de Bornelh and those that follow the unity of the group or species is not really affected by the division; on the contrary, the splitting of the group or species only serves to emphasize its *uniformity*. But with the examples of the first type, though the members of a group are represented as taking part in the same action, still they participate not in an equal, but in an individual manner. If the poet says that in constructing fortifications of a town the father does not wait for the son to begin his work, he suggests to the reader that each person helping in that defense work does so according to his personal gifts and readiness. In such a case, then, I dare say, the splitting of the group or species means *differentiation*.

This method of contrasting members of the same group or species seems to me an excellent means of depicting their eagerness and competitive haste in setting to work. There is something dynamic in it that excellently fits the style of an epic poet. Indeed, all the examples which I could find of this sort of expression come out of epic poetry, the Albigenian chronicle being nothing but a series of contemporary events presented in the form of an epic poem,—of a *Chanson de Geste*. So, the phrase of the father not waiting for the son has the flavor of a popular saying. In so far, Appel was right. But, it seems to me, it is not based on a proverb, as Appel thought, but is one of those epic formulae in which the *Chansons de Geste* abound. At any rate, it can be supposed to have been well known to every one of the listeners of Elias Cairel's Crusade Song, and this troubadour, employing it in a religious poem, raised it out of its epic rigidity. That Elias Cairel, in his solemn song, meant his line: *Quar ges lo filh no-i deu atendre-l paire* to be interpreted in the religious sense of God the Father and the Son of God, there is no doubt whatsoever. But, clothing his religious thought in a well-known epic formula, he reached a double aim: he very efficiently put before the Emperor's eyes the

figure of God the Father and emphasized at the same time the urgency of his holy expedition. Or from the viewpoint of style, Elias Cairel, combining a religious thought with a Chanson de Geste expression, gave that religious thought a worldly, chivalric nuance—and in general the crusade songs naturally offer that mixture of religious and worldly things. At the same time, the poet revived a rather worn, stereotyped epic formula into a new poetical life.

KURT LEWENT

New York City

"POZOS DE NIEVE"

(NATURAL REFRIGERANTS IN SPAIN AND SPANISH AMERICA,
1500 TO THE PRESENT)

In the seventeenth century the use of *nieve* (meaning snow and/or ice) to chill drinks was widespread. Allusions to it abound in the *comedias* and in other poetry and verse. Julio Monreal in 1878¹ noted the fact in passing. Édouard Barry² adduced the earliest known testimony to ice-cooling, that of Pero Mexía; in his *Diálogos* (1547) he mentioned the custom and remarked that thirty years before "no había los extremos de agora, ni las invenciones de los salitres, ni nieves, ni los pozos, ni sótanos buscados en los infiernos." It remained, however, for Miguel Herrero-García to present a detailed and well documented account of the snow trade.³ He was able to describe the various methods of cooling drinks, by evaporation or by snow.⁴ He traced the growth of refrigeration in Spain from the days when it was a rich man's luxury till it was adopted by every class of society. About 1610 a Catalan, Pablo Xarquies, organized the ice trade in Madrid on a large scale, and he and his

¹ *Cuadros viejos*, Madrid, 1878, p. 209 and note 2. Monreal cited Tirso's *Marta la piadosa* and an *Epístola* of Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola.

² Edition of *El burlador de Sevilla*, Paris, 1910, note to line 851.

³ *La vida española del siglo XVII*. I, *Las bebidas*. Madrid, 1933, pp. 145-176 and *Apéndices*.

⁴ It is of some interest to observe that the snow or ice was never put directly into the liquid. Melted snow was regarded as dangerous to health. Either the snow was packed around the container, or was itself placed in a bottle and lowered into the liquid.

heirs ruled it till 1645. Xarquies in Madrid, and other contractors in Granada, Lisbon, Seville, Murcia, Valladolid, Toledo, etc., brought the price within reach of the poorest. In summer even workingmen used snow regularly. Yet it is recorded that Carlos II spent 6,082 *maravedies* a day on snow for the royal household.

Most of the documents cited by Herrero-García concern the storage of *nieve* in the city (*pozos de nieve* for the dealer, private *pozos* or *paja* in the home), and the conditions of dispensing it. On the snow's journey from mountain to town we know little. It was transported on muleback, that is clear, since in 1642 the minor heirs of Pablo Xarquies complained to the city fathers of Madrid that they could not obtain "recuas y cabalgaduras en que conducir desde las sierras y ventisqueros a esta Corte nieves y hielos," and they asked to be allowed to commandeer seventy "cabalgaduras mulares" for the purpose. The *alcaldes* of Madrid granted them only forty.⁵ During the stay of Felipe IV in Sanlúcar de Barrameda in 1624 "traíanse cada día seis cargas de nieve de Ronda, en cuarenta y seis acémilas, repartidas en diferentes puestos, con que no paraba la nieve en ninguno."⁶ These witnesses do shed some light on the method of carrying the frozen water long distances: from the Sierra de Ronda to Sanlúcar is perhaps ninety miles, and from the Serra da Estrella to Lisbon⁷ about 120. But one would be glad to know more about the mountain end of the *nieve*: how many men were kept at the source of supply, how the stuff was packed for transportation (in *serones* covered with *paja*?), and whether it lay over nights, or was kept moving night and day, as one may infer from Pedro Espinosa's sentence above.

At the same period snow-cooling was practised also in Lima, Peru. Professor Irving A. Leonard has called my attention to passages in Juan Antonio Suardo's *Diario de Lima*.⁸ They are not widely known, and I give them in full:

II, 10-11: (Feb. 5, 1634) mataron a un negro, a medio día, cerca de la plaza; dicen que fué a caussa el concursso extraordinario que huuo a comprar nieve, por haver carecido della muchos días muchas perssonas en

⁵ Herrero-García, *op. cit.*, Apéndice 27.

⁶ Pedro Espinosa, *Obras*, ed. R. Acad. Esp., Madrid, 1909, p. 204. Cited by Herrero-García, 150-151.

⁷ Cf. *El burlador de Sevilla*, ed. E. Barry, line 851; ed. A. Castro, line 847.

⁸ *Diario de Lima de Juan Antonio Suardo* (1629-1639), 2 vols., Lima, 1936; ed. Rubén Vargas Ugarte.

esta corte, sin embargo de que el señor Conde Virrey ha dado muy discretas órdenes en orden a la repartición della, para que se haga a tiempo y con quietud y de manera que todos la alcancen.

II, 12: (Feb. 18, 1634) por continuar todavía la falta de la nieve y estar esta ciudad muy fatigada por los excesivos calores, Su Excelencia, por su decreto, mandó bolver al pregón el abasto deste género.

II, 13: (Feb. 28, 1634) y último día de Carnestolendas sobre la repartición de la nieve hubo competencia de palabras entre los alcaldes ordinarios, don Joseph de Rivera y don Fernando Altamirano y el señor Alcalde de corte mandó llevar preso a la cárcel a Gabriel Ordóñez, persona que tiene a su cargo el abasto de dicho género, pero aviéndose dado cuenta del casso al Señor Conde Virrey que a la sazón estava en la chácara de Andrés de Rojas con la señora Condesa, passando la tarde, le mandó soltar y que se repartiase nieve a toda la ciudad.

II, 14: (March 4, 1634) sobre la repartición de la nieve, a medio día, hubo muchas cuchilladas.

II, 64: (Jan. 25, 1635) la Justicia ordinaria mandó prender en sus casas con guardas a don Fernando de Avellaneda y a Alonso Bravo como fiadores de Gabriel Ordóñez en quien se remató el abasto de la nieve por no dar el necesario conforme tiene obligación, y al susodicho le mandaron depositar en el banco quatro mil patacones para traer a su costa nieve.

II, 65: Este día (Jan. 29, 1635) como a las doce, estando repartiendo nieve el alcalde ordinario don Antonio Gelder de Calatayud, cargaron tantos negros que para poder salir fué necesario que los alguaciles y porteros sacasen las espadas, de que resultó herir a algunos negros y ellos empezaron a tirar piedras, y con una de ellas dieron un golpe al dicho alcalde ordinario en un hombro, y a un alguacil otro en un labio de que quedó muy mal herido, y a los demás ministros dieron muchos mojicones y prendieron a cuatro de los dichos negros, y luego *ipso facto* sin dilación alguna el dicho alcalde ordinario los mandó sacar por las calles acostumbradas y dar a doscientos azotes a cada uno.

II, 69: (Feb. 17, 1635) el alcalde ordinario, don Pedro de Vega, prendió en las Casas de Cabildo al Doctor don Diego Mesía de Zúñiga, abogado de esta Real Audiencia, con dos guardas por haber la noche antecedente quebrado las puertas de las cassas de la nieve y sacado un tercio de ella por fuerza, y los señores del Tribunal de la Santa Inquisición advocaron luego la causa en sí por ser el dicho Doctor don Diego, Ministro del dicho Tribunal.

II, 98: (Sept. 13 1635) por decreto de su Excelencia se pregonó una nueva Cédula de su Majestad en que manda que se venda por cuenta de su Real Hacienda el abasto y estanco de la nieve para esta Ciudad con muy grandes prehemencias y exempciones para la persona que lo comprare.

II, 104: (Nov. 8, 1635) se remató el abasto de la nieve por cuenta de su Majestad en ocho mil y doscientos patacones cada año por seis y con veinte mil pesos adelantados, habiéndose primero consultado el negocio por el señor Virrey en el Real Acuerdo de Hacienda.

The lively diarist reveals that in Lima of the 1630's this branch of the art of gracious living flourished. *Nieve* was a necessity, not a luxury, and it was worth drawing a knife for. Suardo does not add to our knowledge of the means of transportation. The distance from Lima to the snowfields can only be conjectured; it can hardly have been less than one hundred miles.

All the data I have thus far cited refer to the period before 1650, and Herrero-García did not pass beyond it. There is no reason to suppose that the ice trade ceased after that date. The *Voyage d'Espagne . . . fait en l'année 1655*⁹ has this to say: ". . . sur le poitrail de son cheval estoient attachez . . . deux fourreaux de cuir bouilly où, au lieu d'armes, il avoit des bouteilles de vin qui se rafraîchissoient par la glace qu'il y mettoit lorsqu'il les remplissoit; c'est pour cette raison qu'on nomme ces estuits de cuir-bouilly, *refreadores*." Mme d'Aulnoy in 1691 spoke of "eau glacée."¹⁰ The British Minister at Madrid, Alexander Stanhope, noted on Sept. 5, 1691, that the Queen was ill by reason of "eating lamb frozen with ice, which gave her a violent colic."¹¹

By the eighteenth century ice-cooling had ceased to be a novelty and no one bothered to mention it. Such at least is the inference I draw from the lack of allusions to it in the eighteenth and nineteenth.¹² Yet it does seem strange that the *costumbristas* should have passed in silence over the ice-trade when their *retratos* embraced almost every known type of Spaniard.¹³ The barest mentions in Larra, "agua de nieve" (*La fonda nueva*, 1833) and "leche helada" (*En este país*, 1833) may show that it existed, but an Englishman did testify that snow was cheap in his day, as we

⁹ Paris, 1665, ch. 36. Foulché-Delbosc plausibly ascribed this work to Antoine de Brunel.

¹⁰ *Relation du Voyage d'Espagne*, ed. R. Foulché-Delbosc, *Revue Hispanique*, LXVII, 1926, 480-481.

¹¹ *Spain under Charles the Second*, London, 1844, pp. 22-23. For this reference and other aid I am indebted to my colleague Professor R. K. Spaulding.

¹² Professor C. E. Kany's *Life and Manners in Madrid, 1750-1800*, Berkeley, 1932, contains no references to *nieve*.

¹³ Besides the well known writings of Larra, Mesonero, Serafin Estébanez and Antonio Flores, *Los españoles pintados por sí mismos* (Madrid, 1851) portrays 98 types, including *El aguador*, *El choricero*, *El portero*, *El ventero*, *La patrona de la casa de huéspedes*, etc. Any one of these could have brought in the matter of *nieve*, but none did.

know that it was under Philip IV.¹⁴ Mesonero Romanos adverted casually to the *pozos de la nieve* still existing in the old spot at the end of the Calle de Fuencarral.¹⁵ We know that mountain ice was used in Mexico at the same period.¹⁶

So far as Madrid was concerned, ice probably continued to be brought in on mule-back, or possibly with the aid of railways after they came in use. Refrigeration by ammonia or by carbonic acid began commercially in the 1870's and 1880's.

I will remind the reader that in the early nineteenth century cutting and shipping of ice was a great New England industry. Clipper ships laden with Maine ice packed in sawdust sailed to India, South America and California. This commerce reached its height in 1850-1870. After that, competition from Norway and artificial ice broke it down.¹⁷

Pozos de nieve still exist in some sections of South America. Sr. Luis Hernán Tejada-Flores, a Bolivian engineer, informs me that the hot agricultural valley of Los Yungas (elevation 6000 to 4000 feet) imports ice by automobile truck from the 14,000 foot *cumbre*

¹⁴ Richard Ford, *Gatherings from Spain*, new ed., London, 1851, p. 143: "Cold liquids in the hot dry summers of Spain are necessities not luxuries; snow and iced drinks are sold in the streets at prices so low as to be within the reach of the poorest classes."

¹⁵ "La calle de Fuencarral termina por su derecha con la extendida posesión donde están los *pozos de la nieve*." *El antiguo Madrid*, Madrid, 1861, p. 287.

¹⁶ George F. Ruxton, *Adventures in Mexico and the Rocky Mountains*, New York, 1848, p. 26: "The cuisine, being Spanish, was the best in the world, the wine good, and abundance of ice from Orizaba." He was writing of Vera Cruz, the year was 1846.

¹⁷ Interest in methods of transportation, of which we know so little for the pre-rail era, leads me to relate a curious incident that occurred in California in 1851. In September of that year the ice-ship failed to reach San Francisco on time. Heat in the Great Valley was intense, as usual. A Sacramento stage driver, "Baldy" Hamilton, gambled on the shortage. He drove a wagon-train ninety miles to Echo Summit in the Sierra Nevada, loaded the caravan with snow "packed in sawdust and green boughs," and with twenty armed guards started back to Sacramento. On the way down he was offered seventy-five cents a pound for the snow, but he rejected the bid, hoping to obtain a dollar a pound in the city. On his arrival in the capital he learned that the belated Boston shipment had arrived, and his snow could only meet its prices. He lost \$20,000 on the venture. (Edmund Kinyon, in the *Grass Valley Union*; quoted by The Knave, *Oakland (California) Tribune*, Sept. 28, 1941.)

of the road to La Paz. The countryfolk of the outlying villages buy the ice in 50-pound blocks called "panes," pack them in hay and bury them in the ground. Similarly, in New England, use of natural ice persists in localities where proximity to ponds brings the price below that of the artificial product.

University of California, Berkeley

S. GRISWOLD MORLEY

THE BEGINNINGS OF FRENCH FIXED WORD ORDER

The difference in word order between Latin and Romance (or more precisely French) has been the object of many studies, some of which I have already discussed.¹ I have called attention to the twofold character of the problem. On the one hand, the customary arrangement of the Latin sentence: subject, object, verb, was gradually replaced in the Old French period by that of modern French: subject, verb, object.² On the other hand, the creation of fixed word groupings, a condition almost unknown to Latin, and specially characteristic of French, is directly connected with the passing of Latin into Romance in the VIII-IXth centuries. It is one of the phenomena that disrupted the umbilical cord which still connected the new *lingua romana rustica* with the mother tongue.

These fixed groups center around the two fundamental elements of speech: the noun and the verb. The first group to be thus formed was that of the noun. As a starting point for this new development,

¹ E. g. "On the Origin of French word order," *Romanic Review*, February 1939.

² Examples of the latter order in the Latin period are mostly either irrelevant or deceptive. A passage like the following: "*Cui respondit Dominus: Qui peccaverit mihi delebo eum de libro meo; tu autem vade et duc populum istum quo locutus sum tibi; angelus meus praecedet te. Ego autem in die ultionis visitabo et hoc peccatum eorum*," Exodus, xxxii, 33-34, which Grandgent (*Introduction to Vulgar Latin*, 51) cites as an indication that a Romance order of words was already in existence in the fourth century, shows, on the contrary an order which is neither Latin nor French. Jerome was well aware of its strangeness when he said, Ep. LVII, v, that the order of words in the Bible is mysterious, but must not be interfered with.

we may consider the greatly extended use of *ipse* or *ille* which had come to represent merely a sort of syntactical accentuation.³ As evidence of this increased use, which is very noticeable in the texts from the sixth century on, is the fact that there are about four times as many occurrences of the demonstrative adjective in the "Liber Historia Francorum" (ca. 730) than in the "Historia Francorum" (ca. 580) and more than thirty times as many occurrences in the "Rule" of Chrodegang (ca. 750) than in that of St. Benedict (ca. 550) written in Italy.

But besides this numerical increase, another important event is taking place. The demonstrative, when subordinated to the function of the syntactical accent (that is to say, having no real demonstrative value, but merely serving to make the noun stand out), tends always to precede the noun directly. In its full, emphatic value, however, it practically always follows. Thus *ipse*, which was a purely accentuating particle, regularly preceded: *ad ipso monasthrio fuerat concessa*; *ipsi agentis memorato Drogone*; *ipse Drogu*; *ipsa villa*; *de ipso Magnoaldo*; *ipsi Magnoaldus*; *apud ipso Berechario*; *ipsi agentis*; *ipsius vero Drogone*; *apud ipso Magnoaldo* (Lauer & Samaran p. 19, an. 697). Also in such stereotyped constructions as *in eo*, *illo*, *hoc tempore*, *anno* etc. (cf. *hoc anno* = O. F. *oan*), the demonstrative, without exception, precedes the noun in the "Liber." This phenomenon is comparatively recent, for it is not to be found in the Vulgate, in the "*Peregrinatio*," or in Gregory of Tours—in fact, not before the end of the seventh century. But in the emphatic demonstrative function, *ille*, without exception, follows the noun. A functional value is thus given to word-order: in the extreme cases of non-demonstrative value and unaccented demonstrative function, the demonstrative always precedes; in the extreme cases of demonstrative emphasis, it always follows. It seems clear therefore that in the former case, it has become a sort of secondary accent of the noun, similar to the accent on the initial syllable of a polysyllabic word. The noun, no longer rhythmically self-sufficient as it was in classical Latin, has all the more need of an adjunct, a sort of spring-board for the full effect of its increasing stress accent. The rhythmical element must have been an important cause in the production of this phenomenon: by the eighth century it has be-

³ See George Trager's thesis, *The Use of the Latin Demonstrative*, New York, 1932, p. 185 + passim.

come a general procedure to place the demonstrative, whatever its character, directly in front of the noun, whereas, from a purely functional point of view, the distinction earlier arrived at would seem a useful one to maintain. First *ille* is attracted into the fixed pre-position:⁴ "*Illa media pars cleri qui seniores fuerint annis singulis accipiant cappas novas. . . . Et illa alia medietas cleri illas veteres cappas quas illi seniores annis singulis reddunt accipiant et illi seniores illas cappas quas reddere debent non commutent*" (Chrodegangi Regula, ca. 750, Migne, 89, 1113); then follows *hic haec hoc*. The exceptions are of interest: the new emphatic (*il*)*lui*, (*il*)*lei*, taking the place, in the Merovingian formulae, of the "*Titius*," "*Maevius*" (John Doe) of Roman legal usage always follow: *ille venerabile lui* (so-and-so) *norae suae lei* (Marculf. Chrest. p. 192), and this needs no explanation. Again, *iste*, being for a while the emphatic synonym of *hic*, will also follow the noun: *hanc donatione ista* (Tardif, 59), *contra hanc epistola donationis ista*" (*ibid.* 68), a word order which survives in Spanish: *el hombre este*; and by analogy, *el hombre ese*, *el libro aquel*. And now the tendency towards fixed order extends to the new demonstrative-possessive *illorum* (*eorum*, *ipsorum*) that served to replace *suus* when the possessor is plural. Before the death of Charlemagne, the progress in the pre-position of *illorum* is manifest. The capitularies of the Frankish Kings for the first half of the ninth century will provide the best evidence, on account of their practical social and political character and their predominantly oral use which the drafters must never have lost sight of. In no. 73 (811), which is a short capitulary in ten paragraphs, out of eleven cases of the possessive *illorum* only two are placed after the noun: "*abbates et eorum advocati potestatem non habeant de eorum tonsis clericis . . . similiter et comites de eorum pagensis non habeant potestatem*" . . . (MGH, *Leg. Sect.*, II, 1). In No. 151 (*ib.* II, 2) of the year 825, all cases of *illorum* (*eorum*) in the possessive function (11 examples

⁴ Cf. Mario Pei, *The Language of the Eighth Century Texts in Northern France*, p. 198: "Only one case of *ille* following the noun against hundreds when it precedes." Notice that this same fixed order appears in all the genuine texts of the period, in the *Formulae*, the original documents of Tardif and Lauer and Samaran, in the original lives of the saints, *Vita Vedastis*, *Vita Eufronie*, *Vita Wandregisili*, in the *Polyptych* of Irminon etc. This shows it to be a fundamental evolution.

in 25 lines) appear before the noun; there is not a single case of post-position.

Note that for the same period, the Italian documents in the same collection are not so advanced (and, in regard to *illorum* = *loro* will never be). In no. 165 (825), although the demonstrative precedes in every case, the position of *illorum* is divided almost equally, four after, three before the noun (cf. It. *il loro libro*, *il libro loro*).

As the years go by, the possessive itself is attracted into this fixed grouping. In the French document no. 187 (*ib.*), the eight possessive adjectives appearing in the first 38 lines all precede the noun, while the three possessives appearing in the last 20 lines all follow; the possessive *illorum* precedes the noun in the section where the possessive precedes and follows where the possessive follows (three cases of each). In no. 196 (829), the possessive *illorum* used twelve times precedes the noun in every case.

In regard to the order of words, the Oaths of Strasbourg continue and confirm this evolution: demonstrative and possessive always precede. In fact, to my knowledge there are no cases of postposed demonstrative, and relatively few of postposed possessive, to be found in French. By now (ixth cent.) the new rhythm sufficiently rooted in the noun will complete itself by the creation of the group around the other basic word, the verb.

The entering wedge for the creation of the verb group appears to have been the fixing of the position of the pronominal adverb *ibi*. Classical Latin already used *unde* and *inde* as relative and personal pronoun respectively. The series was completed by the easy but necessary passage of *ibi* = "there" to *ibi* = "to it," apparent at this period: *De locis dandis ad claustra canonicorum facienda, si de eiusdem ecclesiae rebus fuerit, reddatur ibi* (= to the church) . . . (MGH CRF, I, 141, 819 p. 289). This adverb, relatively new in the pronominal function, is clearly the first to join the verb in a fixed order, so true is it that a new element is necessary to crystallize a tendency. This feature is to be observed best perhaps in the polyptych of Irminon (806) and those of Saint Peter of Corbie and Saint-Maur, on account of their practical, homely character. Besides the numerous *Habet ibi* (Sp. *hay*) we find many *Sunt ibi* (v. g. p. 283 Guérard 1844), *Solvunt ibi* (p. 284), *Dedit ibi* (p. 129), which order is without exception at the beginning of a sentence. But if an accented word begins the sentence, *ibi* will pre-

cede the verb: *si ibi cavaticarii* (p. 286), *ceteri coloni qui ibi se addonaverunt* (p. 290) *ut ipsum silentium . . . ibi servari possit* (p. 318). The only loose point would be in the inverted order *ibi se*.

In the case of *inde* (= *en*), however, regularity is not achieved so completely. By the side of the numerous *Facit inde* (v. g. p. 3), *Fodit inde* (p. 209), *Donat inde* (p. 209), *Solvit inde* (p. 149) (and, as can be expected, *Sed iste nihil inde facit* [p. 219], *Sed iste nihil inde reddit* [ib.]), one finds, exceptionally, it is true, *Inde facit* (p. 67), *Ipsi ministeriales habent inde singuli breves* (p. 306), *Inde sunt testes* (p. 159) and even *Et quicquid inde decimum edcreverit* (p. 326).

This different treatment may be explained by the fact that *inde*, like the other personal pronouns, could be either stressed or unstressed. In the latter part of the Vulgar Latin period, we witness the appearance of a series of stressed personal pronouns: *mihi, tibi, lui, lei, nobis, vobis, eis* (v. g. *scias certissime quia et ego mihi . . . volo tradere ad Dei servicio . . . Quod tibi in tantum suppleco . . . ut . . . me ancilla tua ad iugum Dei tradas* (Vita Wandreg. Chrest. p. 224. Cf. Pei, *op. cit.*, p. 167), by the side of the normal or classical pronouns (Cf. Oaths of Strasb. *in quant il mi altresì fazet . . . Deus sabir . . . me dunat*). When accented the pronoun was independent; unaccented, it was ready to fall under the influence of an accented word and be attracted to it. Although, semantically speaking, we feel that there was little in *inde* (= *en*) that could sustain accentuation, nevertheless, accentuation existed, as is proved by the reënforced synonym *exinde*, very frequently used at this period: v. g. *de ebrietate ut primum omnium seniores semetipsos exinde vetent* (= *qu'ils s'en abstiennent* MGH CRF I, p. 153, an. 810), and by traces of the independent use of *en* in the oldest texts: *Et Ewruins ot en grant dol* (S. Léger 63). Similarly may be explained such post-posed groups as, e. g.: *Et Sancz Lethgiers oc s'ent pauour* (S. Léger 76); *Si ala s'en o tout son ost* (Alix. p. 57). Let us note also that *y*, in the pre-position, remains close to the verb in old French: *Ne il n'en i a mes nul tex* (Yvain 1237); *S'il en i eust V setiers* (ib. 3002).

It is not possible to follow the inclusion of the regular personal pronoun objects into the verb group during the first half of the ninth century because of the difficulty of interpreting the function of the personal pronoun, whether as accented or unaccented, since

the superficial correction of the texts has eliminated the Merovingian or Romance forms. Even much later, form alone could not always be decisive in determining the function: *Por quoi/fes le tu* (Yvain 1763), by the side of: *Porquoi m'asals?* (ib. 5130); *S'ait te Deus par sa grant vertu* (Resurrection 37); *La me pues tu moustrer?* (Alix. 13); *l'en ostez* (Yvain 5548); *Au soir appela l'oste et demanda li de la voie* (La Fille du comte de Ponthieu, 4); *Il apiela la dame et li demanda*. Yet the main basis for the verb group is attained by the time of the Oaths of Strasbourg.

A tempting question is why, in the verb group, the verb should have normally come first unless the group began with a word felt as having some sort of an accentuation; such an order is different from, is almost the reverse of, that of the noun group. A tentative answer might be that, besides the fact that rhythm as a live element calls for alternation, there is a semantic basis for normally placing the verb first; this seems to me to be suggested by Marouzeau's interesting studies on the word order in Latin. In Classical Latin the verb was usually placed first when used in an active, affective, dynamic manner, as in the imperative, or in the expression of a present or visualized activity (v. g. *BSL*, t. 38, 1937, xxii). In one short chapter of the *De Consolatione* of Seneca, consisting of less than thirty lines (II, 11), we find: *Vide quantum. . . . Dicet aliquis . . . Fleant . . . et gemant . . . Transeo . . .*, all first in the respective sentences, while in the narrative proper, the verb will more often take its place at the end of the phrase. That the former position of the verb must have been more decisive at this period in which the language served more for active than for contemplative or intellectual purposes is rather evident; this fact helped to determine the relative position of the terms in the fixed word order around the verb.

At any rate, in both aspects of the word order with the verb there were, to a certain extent, preserved and temporarily fixed, in a simplified, stylized and rhythmical manner, the two essential arrangements of words with the verb in Latin: *Falt li le coer, le helme li embrunchet* (Roland 2019); *Vint i Gerins . . . si i vint Berengers* (ib. 795-6).

The system of fixed word order, barely indicated in Latin, thus made its appearance quite unobtrusively in the latter part of the sixth century by fastening together determinative and substantive

in a definite order. The growth was gradual: even as late as the twelfth century, the place of the determinative was not yet absolutely fixed: *Vit venir deiabls mil* (S. Brendan 1466); *Deus ne . . . si ange tuit* (Perceval 394); *de rien nule* (*ib.* 1620); *espée nulle* (*ib.* 3157).

The principle of fixed word order extended more slowly to the ordinary and participial adjective whose position was for a long time unsettled: *e preiad que un menestrel bon li enveiait* (Les quatre livres des Rois [Koschwitz & Foerster, p. 201]); *sun mort amfant* [Alexis 429]; and Saint-Simon will still say: *à joints pieds* (*Mémoires*, t. 4, p. 399, Paris 1856).

This new rhythm which was destined to enjoy an extraordinary growth was introduced at a time when it seems certain that some of the Latin rhythm based on quantity still subsisted in the form of a rudimentary system of *clausulae* (Levillain, *Examen critique des chartes mérovingiennes et carolingiennes de l'abbaye de Corbie*, Paris 1902).

This survival concerning mostly the verb is perhaps cause and evidence that the principle of fixed word order did not affect the verb until after the beginning of the formation of the noun group—as is indicated by the evidence of the texts. In the early part of the ninth century the two poles of the system are established and its growth will henceforth characterize the new language, Romance.

Columbia University

HENRI F. MULLER

PASCAL AND THE MEDIEVAL DEFINITION OF GOD

"Qu'on ne dise pas que je n'ai rien dit de nouveau:
la disposition de matières est nouvelle."

Some years ago in commenting to a class on the *Tiers livre* of Rabelais, I remarked that Panurge's outburst, in the famous passage on debt (Bk. III, ch. IV): "Je me pers en cette contemplation" seems reflected in Pascal's conclusion, the essence of his *frisson métaphysique*: "Que notre imagination se perde dans cette pensée."¹

¹ *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, art. 72. I have not studied the history of *se perdre*, which seems desirable if the comparison is to be regarded as valid.

My object now is to extend this observation to Pascal's well-known definition of the universe which precedes the quotation, given above, in the passage entitled *Disproportion de l'homme*. Here once more the thread that unites the French seventeenth century with the Middle Ages proper becomes apparent, and some remarks on the history of the definition may, I hope, be appropriate to a volume devoted to a distinguished American student of the French classical age.

All of my readers will recall Pascal's magic words:

Tout ce monde visible n'est qu'un trait imperceptible dans l'ample sein de la nature. Nulle idée n'en approche. Nous avons beau enfler nos conceptions, au delà des espaces imaginables, nous n'enfantons que des atomes, au prix de la réalité des choses. *C'est une sphère dont le centre est partout, la circonférence nulle part*. Enfin c'est le plus grand caractère sensible de la toute-puissance de Dieu, que notre imagination se perde dans cette pensée.²

It is obvious that the kernel of Pascal's thought is the phrase: "C'est une sphère dont le centre est partout, la circonférence nulle part"—the antecedent of *c'est* being *la réalité des choses* or *tout ce monde visible*, of which it is said we perceive only an "imperceptible flash."³ As for its origin, Brunschvicg refers us to Havet (ed. I, 17-19), who traced the definition back to Gerson, Bonaventura, and Vincent of Beauvais, the last of whom states (*Hist.* I, 1): *Deus est sphaera, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam*, although Havet attributes the 'idea' to Trismegistos or Empedocles. There the matter rested until Abel Lefranc, finding the formula in Rabelais and Marguerite d'Angoulême,⁴ expressed the view that both of these authors had taken it from Nicolas de Cusa or Marsilio Ficino, because, he thought, Gerson, Bonaventura, and Vincent were scarcely read "dans les milieux lettrés du milieu du xvi^e siècle." While it is true that Marguerite refers to the

—cercle rond sans la circonférence
Par tous costez egal sans difference,

² This, it will be remembered, is continuously inspired by the contrast between the macrocosm and the microcosm. In Rabelais, ch. III, pp. 46 ff., and ch. IV, pp. 51 ff., there is the same progression.

³ I interpret *trait* as *trait de lumière*; cf. *le soleil darde ses traits*, Eng. 'the sun darts forth its beams.' It may, however, include 'line' since the word alternates in the complete passage with *point*, *pointe*, *atome*.

⁴ Lefranc, *Grandes écrivains de la Renaissance*, pp. 170 ff.

which resembles the *Deum circulum, cujus centrum est ubique* of Nicolas (*De ludo globi*) or, indeed, the *Circulus spiritalis, cujus centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam* of Ficino (*Theolog. Platon.*), yet Rabelais, like Vincent and later Pascal, never refers to a 'circle' but to a 'sphere' in the well-known passage in Bk. III, ch. XIII (repeated in Bk. V, ch. XLVIII). He says:

Contemplation de ceste infinie et intellectuale sphaere, le centre de laquelle est en chascun lieu de l'univers, la circonference pointet (c'est Dieu selonc la doctrine de Hermes Trismegistus).⁵

So that the line of descent was never interrupted, from the Middle Ages to Rabelais and finally Pascal. This conclusion is confirmed by the painstaking study of the formula made by Ernest Jovy in 1930.⁶ It is to this work that I now invite the reader's attention.

As Jovy shows, the attribute 'spherical' (Gr. *σφαῖρικός*, Lat. *conglobata figura*) represented to the Ancients "the perfect equality and absolute unity characteristic of God." Examples of the term occur in the writings of Parmenides, Empedocles, Plato (*Timaeus*) and Aristotle (*De Xenophane*).⁷ Hence it comes about that in

⁵ Lefranc's error is in part corrected in the note, p. 106, of the 1931 ed. of the *Tiers livre*. As for Trismegistos, his thirteenth dialogue with the translation by Turnèbe was published at Paris in 1555 (see Jovy, *op. cit.* below), and Symphorien Champier brought out a *Trismegista theologia* now lost. But the original Hermes Trismegistos refers to the Deity only as a 'circle' in a passage which as late as 1630 Rosseli, a Franciscan, glossed as follows (cf. also Voltaire's *Dict. philosoph.*, s.v. "Emblème"):

In hymno tertii decimi dialogi vocat Deum circulum immortalem, id est sphaeram infinitam cujus centrum est ubique quia ubique est, et circumferentia nusquam, quia scilicet loco non concluditur.

Jovy, *op. cit.* below, cites other instances of the same procedure. See also note 8 below.

⁶ Published in his *Etudes Pascaliennes*, VII, the loan of which I owe to Professor Morris G. Bishop of Cornell. As Professor Spitzer reminds me, Friedrich Beck anticipated Jovy in his reference to Alanus in ZRPH 47 (1927), 4 ff., but in connection with Dante's *Vita Nuova* § 12 (*Ego tamquam centrum circuli*), not with Pascal. On the Dante passage, see further J. E. Shaw, *Essays on the Vita Nuova* (Princeton, 1929), pp. 95 ff., and Leo Spitzer, *Travaux du séminaire de philologie romane d'Istanbul*, I, p. 134. Beck quotes the passage from Alanus, but his references to the *Liber XXIV Philosophorum* and Trismegistus must now be controlled by the works I cite below.

⁷ In *Timaeus* 33 B the 'sphericity' corresponds to the model idea; cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* I, 10, who refers us back to Plato. As to Simplicius' commentary on the *Physica* of Aristotle, see note 8.

Boethius (*Consolat.* III, 12, 103) we get the following explicit statement:

Ea est enim divina forma substantiae, ut neque in externa dilabatur, nec in se aliquid ipsa suscipiat; sed, sicut de ea Parmenides ait, πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλλέγιον ὄγκω.

Nevertheless, I believe it remained for Alain de Lille (Alanus ab Insulis) through his contact with Thierry of Chartres and with Cîteaux to give to the definition the form which it currently enjoyed in the Middle Ages and which survives in Pascal. This he did in the *Regulae* [or rather, *Maximae*] *theologicae*, where (Migne CCX, 627) he defines: *Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cujus centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam*, and then comments as follows: "How great a difference there is between the corporeal sphere and the intellectual. In the corporeal sphere the center, because of its smallness, can hardly be said to find itself in any place, and the circumference is considered to be in several places. But in the intellectual sphere, the center is everywhere, the circumference nowhere." Compare Bonaventura (ed. pub. at Mainz in 1609, VII, 325): *Sphaera intelligibilis, cujus centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam*, or Gerson (*Opera* I, col. 366-67): *quoniam tu velut sphaera intelligibilis cuius centrum ubique est, circumferentia nusquam*. The mention in these quotations of the 'intellectual sphere' indicates clearly the line of descent as far as Rabelais' *Tiers livre*. It could hardly have been on Vincent of Beauvais, therefore, that Rabelais drew.⁸

⁸ But Rabelais' reference to Trismegistus raises an interesting point, which I do not undertake to settle here. As C. Baeumker (*Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philos. u. Theol. des Mittelal.*, xxv, fasc. 2, 1928, p. 201; cf. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosop.*, II, eleventh edition, esp. p. 247, and Baumgartner, "Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis," *Beitr.* II, fasc. 4, esp. p. 118) points out, the thirteenth century *Liber XXIV philosophorum*—a pseudo-hermetic treatise—is attributed in two MSS to Termegistus (Trismegistus). It was doubtless used by Meister Eckhart, who must have derived our formula from it. Moreover, Bonaventura [and Thomas Aquinas] in *I Sent.* d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and 3, places the definition under the name of Termegistus (Trismegistus). On the other hand, Albertus Magnus—according to Baeumker—thought the name and the book a fiction and refers us back to the *Maximae theologiae* of Alain de Lille. Whether or not Rabelais knew the *Liber* is doubtful; his reference to *ceste infinie et intellectuale sphaere* suggests that he was drawing on Meister Eckhart, who says (Denifle-Ehrle, *Archiv*, II, 571): *sphaera intellectualis*

At the same time, neither Jovy nor Langlois,^{6*} editor of the *Roman de la Rose*, has noticed that Jean de Meung ingeniously employed his knowledge of Alain de Lille (and Plato) in his account of the Virgin Birth, beginning with verse 19124 of the poem:

Mais, senz faille, il est veirs que cele
A cui li ventres en tendi
Plus que Platons en entendî,
Car el sot des qu'el le portait,
Don au porter se confortait,
Qu'il iert l'espere merveillable
Qui ne peut estre terminable,
Qui par touz leus son centre lance,
Ne leu n'a la circonference;
Qu'il iert li merveilleus triangle

infinita, whereas Alanus, Bonaventura, Aquinas all have *sphaera intelligibilis* (see Baeumker, *op. cit.*, p. 208, n. 8) as against the *Liber*, which reads: *sphaera infinita*. Sneyders de Vogel, *Neophilologus* 17 (1932), 212, holds that Rabelais' source was Bartholomaeus Anglicus, *De proprietatibus rerum* I, 16. But Bartholomaeus reads: *spera intellectualis*, omitting *infinita*. At the same time, de Vogel is right in adding that Symphorien Champier's reference in 1510 to *une esphère inintelligible* owes its origin to the mistaken reading in the 1594 Venetian text of Bonaventura which has *sphaera inintelligibilis*, and which thus must have occurred in some earlier manuscript.

As for Vincent, Professor Ullman has been kind enough to give me the following additional references from his rich collection on Vincent: *Nat.* I, 4—Helinandus: Empedocles quoque sic eum fertur diffiniuisse: "Deus est sphaera, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam. Secundus quoque Philosophus ita: Deus est mens immortalis, incontemplabilis celsitudo, forma multiformis, incogitabilis inquisitio, insopitus oculus, omnia continens lux, bonum, et quid est huiusmodi." [According to Ullman, the quotation from Secundus is probably not from Helinandus but may be Vincent's own since he quotes it also in *Hist.* x, 71; it has frequently been printed, see *Philologus* 18 (1862), 529, and 46 (1888), 393; also Hilka, 88. *Jahrb. Schles. Gesell. vaterl. Kultur*, Breslau, 1910, I, iv.] *Hist.* III, 44—Hic est Empedocles qui sic Deum legitur descripsisse. Deus, inquit, est sphaera cuius centrum ubique et circumferentia nusquam. [Cf. also *Doct.* v, 65, and see Bühler, *Speculum* 12 (1937), 441. The reference to Empedocles probably came indirectly from Simplicius, "Commentary on Aristotle's *Physica*," viii. i (250 b 23), p. 1124, line 1 (Diels, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, x, 1885):

τὸν σφαῖρον ποιῶσαν, δὲ καὶ θεὸν ἐπονομάζει.]

^{6*} See, however, Sneyders de Vogel, *Neophil.* 16, 241, who is inclined to accept Bonaventura as Jean de Meung's source.

Don l'unité fait les treis angles,
 Ne li trei tout entierement
 Ne font que l'un tant seulement;
 C'est li cercles trianguliers,
 C'est li triangles circuliars,
 Qui en la vierge s'ostela.

The manner in which Jean de Meung completes his definition by including the Trinity has its echo later in Marguerite d'Angoulême, who joins to her description of the *cercle* this observation:

Le cercle suys dont toute chose vient,
 Le point ou tout retourne et se maintient,
 Je suys qui suys triangle tres parfaict.
 * * * *

L'eternel Dieu ou n'y a si ne mais,
 Pere puyssant du monde createur,
 Tres saige Filz du monde redempteur,
 Esprit tres saint le monde illuminant,
 Divinité, les troys en ung tenant—

a passage that recalls Dionysius the Areopagite, known to the Middle Ages mainly in the translation of John the Scot and to Marguerite probably in the translation of Ficino (1492). I quote the appropriate passages from the *De Divinis Nominibus* (*Dionysiana*, I, pp. 76, 86, and 223):

Ut in unitate divina, sive superessentialitate, unum quidem est uniprincipali Trinitati * et commune: * *

Et hoc etiam commune et unitum et unum est toti Deitati, omnem ipsam totam ab unoquoque participantium participari, et a nullo iterum nulla parte; sicut rota [punctum] in medio circuli ab omnibus in circulo circumpositis rectis lineis, * *

Sicut quidam aeternus circulus, per optimum et ex optimo et in optimo et in optimum inerrabili conversione circumiens, et in eodum et per idipsum et perveniens semper et manens et revolutus.

It befitted the Neo-Platonizing sixteenth century to portray this idea pictorially, as in the wood-cut¹⁰ of the 1516 edition of the *Perlesvaus*, where the trinitarian triangle needs only to have a circle drawn about it in order to meet the requirements of the case.

* If a text were needed to justify the idea of the triangle or Trinity "blending indistinguishably in the *sphaeros*," the Middle Ages had only to turn to *Timaeus* 53-54, of which John the Scot used the Latin translation and commentary by Chalcidius (see Manitius I, 336); cf. Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said*, p. 340.

¹⁰ Nitze-Jenkins, I, p. 12.

As for Pascal, he doubtless had occasion to consult Mlle de Gournay's edition of Montaigne (1635). That, I think, gave him his lead, for there he read in the preface: "Trismégiste appelle la Déité cercle, dont le centre est partout, la circonférence nulle part." The reference to Trismegistos must have reminded him of Rabelais, whose *Tiers livre*, as I pointed out above, I think he knew. This is, of course, conjecture since Pascal could have derived his definition from one or more of the theological writers at his disposal. But sufficient has been said to establish that the famous definition stems from Alain de Lille. Thence it passed into the *Rose* and the works of Meister Eckhart, Bonaventura, Vincent, Gerson, Marguerite, and Rabelais—and the last named source was available to Pascal.

WILLIAM A. NITZE

University of California, Los Angeles

ANDRÉ GIDE ET LES PROBLÈMES D'INFLUENCE EN LITTÉRATURE

I

Il n'est pas de notion ou d'expression qui, plus que celle d'influence, soulève d'amères controverses et des incompréhensions acharnées entre les écrivains d'une part, les critiques ou les historiens de la littérature de l'autre. La faute en doit sans doute, dans une large mesure, être imputée aux critiques et historiens. Acharnés à sonder les recoins les plus obscurs du passé, ils se persuadent vite que tout a déjà été dit en ce monde et rien ne les chagrine comme d'avoir à saluer, dans une œuvre nouvelle, "prolem sine matre creatam." Ils confondent ainsi plus d'une fois rapprochement et source, affinité entre familles d'esprits et influence effective, antériorité et causalité. C'est évidemment faire grand honneur à tel écrivain d'aujourd'hui, qui ne passe point ses veilles dans la poussière des bibliothèques, que de le présenter comme l'héritier malgré lui de ce que quatre ou cinq littératures ont auparavant pensé. Mais bien des richesses du passé sont pour nous comme si elles n'existaient point, puisque nous les ignorons voluptueusement jusqu'à ce qu'un infatigable biographe découvre que nous les avons pillées sans vergogne. Aucune notion (si ce n'est celle d'évolution,

fréquemment interprétée selon un naïf finalisme imposant au développement des individus et des littératures la traversée d'une série de phases mystiques), n'a causé plus de ravages en histoire littéraire depuis un demi-siècle.

N'hésitons point à prononcer un humiliant *mea culpa*, si cela doit désarmer messieurs les auteurs et les engager, lorsque nous les étudions de leur vivant, à nous consentir sur leurs lectures, sur leurs admirations et leurs méthodes de travail des révélations qui, interprétées avec doute méthodique et saine méfiance, pourraient être des plus précieuses. Jusqu'ici, il en est peu qui n'aient ressenti une légitime irritation devant ces innocents jeux de patience, dans lesquels nous les classons en groupes et en écoles, et leur assignons des inspireurs dont ils seraient les imitateurs, les plagiaires ou les fils naturels, c'est-à-dire spirituels. Il est normal sans doute que les auteurs ou, comme les critiques les appellent avec courtoisie, les créateurs soient comme tout ce qui est créateur ici-bas, femmes par plus d'un trait : ils ont donc quelque chose de l'aimable susceptibilité de ce sexe prétendu faible, dont les bouderies et les colères ont toujours été l'arme la plus efficace. Chacun sait combien il est peu galant de déclarer à une gracieuse compagne, "Comme vous ressemblez à Mme Une Telle," surtout si cette Mme Une Telle n'est ni Cléopâtre, ni la Pompadour, ni Greta Garbo. Il n'est guère moins grossier de proclamer devant un écrivain vivant qu'il a subi l'influence de tel auteur récent.¹ Plus l'influence a été réelle et profonde, plus l'écrivain s'acharnera à la dissimuler, comme la femme cachera plus soigneusement le poids de ses années si celles-ci ont déjà commis quelques outrages difficilement réparables.

Bien rares sont donc les écrivains assez intrépides pour éclairer sans perfidie la critique sur les influences qu'ils ont subies et les lectures qu'ils ont faites, sans craindre par là de prêter à l'historien malveillant ou étroit des armes faciles contre eux-mêmes. Notre siècle en a compté quelques-uns : Yeats, Gide, Rilke. Leur sincérité et leur honnêteté intellectuelle ont même été telles qu'elles risquent

¹ Tout au plus consent-il à admettre qu'on le rapproche d'Eschyle, de Shakespeare, d'Homère, de Goethe ou de V. Hugo. Claudel a rarement dédaigné d'être flatté par le parrainage des deux premiers de ces génies. Jules Romains accepte qu'on le rapproche des trois autres, mais non de Walt Whitman ou de Durkheim. (Voir sa préface de 1925 à la réédition de la *Vie Unanime*, NRF 1926.)

fort d'égarer les sourciers, à la fois érudits et naïfs, à venir. Ils ont affiché leurs admirations littéraires avec ce qu'un moderne appelle à propos de l'un d'eux, "misplaced intellectual loyalty,"² et dérouté ainsi pour longtemps ceux qui s'imaginent que l'on cesse d'être original dès que l'on se nourrit des autres.³

De tous, Gide est celui à qui la critique doit la plus vaste reconnaissance. Cet écrivain, l'un des plus personnels de son siècle, a accueilli avec délectation toutes les influences. Son histoire intellectuelle pourra un jour s'écrire par l'énumération des inspireurs étrangers qu'il s'est successivement donnés (sans parler de ses maîtres français depuis Montaigne jusqu'à Mallarmé) : l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament, Virgile, la métaphysique de Schopenhauer, celle de Fichte et même celle de Leibnitz,⁴ Dante et Heine sont les lectures favorites de sa jeunesse.⁵ La découverte de la vie, au cours du voyage en Afrique du Nord, s'accompagne elle-même de la révélation de la poésie arabe et persane, de l'influence (en vérité fort limitée) d'Oscar Wilde et de la plus puissante de toutes, celle de Goethe. Peu après, ce sera (un peu plus tôt et un peu plus

² L'expression est de Richard Aldington, à propos de Yeats, dans "Farewell to Europe," *Atlantic Monthly*, octobre 1940, p. 519.

³ "Rien de plus original, rien de plus soi que de se nourrir des autres. Mais il faut les digérer. Le lion est fait de mouton assimilé." Cette pensée, qui pourrait être de Gide, est de P. Valéry, *Choses tues*, p. 31.

⁴ Nous avons été à même de questionner Gide sur ces influences étrangères subies par lui et de lui entendre affirmer celles qui pourraient paraître contestables, Fichte par exemple. Gide nous a confié cependant que l'influence de Leibnitz, si elle s'exerça, fut une influence à rebours. Il lut beaucoup Leibnitz, comme il lut Lessing, mais en guise de pensum, et avec l'obstination qu'il a souvent apportée à la recherche de ce qui diffère de lui et de ce qui lui est pénible et rébarbatif.

⁵ Dès ce moment-là, André Walter écrit dans son plan de conduite (*Œuvres complètes*, I, 43) : "Les influences certes nous modèlent; il les faut donc discerner.

Que la volonté partout domine: se faire tel que l'on se veut. Choisissons les influences.

Que tout me soit une éducation."

Gide n'a certes pas tort de dire que presque tout son développement futur était déjà préfiguré dans ses premiers livres. (Voir sa confession à R. Lalou dans le débat sur Gide du studio franco-russe, 5 avril 1930, *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, 20^e série, no. 6.) Ces lignes révèlent dès 1891 quelle forte et courageuse volonté a toujours dissimulée la plasticité sinieuse de Gide.

pleinement que Gide n'a bien voulu le reconnaître), la profonde action de Nietzsche, celle de quelques autres Allemands comme Hebbel, et surtout celle de Dostoïevski. Après 1909, Gide, âgé de quarante ans, se mettra avec acharnement à l'étude de l'anglais et s'annexera une multitude d'écrivains d'outre-Manche et plus tard d'outre-Atlantique : Shakespeare, Keats, Fielding, De Foe, Dickens, Stevenson, Conrad, Meredith, et par dessus tous Blake et Browning. Il se refusera à partager l'admiration de son ami Du Bos pour Henry James, mais s'enthousiasmera pour Whitman et pour Melville, plus tard encore dévorera avec avidité Dos Passos, Hemingway et Faulkner.

En confessant et proclamant tant d'influences diverses, Gide a fait preuve, non de naïve faiblesse, mais de sûreté et de force. Très finement, il a compris que, dans ces contacts intellectuels comme dans certains autres, "there is safety in numbers," et que dix influences se contredisant ou se neutralisant sont plus fortifiantes et moins compromettantes qu'une seule qui risque de tout accaparer. La critique peut à juste titre saluer en lui un grand auteur qui, affecté d'une timidité incroyable et d'une faculté de sympathie prodigieuse, a pu communier avec les pays et les inspireurs les plus divers, sans jamais perdre son âme parce qu'il n'était pas trop avidement préoccupé de la sauver.

Mais une instruction plus précieuse est renfermée dans les réflexions éparées que Gide a, au cours de cinquante années de vie littéraire, consacrées à ces problèmes d'influence, les plus périlleux que proposent nos études. La sagesse mesurée et saine des jugements critiques de Gide ne doit pas nous dissimuler leur originalité ; leur raison nuancée et perspicace, qui a fait de Gide, à ses heures, le premier sans doute des critiques de ce temps, ne doit pas nous empêcher de voir, en ce subtil adversaire des nationalistes maurrassiens et de l'enracinement à la Barrès, un critique de combat. Derrière son apologie persistante de l'influence, on devine plus d'une fois le lecteur agacé de telle petite revue d'avant-guerre où l'on croyait être le plus intégralement national, si l'on se fermait le plus hermétiquement à toute pénétration étrangère. Mais, alors même qu'il fait œuvre de circonstance et parfois de polémiste, Gide atteint à quelques vérités générales et peut-être éternelles, dont maint historien littéraire devrait faire son profit.

II

Tout d'abord, et comme devraient le faire ceux d'entre nous qui, hommes de cabinet eux-mêmes, se représentent tous les grands auteurs comme des Chateaubriand ou des Flaubert, composant à coups de fiches et puisant à de gros in-folios, Gide qui a beaucoup lu, trop lu sans doute,⁶ met au premier rang les *influences vécues*, et non les influences livresques :

J'ai beaucoup réfléchi à cette question des "influences" et je crois que l'on commet à ce sujet de bien grossières erreurs. Ne vaut réellement, en littérature, que ce que nous enseigne la vie. Tout ce que l'on n'apprend que par les livres reste abstrait. N'eussé-je rencontré ni Dostoïevsky, ni Nietzsche, ni Blake, ni Browning, je ne puis croire que mon œuvre eût été différente. Tout au plus m'ont-ils aidé à débrouiller ma pensée. Et encore ?

Une femme aimée ou rêvée, la conversation d'un ami, la contemplation d'un nuage rosi par le soleil couchant, telle réflexion d'un garçon de café ou d'une femme de ménage (les lettres de Katherine Mansfield sont des plus révélatrices à cet égard) peuvent compter beaucoup plus, dans le mystérieux processus de la création littéraire, que la lecture de Shakespeare ou de Balzac. Mais, comme de telles influences ne sont qu'exceptionnellement et que très malaisément saisissables, l'historien des lettres préfère leur assigner la place de vagues inconnues, et s'en prendre aux autres, qu'il croit pouvoir mieux connaître.

Parmi les influences livresques proprement dites, les réflexions gidiennes nous amènent à distinguer plusieurs espèces. C'est d'abord l'influence mal assimilée qui se traduit par l'imitation pure et simple d'un modèle. C'est la plus fréquemment étudiée, et de beaucoup la plus négligeable, puisqu'elle ne s'exerce guère que sur les auteurs inférieurs ou sur les moins bonnes œuvres des auteurs originaux. Pour le reste, l'emprunt lui-même a peu d'intérêt, à moins qu'il n'ait été transformé, approfondi, repensé, donc à moins que la personnalité de l'influencé n'ait joué son rôle enrichissant. On devine que cette *influence par imitation* ne retient pas longtemps la curiosité de ce maître de la sincérité qu'est Gide. Il sait mieux que nul autre quelle est l'effrayante puissance de l'imitation dans la vie, et même de cette pâle imitation de nous-mêmes à laquelle nous nous livrons paresseusement après un certain âge.

⁶ Voir sur ce point ses aveux, *Journal* (Pléiade, 1939), pp. 1124, 1265

"Certains êtres" écrit-il dans son *Journal* (p. 1054) "traversent la vie sans éprouver jamais un sentiment vraiment sincère; ils ne savent même pas ce que c'est. Ils s'imaginent aimer, haïr, souffrir; leur mort même est une imitation." De telles imitations ne paraîtraient pardonnables à Gide que comme des étapes juvéniles vers le grand idéal hellénique et nietzschéen: devenir celui que nous sommes.⁷

Autrement captivantes sont les natures sur lesquelles l'influence agit *par réaction, par protestation*, influences à rebours que nos disciplines n'étudient guère, et cela est dommage. Si l'on se modèle parfois sur ceux que l'on aime, il arrive aussi que l'on exaspère sa différence pour mieux s'opposer, l'un à sa femme, l'autre à un ami, le troisième à un collègue ou à un aîné.⁸ Qui dira combien Gide a dû, en bien ou en mal, à vouloir se dresser contre Barrès, ou combien le tragique angoissé de Mauriac s'explique par son désir de faire un roman catholique qui ne soit pas le roman à l'eau de rose de Bazin ou le roman bien-pensant à la Bourget? Ces influences à rebours sont souvent de toutes les plus fortes. On sait que nombre de jeunes gens orientent dans un certain sens leur vie entière, parce qu'ils veulent éviter de répéter les erreurs ou les ridicules de leurs parents. Repousser une influence est encore un moyen détourné mais infaillible pour la subir. "Ne cherchez donc pas à tout accueillir; repoussez. Souvenez-vous que le peuple hébreu tuait, mais ne convertissait pas. C'est toujours l'ennemi qu'on accueille." Ainsi s'est écrié Gide en 1900 dans un de ses paradoxes assurément les moins goethéens.⁹ En 1938, il ajoutera avec un humour renanien que son meilleur disciple est probablement Henri Massis. "L'influence que j'ai pu souhaiter est toute émancipatrice; c'est d'encourager chacun dans son sens, et de différer de moi le plus possible."¹⁰ Ou encore, autre forme de réaction que Gide a beaucoup pratiquée, nous découvrons chez un auteur quelque idée que nous portions en

⁷ C'était la devise grecque de Nietzsche: *Γένει' οὐδὲς ἔσσι*. L'un des plus gidiens parmi les jeunes romanciers, Julien Green, note dans son *Journal* (Plon, 1938, I, 7): "La sincérité est un don comme un autre. N'est pas sincère qui veut."

⁸ *Journal*, pp. 902-903. Nietzsche a glissé, dans sa *Volonté de puissance* cet aveu curieux: "Socrate, il me faut l'avouer, m'est si proche, que je suis constamment en lutte avec lui."

⁹ Dans "Paradoxes," *Œuvres complètes*, II, 473.

¹⁰ Dans "Feuillets," *Œuvres complètes*, XIII, 444.

nous, que nous allions nous-mêmes exposer. Vexés d'avoir été prévenus, nous décidons de taire cette vérité rencontrée ailleurs, peut-être ailleurs plus fortement traduite, et nous accentuons ou exprimons de préférence un autre aspect de nous-mêmes. C'est ainsi que l'*Immoraliste* était déjà à demi composé lorsque Gide fit, nous dit-il,¹¹ la connaissance de l'œuvre nietzschéenne. Il crut donc pouvoir alléger son livre d'un lourde part de discussion théorique pour aller dans le sens du roman ou du récit épuré.¹²

La critique fait fausse route lorsqu'elle conclut de toute ressemblance entre deux auteurs à une influence, ou lorsqu'elle confond influence et ressemblance. Beaucoup plus souvent, l'influence est une *autorisation*. Gide tient fort à cette notion, qui explique en effet sa perpétuelle obstination à proclamer ses lectures, à se mettre à l'abri de tel grand écrivain étranger, alors qu'en vérité il s'exprime lui-même. Le grand timide qu'il fut toujours, hardi à ses heures et ami du scandale comme seuls les timides savent l'être, a été renforcé dans sa vérité tardivement et joyeusement trouvée par l'exemple de prédécesseurs à l'abri desquels il s'est placé. Il est clair que toute une partie de ses goûts littéraires (sa curiosité pour Winckelmann, pour Walt Whitman, pour les Grecs eux-mêmes, pour le *Hero and Leander* de Marlowe) s'explique par le même souci de justifier son anomalie physiologique qui lui fit, dans *Corydon*, accumuler les preuves empruntées à l'histoire naturelle. Ailleurs, dans Blake, dans Dostoïevski, c'est lui-même qu'il a recherché et c'est lui-même qu'il dépeint dans son ouvrage sur le romancier des *Possédés*—son "livre-charnière,"¹³—comme le peintre trace involontairement tous les traits de sa propre physionomie spirituelle en croyant inter-prêter fidèlement son modèle. Il arrive d'ailleurs que cette influence par autorisation ou par libération couvre d'égoïstes sophismes. "Que de Werthers secrets s'ignoraient qui n'attendaient que la balle du

¹¹ C'est du moins ce qu'affirme Gide dans son *Journal*, p. 859, dans son intéressante lettre publiée en tête du livre d'Elsie Pell sur Gide, à Grenoble, en 1935, et dans *Œuvres complètes*, XIII, 441. Il est permis de mettre en doute ici la sûreté de sa mémoire.

¹² Comme cela est si souvent le cas chez Gide, un précepte esthétique est la contrepartie d'un précepte de morale. On songe au proverbe de Blake, si cher à Gide: "If others had not been foolish, we should have been so." On lit déjà dans la *Digression sur les anciens et les modernes* de Fontenelle: "Il y a je ne sais combien de sottises que nous dirions si elles n'avaient pas été dites."

¹³ R. Lalou, *André Gide* (Strasbourg, Heissler, 1928), p. 22.

pistolet de Werther pour se tuer !” Il est vrai, et c’est dans cette autorisation demandée à de plus grands ou à de mieux doués que nous (*Journal*, p. 723), à des génies qui peuvent, mieux que nous, s’arroger le droit de vivre par delà le bien et le mal, que gît le péril de certaines influences néfastes.

Enfin, l’influence est fréquemment aussi un stimulant, un encouragement, une *confirmation*. “Entre gens de lettres,” a écrit Stendhal dans une petite phrase qui va loin, “tout éloge est un certificat de ressemblance.” La rencontre de Dostoïevski ou de Browning a non seulement fourni à Gide quelques autorisations—elle l’a encouragé dans une voie où il tendait déjà.¹⁴ Elle l’a aidé à voir plus clair en lui, à discerner ses directions futures, comme l’exemple quotidien d’un frère aîné nous éclaire sur celui que nous deviendrons, ou comme la mère de la jeune fille à marier avertit par avance le fiancé de ce que sera, dans quelques lustres, la vierge fluette et soumise qu’il courtise. Tel livre, telle sonate provoque en nous un choc violent, un ravissement quasi physique. C’est que l’œuvre ainsi découverte nous révèle soudain à nous-mêmes. Dans sa conférence de 1900 sur “l’Influence en littérature,” (*Œuvres complètes*, III, 257), Gide disait déjà :

On les a comparées [les influences] à ces sortes de miroirs qui nous montreraient non point ce que nous sommes déjà effectivement, mais ce que nous sommes d’une façon latente.

Ce frère intérieur que tu n’es pas encore, disait Henri de Régnier. Je les comparerai plus précisément à ce prince d’une pièce de Mæterlinck qui vient réveiller des princesses. Combien de sommeillantes princesses nous portons en nous, ignorées, attendant qu’un contact, qu’un accord, qu’un mot les réveille . . .

III

L’œuvre critique de Gide, et en vérité son œuvre tout entière, est, dans ses profondeurs une apologie de l’influence intelligemment conçue.

Des *Nourritures terrestres* aux *Faux-Monnayeurs*, Gide a fréquemment entonné son cri d’iconoclaste : “Familles, je vous hais !” Au-delà de la famille et de sa prison cellulaire, il nous enseigne à haïr tout ce qui est trop proche ou trop voisin de nous. Sa subtilité recherche les énigmes et les problèmes toujours complexes que pose la compréhension d’une pensée qui n’est pas celle de notre pays ou

¹⁴ Gide fait une remarque analogue à propos de Blake, *Journal*, p. 752.

de notre milieu. Un passage de *Si le grain ne meurt* (*Œuvres complètes*, x, 370) le confesse :

Je ne puis mieux comparer l'exotisme qu'à la reine de Saba qui vint auprès de Salomon "pour lui proposer des énigmes." Rien à faire à cela : il est des êtres qui s'éprennent de ce qui leur ressemble, d'autres de ce qui diffère d'eux. Je suis de ces derniers : l'étrange me sollicite, autant que me rebute le coutumier.

Certains nationalistes étroits, comme la France en a compté en ce siècle, reprennent à leur manière le "Comment peut-on être Persan ?" Ils redoutent, en accueillant un auteur étranger, d'avoir à bouleverser leurs habitudes casanières, de perdre une personnalité apparemment trop pâle ou trop malade pour assimiler ce qui diffère d'elle. Leur prudence est avoué de faiblesse. "On ne triomphe bien que de ce que l'on s'assimile," leur réplique Gide. (*Journal*, 733.)

Les influences étrangères sont donc bienfaisantes, d'après cet écrivain qui les a avidement accueillies, parce qu'elles sont l'étrange, le nouveau, l'énigmatique. Mais elles sont aussi la pente à remonter, la lutte contre notre insidieuse paresse, en un mot, la difficulté. Leur valeur est morale autant qu'esthétique, et d'autant plus précieuse par là aux yeux de ce moraliste protestant qui a prononcé dans son admirable *Philoctète* (acte IV, scène II) : "Ce que l'on entreprend au-dessus de ses forces, voilà ce qu'on appelle la vertu." Un Français, de par sa naissance et son éducation, a déjà dans son sang et dans sa cervelle les écrivains de son pays (*Journal*, 1277). Faible est son mérite à ressentir spontanément le charme de Descartes, La Fontaine ou Verlaine. Shakespeare, Whitman, Dostoïevski sont pour lui moins charmants. Justement, "Tout ce qui m'est charmant m'est hostile."¹⁵

Perpétuellement assoiffé de palingénésie, Gide a encore recours à l'étranger pour mieux se connaître et se renouveler plus sûrement. Les littératures les moins vigoureuses, se repliant sur elles-mêmes, croupissent dans une monotone et paludéenne stagnation. Les plus vaillantes puisent périodiquement dans le recours à l'étranger le ferment vivifiant qui leur permet de se dépasser elles-mêmes et de créer du neuf. Plus que toute autre, la littérature française, volontiers artiste et formaliste, a besoin de ce recours à l'étranger ; plus que pour toute autre, ce recours a, chez elle, été admirable de fécondité. Dès 1920, dans une conférence sur Verhæren (*Œuvres complètes*, x, 7), Gide déclarait :

¹⁵ *Œuvres complètes*, II, Introduction à *Saül*.

En France, la forme triomphe toujours et de tout, parce que le peuple français est le peuple le plus artiste de l'Europe; et le danger . . . , c'est que cette forme n'en vienne à se figer, à devenir formule; et ce serait la sclérose si, périodiquement, ce que les nationalistes considèrent comme un virus étranger ne venait provoquer une de ces palpitations puissantes, par quoi notre poésie se trouve toute revivifiée.

L'écrivain le plus largement et le plus diversement influencé est souvent aussi le plus original: telle est donc la première conclusion, déjà bien des fois vérifiée depuis Chaucer et Molière, que nous propose l'œuvre critique de Gide. Car le peuple jeune ou l'artiste vigoureux possède un appétit capable de tout dévorer, un estomac à même de tout assimiler. Dans un curieux passage retranché de la rédaction définitive de *Si le grain ne meurt* et cité dans le *Dialogue avec André Gide* de Charles Du Bos (Au Sans-Pareil, 1929, p. 69), Gide affirmait, à propos des influences étrangères, qu' "un cerveau bien français est fait pour les supporter toutes. . . . Tout cela part, bien entendu, de la puissance de digestion de la cervelle. La mienne eût digéré des cailloux."

Et la seconde conclusion devrait être sans doute: l'écrivain le plus cosmopolite est aussi le plus national, et d'autant plus universel qu'il est plus national. Stendhal, Baudelaire, Proust, Claudel que tant de sots critiques avaient accusé de n'être pas français, Rilke successivement soumis à l'influence de trois ou quatre pays étrangers, Pouchkine, tous écrivains si profondément nationaux, ont confirmé cette vérité à laquelle atteint toute réflexion prolongée sur les problèmes d'influence. L'écrivain nationaliste se préoccupe d'accentuer ses différences et d'exprimer cela seul que d'autres littératures dissimulent (*Journal*, 781); l'écrivain vraiment national traduit, derrière les différences, ce qui est largement humain. "De tous les auteurs français," écrit de Gide un admirateur allemand,¹⁶ "il est celui qui offre le plus de traits allemands et anglais." Affirmation fallacieuse. S'il est anglais, allemand ou russe, n'est-ce pas surtout parce que Gide, pour s'être confronté avec quatre ou cinq cultures étrangères, n'en est devenu que plus profondément français, et par là même plus séduisant et plus représentatif pour le lecteur étranger épris des œuvres françaises les plus largement humaines?

HENRI PEYRE

Yale University

¹⁶ Klaus Mann, "Influences françaises," *Cahiers du Sud*, novembre 1938, p. 755.

LA ESPADA Y LOS TIEMPOS DE LA VIDA EN
LAS MOCEDADES DEL CID

Desde el siglo XII al XX, perdura invariable en la literatura española a través de las páginas de los mejores, un tintineo de espadas. Rastrear con exactitud y pormenor esta presencia constante en nuestras letras me parece que, lejos de resultar en vano acopio de papeletas sin alma, daría en sorprendentes hallazgos psicológicos. Hasta que un erudito, con algo más que erudición, consagre sus afanes a esa tarea, permítasele a cualquier lector, a mí, hoy, acudir con un mazo de notas al ojeo de este tema. Doy a continuación las que me ha sugerido la lectura de *Las mocedades del Cid*, Comedia primera.¹

El vocablo "espada" se da en la comedia poco más de cuarenta veces. Pero no voy a estudiar todas y cada una de sus ocurrencias; me limitaré a unos pasajes en que la espada es escogida por el poeta para expresar, en torno a su realidad de objeto único, tres estados vitales del hombre, tres actitudes típicas de la adolescencia aun agraz, la juventud sombreada de virilidad y la vejez.

En la escena I del acto primero, se representa, como todos recordarán, la ceremonia de armar caballero a Rodrigo. Asiste a ella el joven príncipe Don Sancho que, envidioso de la suerte del novel armado, pregunta a su padre:

Padre, y cuando podré yo
ponerme una espada al lado?

Al contestarle el rey que aun no es tiempo, porque sus años son tiernos y la espada habría de parecerle pesada, el doncel se lanza a un fogoso trozo lírico:

Ya desnuda o ya envainada
las alas del corazón
hacen ligera la espada.
Yo, señor, cuando su acero
miro, de la punta al pomo,
con tantos bríos le altero,
que a ser un monte de plomo
me pareciera ligero.

¹ Cito por la edición de G. W. Umphrey, Holt, 1939.

He aquí, bullentes, encendidas, todas las impaciencias e ilusiones del mozalbete en el umbral de vivir. El rey, su padre, da por decirlo así, el núcleo del enfoque poético del tema al hablar de la *pesadez* de la espada. ¿Qué opone el garzón a esa pesadez, inevitable mandato del mundo físico? En primer lugar "las alas del corazón," por lo que no ha de entenderse otra cosa sino ese aletear, dentro del pecho de un mancebo, de energías aspirantes, de ímpetus aun retenidos, mal tascados. ¿Qué importa, dice en el segundo párrafo, que la espada sea "un monte de plomo," exagerando así la idea de la pesadez? El la infunde, al mirarla, sus bríos. Y el efecto mágico, carga en una palabra: *altero*. Porque los bríos del mozo son tales que la natural calidad grave del arma se cambia, se muda, se *altera*, al verse sometida a su influjo. He ahí el eterno y maravilloso engaño de la primer juventud, en que los volúmenes más duros y resistentes del mundo se aparecen, a la pujante vida que empieza, moldeables y plásticos, y en que la existencia es horizonte de una totalidad infinitamente posible. Es este el primer tiempo de la vida expresado por Guillén de Castro por el expediente de la espada.

El segundo lo personifica el propio protagonista de la comedia. Al ser armado caballero por el monarca éste le dice que le entrega espada con la que ganó cinco batallas campales. Rodrigo, con uno de esos característicos prontos que nacen a su figura literaria en el poema de las Mocedades, y que le eran tan ajenos en el *Cantar*, repone que para honrar arma tan ilustre la quitará de su cinta y la colgará en su esperanza, jurando no volver a ceñírsela hasta haber vencido, él mismo, otras cinco batallas campales. En la escena segunda al despojarse de las armas, ya en su mansión, repite ante sus hermanos el juramento. Con sumo acierto poético usa Guillén de Castro la metáfora de descolgarse la espada del cinto y colgarla de una esperanza. Porque la imagen lleva implícito su reverso psicológico: que es tener una esperanza pendiente de una espada. Obsérvese que dos valores, correspondientes a dos mundos distintos, una esperanza de vencer, de cumplir su destino de héroe, trémulo y soberbio valor del reino de la conciencia, y una espada, la espada real entregada a Rodrigo por el monarca se someten, en virtud del juramento y de la metáfora, a una mutua dependencia: la esperanza de ceñirse *esta* espada reside en otra espada con la que el joven Rodrigo logre ganar las cinco contiendas; y esa ilustre espada,

recién transmitida al joven caballero por el rey Alfonso, está pendiente a su vez de algo impalpable e imponderable, de una esperanza. Aun tiene otro sentido ese acto de Rodrigo al jurar no colgarse la espada al costado mientras no venza cinco combates en campo abierto: la espada sirve de centro de referencia, más simbólico que material, a uno de los más nobles movimientos de toda alma noble en el arranque de la juventud: el pacto que hace el ser humano con su voluntad hazañosa, la promesa consigo mismo de realizar algo descomunal y heroico. Nadie vió mejor que los románticos este hervir dentro de los pechos de pasiones disparadas hacia metas altísimas, esta mezcla de arrogancia e inocencia, ese anhelo de descollar o morir, típico más que de otras edades de la vida, de la mocedad. El pasaje que comentamos, y su cristalización en torno a la espada da perfecta corporeidad poética a ese estado humano.

Al final de la misma escena segunda, Rodrigo, ya resuelto a vengar la afrenta sufrida por su padre echa mano a una espada que se guardaba en su casa, arma de abolengo preclaro, ya que perteneció a Mudarra, el héroe de la leyenda de los infantes de Salas. Este pasaje está tomado por Guillén de Castro de un romance, incrustado en la obra con perfecta adecuación de tono. En él Rodrigo acepta todo el compromiso que supone el ceñirse la espada de un héroe famoso, y dirigiéndose a la espada, en figura de personificación, como si le pudiera oír y entender, dice:

Bien sé que te correrás
de venir a mi poder
más no te podrás correr
de verme echar paso atrás . . .
. . . segundo dueño has cobrado
tan bueno como el primero.
Pues cuando alguno me venza
corrido del torpe hecho
hasta la cruz, en mi pecho
te esconderé, de vergüenza.

Notable es, en primer término, el tratar a la espada como ser vivo, haciéndola testigo de la promesa; y lo que es más, juez de su incumplimiento, ya que la ofrece matarse con ella, si llegara a quedar vencido. Se acumula así en la espada una serie de significados, en que se entretejen lo moral y lo material: la espada objeto de la promesa, testigo de la misma, y si fuera menester ejecutora material del castigo de muerte que cumple al deshonorado por la derrota.

Pero además la espada en este caso sirve de expresión a otra fase del estado de juventud: la aceptación voluntaria y entusiasta por el hombre mozo de su papel de continuador de una tradición de esfuerzo y heroísmo. Sí, la nobleza obliga. La circunstancia de recibir acero del rey, y de usar otro del antiguo héroe Mudarra ligán a este mancebo, recién salido a la vida, con un linaje de hombres que vivieron antes que él, y cuyos destinos de excepción él ahora se apresta a continuar con su persona, demostrando así su conciencia de pertenecer a algo más que a un circunscrito destino individual. Y es, otra vez, la espada, la que le pone en comunicación con ese complejo de valores psicológicos y morales: la vida del caballero como deber de proseguir cumpliendo un repertorio de normas de honor y sacrificio, heredado de gentes de su sangre y su tierra.

El último tiempo de la vida humana, la senectud, se ejemplifica en Diego Laínez, el padre de Rodrigo, y en aquella escena segunda del acto primero en que regresa a su casa abrumado por el pesar de la ofensa recibida del Conde Lozano, que le abofeteó ante el Rey. En un patético monólogo, el buen viejo excitado por sus propias encendidas palabras arroja de sí el báculo en que se apoyaba, y que quedó roto, y decide tomar una espada para vengar su honor. Así lo hace:

En tí, en tí, espada valiente
ha de fundarse mi honor.

Pero apenas comienza a blandirla siente su peso. Su sangre hierve en sus venas, sí. Pero al brazo le falta la fuerza requerida para servir ese fuego interior.

Ya me parece de plomo,
ya mi fuerza desfallece,
ya caigo, ya me parece
que tiene a la punta el pomo.

El noble Diego pierde toda esperanza de vengar su honor por propia mano, y sobre él cae el desaliento, al darse cuenta de que ya las fuerzas físicas traicionan a los poderes del alma.

¡Oh caduca edad cansada!
Estoy por pasarme el pecho.
Ah tiempo ingrato ¡qué has hecho?

Fijémonos en que lo que el poeta trata de transmitirnos es la repentina revelación que un hombre tiene de su caducidad física, de su

impotencia para valerse por si mismo en trance de tanta monta como el vengar su honor. Es el imperio de la vejez, la victoria del *tiempo ingrato*, que somete a su yugo los afanes más nobles del hombre. Y ese tremendo momento de reconocer el propio acabamiento, de encararse con la realidad de que ya no se es el mismo, se transmite poética y dramáticamente al lector por medio del símbolo de la espada. A ella apela Diego Laínez, descolgándola del muro, blandiéndola, en prueba de que sus bríos interiores, su fuerza de alma, le permitirán usarla, aun. Pero ella, muda e inexorablemente, por la terrible persuasión de su mucho peso material, revela a Diego su senilidad, su ingreso fatal en ese último estado de la vida humana. Se nos vienen a la memoria ahora las palabras del joven príncipe Don Sancho, en la escena primera, sobre como "las alas del corazón hacen ligera la espada." Sí. Lo que Don Diego siente ahora, sin remedio, es que ya no hay alas en el corazón, para levantar ese peso de la espada.

Y así se cierra ese ciclo que queríamos comentar, en que el poeta, sirviéndose siempre de un mismo objeto, la espada, nos ha comunicado tres fases muy distintas de las edades reales y psicológicas del hombre. En suma, el drama del vivir, desde su alba a su ocaso. La espada, objeto material, arma de lucha, pasa, en la poesía a la categoría de un objeto-símbolo, demostrando su capacidad de expresar sentimientos muy diversos de los tiempos de la vida. Dijérase que el limpio metal de su ancha hoja sabe reflejar, a más de las formas del mundo de afuera, las fugitivas, leves imágenes de lo que pasa por los adentros del alma del hombre.

Yendo dedicado este artículo al homenaje a un gran historiador del teatro francés, permítaseme añadir, como apéndice, algo sobre la suerte que ha corrido este tema de la espada en *Le Cid* de Corneille. El poeta francés, en su labor de simplificación de elementos, suprimió la escena primera de *Las Mocedades del Cid*, y por consiguiente el pasaje sobre la espada puesto en boca del príncipe Don Sancho. Igualmente prescinde del romance de la escena tercera en que Rodrigo promete a su espada no dar paso atrás, o matarse con ella, caso de ser vencido. Sólo queda el tema de la espada en las palabras de Don Diègue, escenas iv, v y vi. y eso con un dramatismo muy atenuado en relación con el famoso monólogo de Diego Laínez, de la obra española. Y en otras palabras de Don Rodrigo, en la escena vii, donde interroga al acero pre-

guntándole si le ha sido dado para vengar su honor o para perder a su Jimena. El empleo de la espada como objeto-símbolo de tres edades del hombre queda, pues, excluido de la tragedia francesa, esa "conversation sous un lustre" de la cual deben quedar eliminados los arrebatos líricos que pudieran oscurecer el contorno esquemático del dibujo de las pasiones.

PEDRO SALINAS

LES DANGERS DU CLICHÉ LITTÉRAIRE: LE DR.
JOHNSON ET JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ¹

Ces deux contemporains, la postérité s'est plu à les placer aux antipodes l'un de l'autre. L'accord de leur philosophie—sans parler même de leur personnalité—paraît avoir échappé même à des commentateurs sous la plume desquels on se serait le plus attendu à le voir signalé: Macaulay, Carlyle, Leslie Stephen, et jusqu'à Tinker et Alf. Edw. Newton. Et pourtant, c'est presque l'œuf de Colomb.

Commençons par dire que cette attitude négative s'explique un peu—sans toujours se justifier. En ce qui concerne la France, on n'y connaît guère le Dr. Johnson, ou plutôt quand on le connaît c'est par l'éreintement vigoureux dans l'*Histoire de la littérature anglaise* par Taine—auquel s'est à peu près rallié Dottin en 1911 (A. Colin), et qui n'a été amendé que récemment par Legouis et Cazamian (Hachette, 1928). Peu des écrits de Johnson d'ailleurs ont été traduits: les essais du *Rambler*, ceux de l'*Idler* et quelques vies de poètes. *Rasselas* avait été mieux connu, mais de nos jours il ne l'est guère; la dernière traduction est de 1886, par Baudry, et semble avoir eu peu de succès. Et par parenthèse, on peut discerner déjà ici un malentendu: ceux qui se sont occupés de Johnson en France ont jugé l'écrivain et le critique dont l'attitude a toujours été celle d'un classicisme périmé; or, de Johnson qui avait le funeste pouvoir parmi ses contemporains de faire ou défaire une réputation d'un coup de plume, Garrick déjà disait: "Quand Johnson commence à écrire la passion dort et la déclamation commence à ouvrir la bouche." Ce n'était pas un Boileau qu'il fallait chercher en Johnson, mais un Rousseau.

¹ Ces pages font suite à une étude sur la superstition du cliché littéraire, qui a encore une si grande emprise sur notre critique—dans nos livres et dans nos cours.

Quant à l'Angleterre, où, pas davantage qu'en France, on n'a songé à établir de lien entre les deux hommes, c'est à Johnson lui-même qu'en revient avant tout la responsabilité. Sans guère connaître de Rousseau, paraît-il bien, beaucoup plus que le *Second Discours*,^{1a} c'est-à-dire l'écrit avec lequel on associe la théorie de la supériorité de l'homme de la nature sur l'homme civilisé, il a lancé contre lui la fameuse boutade rapportée par Boswell:

Our next meeting at the Mitre was on Saturday the 15th of February [1766], . . . I had mentioned that I had passed some time with Rousseau in his wild retreat [Môtiers-Travers]. . . . Johnson said sarcastically: "It seems, Sir, you have kept very good company abroad. . . . My dear Sir, you don't call Rousseau bad company. Do you really think *him* a bad man?" JOHNSON: "Sir, if you are talking jestingly of this, I don't talk with you. If you mean to be serious, I think him one of the worst of men; a rascal who ought to be hunted out of society, as he has been. Three or four nations have expelled him, and it is a shame that he is protected in this country. . . . Rousseau, Sir, is a very bad man. I would sooner sign a sentence for his transportation, than that of any felon who has gone from the Old Bailey these many years. Yes, I should like to have him work in the plantations." BOSWELL: "Sir, do you think him as bad a man as Voltaire?" JOHNSON: "Why, Sir, it is difficult to settle the proportion of iniquity between them."

Rousseau devait, en outre, pâtir de l'antipathie générale de Johnson à l'endroit de tout auteur français. Il s'irritait de ce que les Anglais, au lieu de se nourrir de leurs écrivains, eux qui avaient Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, continuaient à faire les snobs et à regarder outre-Manche pour décerner des palmes à des poètes et à des prosateurs. Il manquait rarement l'occasion de dénigrer les écrivains français, et se plaisait à exercer sa satire à leur dépens. Quand on lui parlait avec admiration de l'incroyable labeur que représentait son *Dictionnaire*, ajoutant que l'Académie Française, avec ses quarante membres avait mis quarante ans à préparer un dictionnaire, il répondait: "Précisément, 40 fois 40 = 160; c'est la proportion exacte; un Anglais vaut 160 Français." Et dans la Préface du *Dictionnaire* on lit: "J'ai consacré à ce travail des années afin que nous n'ayons plus à affirmer notre primauté philologique aux nations du continent." Il y avait, sous ces boutades un ressentiment qui cachait une admiration envieuse. Johnson lisait constamment du français.²

^{1a} On trouvera des renseignements sur Rousseau en Angleterre au 18^{me} siècle dans les articles de R. B. Sewall, *PMLA*, LII, P. Q. XVII et XVIII, *MLN*, LVII; et de J. H. Warner, *PMLA*, XLVII, LII.

² Boileau était son maître au travers de Dryden et Pope; son poème

Or, si Johnson, en dirigeant ses traits de satire contre les écrivains français en général, trahissait justement une admiration, on pouvait s'attendre, en somme, à découvrir une prévention de même espèce lorsqu'il s'agirait de l'écrivain le plus violemment attaqué par lui, Rousseau. Pour nous qui jugeons à distance, il est difficile de ne pas voir les points de contact entre les deux hommes.

Et d'abord, nous pouvons passer sans guère nous y arrêter sur le trait qui fait si bien de Johnson un véritable frère siamois de Rousseau, à savoir cette combinaison de l'ours avec l'homme aux grandes délicatesses de cœur—tous deux adoptent consciemment le rôle d'Alceste dans la société du XVIII^e siècle, méprisant les Philinte indulgents jusqu'à l'hypocrisie. La seule différence serait que Rousseau était loin d'être aussi prompt à la répartie que son émule anglais, et que, pour cette raison sinon pour une autre, Rousseau n'aurait jamais été assez bourru pour répondre: "Madame, avant de me jeter au visage un tel déluge de compliments vous feriez bien de vous demander si vos compliments peuvent avoir quelque valeur." C'est dans la correspondance des deux hommes que, sur ce point, on peut trouver l'accord complet. La lettre de Johnson à Lord Chesterfield, lorsque celui-ci avait trop attendu pour offrir son haut patronage à l'auteur du *Dictionnaire*, et où des vérités si fortes sont exprimées en langage merveilleux, trouverait bien des parallèles dans des lettres de Rousseau, à la maréchale de Luxembourg, à Mme de la Tour Franqueville, à M. de Malesherbes même, ou encore au roi de Prusse:

J'ai dit beaucoup de mal de vous; j'en dirai peut-être encore. Cependant, chassé de France, de Genève, du canton de Berne, je viens chercher un asile dans vos États. Ma faute est peut-être de n'avoir pas commencé par là; cet éloge est de ceux dont vous êtes digne. Sire, je n'ai mérité de vous aucune grâce, je n'en demande pas; mais j'ai cru devoir déclarer à votre

sur Londres est une satire inspirée de la 3^{me} de Juvénal, mais aussi de la 1^{ère} de Boileau. Il paraît que quand il lisait l'*Encyclopédie* chez Mrs Thrall, on ne pouvait l'en arracher. Et quand on crut voir que son *Rasselas* était un curieux parallèle de *Candide*, il s'en montrait fier. On peut ici renvoyer au travail excellent de Robert Klenker, *Dr. Sam. Johnson's Verhältnis zur französischen Litteratur* (Strasbourg, 1907). On y trouve mentionnés des emprunts indiscutables à La Bruyère, lequel était comme un bréviaire de Johnson; celui-ci connaissait presque par cœur les *Ménagiana*. On peut être étonné de certains de ses jugements; s'il appelle "pretty baubles" les vieux romans précieux, il tombe en admiration d'autre part devant Voiture et Scarron.

majesté que j'étais en son pouvoir, et que j'y voulais être: elle peut disposer de moi comme il lui plaira.

Plus important à souligner—et au premier abord moins apparent—est l'accord des deux écrivains quand ils jaugent l'esprit général de leur époque, époque où les mérites de l'esprit pèsent si peu en face des contingences mondaines. Qu'est-ce que le poème vengeur de Johnson, *London*, qui se résume en ces vers:

This mournful truth is everywhere confessed:
Slow rises worth by poverty oppressed,

sinon le cri de guerre lancé, sous une autre forme, dans le *Premier Discours* de Rousseau, contre les effets funestes d'un monde poli écrasant la vertu et le vrai mérite? Et lorsque Johnson, arrivant à la dernière page de son émouvante *Vie de Richard Savage*, résume la carrière de cette misérable victime du snobisme et de la persécution, par ces mots: "Qui oserait dire que, placé dans les mêmes circonstances que Savage, il aurait mieux vécu?," il est difficile de ne pas penser au mot célèbre de Rousseau: "Que chacun découvre son cœur au pied de ton trône, Être éternel, avec la même sincérité, et puis qu'un seul te dise, s'il l'ose: Je fus meilleur que cet homme-là!"

Voilà pour l'homme. Voyons maintenant le philosophe—quand Johnson n'est pas le simple porte-parole d'une doctrine, mais laisse voir un Johnson sincère et humain. Évitions l'examen détaillé, toujours un peu fastidieux, en citant un passage qui résume d'une façon très concise la "Weltanschauung" de Johnson et en affirmant bien haut qu'il y a bien des passages parallèles soit dans le *Rambler*, soit dans le *Idler*; rien de "littéraire" dans ces pages. Elles sont une expression de la sagesse philosophique acquise par l'expérience plus que par la lecture ou l'étude proprement dite. Ceci est tiré du *Idler*, du 30 déc. 1758:

. . . If the extent of the human view could comprehend the whole frame of the universe, I believe it would be found invariably true, that Providence has given that in greatest plenty, which the condition of life makes of greatest use; and that nothing is penuriously imparted or placed far from the reach of man, of which a more liberal distribution, or more easy acquisition, would increase real and rational felicity.

Iron is common, and gold is rare. Iron contributes so much to supply the wants of nature, that its use constitutes much of the difference between savage and polished life. . . . Gold can never be hardened into saws or axes; it can neither furnish instruments of manufacture, utensils of agriculture, nor weapons of defence; its only quality is to shine, and the value of its lustre arises from its scarcity.

Throughout the whole circle, both of natural and moral life, necessities are as iron, and superfluities as gold. . . . Nature makes us poor only when we want necessities; but custom gives the name of poverty to the want of superfluities. . . .

Superfluity and difficulty begin together. To dress food for the stomach is easy, the art is to irritate the palate when the stomach is sufficed. A rude hand may build walls, form roofs, and lay floors, and provide all that warmth and security require; we only call the nicer artificers to carve the cornice, or to paint the ceilings. Such dress as may enable the body to endure the different seasons, the most unenlightened nations have been able to procure; but the work of science begins in the ambition of distinction, in variations of fashion, and emulation of elegance. . . .

[Quant à la vertu] No man needs to stay virtuous till the moralists have determined the essence of virtue. . . . Religion may regulate the life of him to whom the *Scotists* and the *Thomists* are alike unknown; and the assertors of fate and free will, however different in their talk, agree to act in the same manner. . . . It is not my intention to depreciate the politer arts or abstruser studies. . . . Let us gratefully acknowledge that goodness which grants us ease at a cheap rate.

Il y a là trois idées fondamentales communes à Rousseau et à Johnson: (1) L'innéité et l'excellence de la conscience morale. *Johnson*: "No man needs to stay virtuous till the moralists have determined the essence of virtue." *Rousseau*: "Le théâtre rend la vertu aimable. Il opère un grand prodige de faire ce que la nature et la raison font avant lui." (2) La religion de l'adoration de la Providence. *Johnson*: "Let us gratefully acknowledge that goodness which grants us ease at a cheap rate." *Rousseau*: "Je médite sur l'ordre de l'univers pour adorer le sage auteur qui s'y fait sentir. . . . Je m'attends de ses bienfaits. Je le bénis de ses dons."

Un mot au sujet de la 3^{me}. L'homme a fait fausse route en abandonnant la nature comme guide; mais aurait-il pu ne pas faire fausse route en adoptant les progrès de la civilisation matérielle? La réponse de Rousseau et celle de Johnson sont les mêmes encore: oui, certes, car si l'homme a fait mauvais usage des connaissances acquises au cours des siècles, il pouvait en faire un bon. *Johnson*: "It is not my intention to depreciate the politer arts or abstruser studies." *Rousseau*: "Ce n'est point la science que je maltraite, c'est la vertu que je défends." (*Premier Discours*); et dans la polémique qui suit: "La science est très bonne en soi, cela est évident et il faudrait avoir renoncé au bon sens pour dire le contraire. L'auteur de toutes les bonnes choses est la source de la vérité; tout connaître est un de ses attributs; c'est

donc participer en quelque sorte à la suprême intelligence que d'acquérir des connaissances et d'étendre ses lumières." (*Réponse au Roi de Pologne*). "La science prise d'une manière abstraite mérite toute notre admiration; la folle science des hommes n'est digne que de risée et de mépris." (*Préface à Narcisse*).

Mais, dira-t-on, Johnson ne s'est pas fait faute de prodiguer l'anathème au sauvagisme de Rousseau. A quoi il faut répondre que Johnson ayant peu lu Rousseau—ou peu attentivement—lui a prêté gratuitement l'idée qu'il était un sauvagiste. Il n'est pas possible de reprendre ici un sujet de discussion abondamment traité par les étudiants de Rousseau depuis un certain nombre d'années.³

Un point plus facile à élucider brièvement est celui de l'attitude nette, convaincue et parallèle des deux écrivains en face du profond conflit qui sévissait au XVIII^e siècle entre les déistes anglais et les Encyclopédistes français, d'une part, et les défenseurs du témoignage de la conscience religieuse, d'autre part. Il suffit de rappeler deux passages de chacun de nos auteurs, passages également célèbres:

JOHNSON:—Hume, and other sceptical innovators, are vain men, and will gratify themselves at any expense. Truth will not afford sufficient food to their vanity; so they have betaken themselves to error. Truth, Sir, is a cow which will yield such people no more milk, and so they are gone to milk the bull. If I could have allowed myself to gratify my vanity at the expense of truth, what fame might I have acquired? Every thing which Hume has advanced against Christianity had passed through my mind long before he wrote. Always remember this, that after a system is well settled upon positive evidence, a few partial objections ought not to shake it. The human mind is so limited that it cannot take in all parts of a subject, so that there may be objections raised against any thing" (Boswell).

ROUSSEAU:—Je consultai les philosophes, je feuilletai leurs livres, j'examinai leurs diverses opinions; je les trouvai tous fiers, affirmatifs, dog-

³ Edme Champion, *J.-J. R. et la Révolution française* (A. Colin, 1910); Fr. Viel, *Revue pédagogique*, Déc. 1912, "La notion de l'homme naturel chez R."; A. Schinz, *Rev. du XVIII^e siècle*, Déc. 1913, "La notion de l'homme naturel chez R.," et *Pensée de R.*, 1929, pp. 177-89 (où il est démontré que le primitivisme est, d'ailleurs, en contradiction avec l'idée fondamentale du *Second Discours* même). Et récemment A. O. Lovejoy, *Modern Philology*, 1933, pp. 165-86, "The Supposed Primitivism of J.-J. R.," Henry S. V. Ogden, *Am. Pol. Science Review*, August, 1938, pp. 634-36, "The Antithesis of Nature and Art. R.'s Rejection of the Theory of Natural Rights."

matiques, même dans leur scepticisme prétendu, n'ignorant rien, ne prouvant rien, se moquant les uns des autres. . . . Quand les philosophes seraient en état de découvrir la vérité, qui d'entre eux prendrait intérêt à elle? Chacun sait bien que son système n'est pas mieux fondé que les autres; mais il le soutient parce qu'il est à lui. Il n'y en a pas un seul qui, venant à connaître le vrai et le faux, ne préférât le mensonge qu'il a trouvé à la vérité découverte par un autre. Où est le philosophe qui, pour sa gloire, ne tromperait pas volontiers le genre humain? Où est celui qui, dans le secret de son cœur, se propose un autre objet que de se distinguer? Pourvu qu'il s'élève au-dessus du vulgaire, pourvu qu'il efface l'éclat de ses concurrents, que demande-t-il de plus? L'essentiel est de penser autrement que les autres. Chez les croyants il est athée, chez les athées il serait croyant" (*Profession de foi*).

Nous voudrions toucher un dernier point. L'auteur du *Contrat social*—surnommé le père de la Révolution—peut-il avoir quoi que ce soit de commun avec le fanatique tory que Johnson a toujours voulu être?—Parfaitement. D'abord souvenons-nous que ce fanatique tory était un grand ami des humbles, et que pour avoir (comme Rousseau d'ailleurs) su goûter les raffinements de la société, il était un protecteur des déshérités: témoin les diverses épaves humaines qu'il avait recueillies chez lui et qu'il appelait son sérail; témoin ses égards touchants pour son valet noir Barber, qu'il servait autant qu'il en était servi; témoin surtout ses opinions très décidées sur l'immoralité de l'esclavage.⁴ Mais il croyait à l'autorité, ou nécessité d'autorité, en matière politique. Or, ce sont exactement les vues de Rousseau dont le *Contrat social* pivote tout entier sur les mots: "L'aliénation totale de chaque associé avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté" (I, VI). Peut-on être plus toryste? Que le "prince" de la communauté soit empereur, roi, duc ou président de république—c'est question de mots. Émile Faguet caractérisait le *Contrat* comme le pire traité de despotisme qui eût jamais été formulé—interprétation qui n'a cessé de gagner du terrain depuis le grand ouvrage de Vaughan. Et se souvient-on du chapitre sur "La Religion civile" (IV, VIII)? Chez Rousseau ✓ comme chez Johnson, la croyance religieuse constitue une partie intégrante du système politique. Leur façon d'aborder le problème religieux est d'essence toute pragmatique: la croyance religieuse constitue pour tous les deux la seule garantie absolue pour l'observation des clauses du contrat et des lois de la morale personnelle, d'où il suit qu'une société politique ne devrait pas permettre à un

⁴ Klenker déclare que, selon lui, Johnson ne fut jamais un "überzeugter Tory," p. 154.

athée d'y demeurer. Si Johnson n'a pas dit comme Rousseau qu'un athée s'ingérant dans la société et prétendant accepter la clause religieuse devait être puni de mort, il en a plus souvent que Rousseau exprimé l'idée.

Pour terminer, il sera piquant de mettre en regard du passage féroce—que nous avons cité tout au début—de Johnson à l'adresse de Rousseau, quelques mots de celui-ci se rapportant à celui-là. On y voit que le philosophe de Genève fut, lui, assez perspicace pour deviner très finement son frère d'Outre-Mer. C'est Boswell encore qui nous l'apprend. Lors de la visite qu'il fit à Rousseau à Môtiers-Travers, il avait parlé de son admiration pour Johnson, comme il devait parler à Johnson plus tard de son admiration pour Rousseau. Rousseau avait dit, après avoir bien écouté: "J'aimerais cet homme-là. Je l'estimerais. Si je pouvais l'ébranler dans ses principes, je ne le ferais pas. Je voudrais le voir, mais de loin, de peur qu'il ne me rossât. . . . Je lui rapportai (continue Boswell) le bon mot du Docteur sur les innovateurs: La vérité est une vache qui n'a aujourd'hui plus de lait à donner, et alors ils vont traire le taureau. . . . Alors, reprit Rousseau toujours souriant, mais avec quelque mélancolie cette fois: il me détesterait; il dirait: Voici un corrupteur d'hommes qui vient ici traire le taureau."

Philadelphia, Pa.

ALBERT SCHINZ

"PER L'ALTRE" *CONVIVIO*, III, xiv, 15

"Per le quali tre virtudi si sale a filosofare a quelle Atene celestiali, dove gli Stoici e Peripatetici e Epicurii, per la l[uc]e de la veritate etterna, in uno volere concordevolmente concorrono."¹

A note in this best edition of the *Convivio* explains that the reconstruction "la l[uc]e" has been adopted from the *Testo Critico della Società Dantesca Italiana* of 1921. It says: "I mss. danno 'per laltre,' dove a laltre nelle precedenti edizioni s'era sostituito l'arte." Presumably all the manuscripts give "per laltre": the one that is recognized as the best—the Barberiniano Latino 4086—gives it quite clearly.² Apparently, too, all the printed editions

¹ *Il Convivio*, ed. Busnelli and Vandelli, Vol. I, Firenze, 1934, pp. 430-431.

² *Il Convivio* di Dante Alighieri, riprodotto in fototipia dal codice Barb. Lat. 4086. Ed. Schneider. Bibl. Apostol. Vaticana, 1932.

before the *Testo Critico* have *l'arte*: those I have been able to see (Biscioni, Fraticelli, Giuliani, Moore, Flamini, Passerini, Della Torre) reproduce it without comment.

The same note goes on to suggest a third substitute for the *laltre* of the manuscripts, "*l'albore*," which seems better than the other two. It has a sense more suitable to the context and is palaeographically more plausible, for whereas it is not easy to see why a copyist who had before him a simple expression like *l'arte de la verità*,³ or a commonplace one like *la luce de la verità*, should be tempted to write *laltre de la verità*, he might be puzzled by the less simple *l'albore de la verità*, and *l'albore* has the final *re* of *laltre*.

However I do not intend to discuss the respective merits of the three emendations, for my contention is that the reading given by the manuscripts, *per laltre*, makes better sense than any of them, and should have been retained.

Removing the commas after *Epicurii* and *eterna*, and placing one after *laltre*, the passage reads as follows:

Per le quali tre virtudi si sale a filosofare a quelle Atene celestiali, dove gli Stoici e Peripatetici e Epicurii per laltre, de la veritade eterna in uno volere concordevolmente concorrono.

The meaning, which is thus made clear, would be in modern language:

Per mezzo delle quali tre virtù si sale a filosofare a quell'Atene celeste verso cui gli Stoici, i Peripatetici e gli Epicurei, per mezzo delle altre (le altre virtù), si muovono d'accordo in un solo desiderio della verità eterna.

This fourteenth chapter of *Convivio* III begins by reminding us that "*sapienza*" is the "*subietto materiale*" of philosophy, and "*amore*" is its "*forma*," and the compound is "*l'uso della speculazione*." Speaking now particularly of the form of philosophy, "*amore*," it is said that, just as the rays of the sun make bright the object upon which they fall, to the extent to which the object is capable of receiving the light, so the divine power descends upon the love of wisdom, transforming it to its own likeness to the extent of its capability of being thus transformed. Now the love of wisdom is capable of being made similar to divine love because wisdom is eternal, and the objects of God's love are, properly speaking, the eternal things. This means that the noble soul, free in the use of reason, is made to perceive, by the divine power

³ Whoever first introduced *l'arte* may have had in mind "*chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l'arte*" of *Par. xiii*, 123.

descending upon it, that the wisdom it already loves is concerned with divine as well as human things; and since previous study has shown that many phenomena that were at first astounding are nevertheless rationally comprehensible, the noble soul is enabled to believe that the miracles of divine revelation may be comprehensible by a loftier intelligence than its own. In this way Christian faith may arise from rational philosophy, and hope that is based on faith, and active charity.

By means of these three theological virtues, the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, becomes a theologian; his philosophy becomes theology, the science which "perfettamente ne fa il vero vedere nel quale si cheta l'anima nostra":⁴ he rises to philosophize in the celestial Athens.⁵

The same three virtues, Faith, Hope and Charity, made known to us by the Holy Ghost in the scriptural revelation, are the necessary means for the attainment of celestial beatitude in Paradise, whereas the terrestrial beatitude on Earth can be attained by means of the moral virtues in the active life, perfected by the intellectual virtues in the contemplative life,⁶ which virtues are demonstrated by the philosophers:

Ad has quidem beatitudines, velut ad diversas conclusiones, per diversa media venire oportet. Nam ad primam per philosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales operando; ad secundam vero per documenta spiritualia que humanam rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes theologicas operando, fidem scilicet, spem et caritatem. Has igitur conclusiones et media, licet ostensa sint nobis hec ab humana ratione que per philosophos tota nobis innotuit, hec a Spiritu Sancto qui per prophetas et agiographos, qui per coeternum sibi Dei filium Iesum Christum et per eius discipulos supernaturalem veritatem ac nobis necessariam revelavit, humana cupiditas postergaret nisi homines. . . .⁷

⁴ *Conv.*, II, xiv, 20.

⁵ For reasons too many to explain here, I am inclined to think that "Atene celestiali" means not Paradise but the realm of theological speculation. This view is in agreement with the commentary in chapter xiii on the lines beginning "Suo esser tanto a Quei che lel dà piace" and that in chapter xv on "Cose appariscon ne lo suo aspetto—che mostran de'piacer di Paradiso" (see the excellent notes of Busnelli) and not at all in disagreement with *Mon.*, III, xvi, 7-10, where, with a different purpose in mind, Dante says that the three theological virtues lead to "beatitudinem vite eterne, . . . que per paradisum celestem intelligi datur."

⁶ "Veramente è da sapere che noi potemo avere in questa vita due felicitadi, secondo due diversi cammini, buono ed ottimo, che a ciò ne

Beatitude consists in the vision of the truth, the "veritate eterna" of our passage, the common end of both philosophy and theology:—"... fine de la Filosofia è quella eccellentissima dilezione ... cioè vera felicitade che per contemplazione de la veritate s'acquista."⁸ "E dei saper che tutti hanno diletto,—quanto la sua veduta si profonda—nel vero in che si queta ogni intelletto."⁹ "... vera illa beatitudo in sentiendo veritatis principium consistit; ..."¹⁰

As we are told in *Convivio*, IV, vi, the three schools of Pagan philosophy, "the Stoics and Peripatetics and Epicureans," were at one in seeking the true end of man: "quello dove dirittamente ogni umano appetito si riposasse."¹¹ The fruit of their labours matured with the conclusion of Aristotle that "Felicitade è operazione secondo virtute in vita perfetta."¹²

In *Convivio* IV, xxii the same three Pagan schools are said to be represented allegorically by the three Marys going to the sepulchre expecting to find the Saviour there. The sepulchre represents the present world, the Saviour represents perfect happiness, "beatitudine." The three philosophical sects are seeking human happiness in this world by means of the moral virtues of the active life. They are directed by the angel in the tomb, who represents the nobility of the human soul, to seek the Saviour, that is happiness, in Galilee, that is "ne la speculazione," by means of the intellectual virtues of the contemplative life. Not that they will find it even there, but they will then be travelling in the right direction and will attain the degree of happiness of which they are capable. "E così appare che nostra beatitudine (questa felicitade di cui si parla) prima trovare potemo quasi imperfetta ne la vita attiva, cioè ne le operazioni de le morali virtudi, e poi perfetta quasi ne le operazioni de le intellettuali."¹³

The Stoics, Peripatetics and Epicureans can never reach the menano: l'una è la vita attiva, e l'altra è la contemplativa; la quale, avvegna che per l'attiva si pervegna, come detto è, a buona felicitade, ne mena ad ottima felicitade e beatitudine, secondo che pruova lo Filosofo nel decimo de l'Etica." *Conv.*, IV, xvii, 9.

⁷ *Mon.*, III, xvi, 8-9.

⁸ *Conv.*, III, xi, 14.

⁹ *Par.*, xxxviii, 106-108.

¹⁰ *Epist.*, xiii, 89.

¹¹ *Conv.*, IV, vi, 8.

¹² *Conv.*, IV, xvii, 8.

¹³ *Conv.*, IV, xxii, 18.

"Atene celestiali" (no matter whether this expression means Paradise or the realm of Christian theology) to which one rises by means of the three theological virtues, because these philosophers are deprived of the Revelation of the Holy Scriptures which acquaint us with those three virtues; but they move as far as they can toward the perfect vision of the truth by means of the others, that is the moral and intellectual virtues.

The word "l'altre," which has been rejected by all the editors of the *Convivio*, is the word one would expect to be used to designate the moral and intellectual virtues, after the theological virtues have been mentioned: "Per le quali tre virtudi . . . per l'altre. . . ." It is the word used in a similar context by Virgil, speaking of the Limbus where he dwells with Aristotle and the other pagan philosophers:

Quivi sto io con quei che le tre sante
virtù non si vestiro, e senza vizio
conobber l'altre e seguir tutte quante.¹⁴

It is not easy to see what reasonable objection could be made to the reading as it is in the manuscripts. The syntactical inversion *de la veritade eterna in uno volere* makes no difficulty, since such inversions are frequent in Dante.¹⁵ Nor does, I think, the somewhat unusual use of *volere* as a substantive-infinitive with *di* and a substantive object in *uno volere de la veritade*.¹⁶ It may be said that, since all of the thirty-nine manuscripts are derived from a common source which was not an autograph, their unanimity does not guarantee the correctness of the reading. Nevertheless, even in the case of the *Convivio*, a reading given by all the manuscripts, which makes good sense, would seem to be preferable to others without manuscript support, and less suitable to the context.¹⁷

The University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ont.

J. E. SHAW

¹⁴ *Purg.*, vii, 34-36.

¹⁵ E. g. ". . . ne la quale de la divina luce assai mi si mostrava, . . ." *Conv.*, III, ii, 9. ". . . la verace de li uomini nobilitade, . . ." *Conv.*, IV, i, 11. ". . . la paura del disnore ricevere per la colpa; . . ." *Conv.*, IV, xix, 10.

¹⁶ Cf. "Tanto voler sopra voler mi venne—de l'esser su, . . ." *Purg.*, xxvii, 121-122.

¹⁷ If the editors of 1934 had kept the word "l'altre," they would not have needed to explain toward the end of note 1, p. 431: "Così sarà da interpretare questo passo, che, a prima giunta, sembra dire che le tre sette filosofiche avessero fede, speranza e carità; . . ."

MACHIAVELLI AND THE SPIRIT OF COMEDY

Whatever the exact date of composition of the *Mandragola* may have been, it was certainly written before one would expect much attention to be given to Aristotle or to any derivative theory of the Unities. Yet one readily notices the strict observance which the play seems to make of them. The most rabid Aristotelian critic of the second half of the century could not have found fault with its unity of time. The comedy is even explicit (with a smile) in its respect for uninterrupted action on a twenty-four hour basis. In closing Act IV, Friar Timoteo¹ says of that scene which decency would not allow on the stage and which took place in the late night and early morning:

E voi spettatori, non ci appuntate: perché in questa notte non ci dormirà persona, sì che gli Atti non sono interrotti dal tempo.

This is perhaps little more surprising than the observance that the play makes of the unity of place—which, again, is strict, and being the usual *piazza* scene throughout, quite the arrangement acceptable to any critic of the Counter-Reformation period.

Unity of action must likewise be granted the play—a unity, indeed, which goes deeper than what was to be demanded, later on, of comedy. More real unity of plot is to be found in the *Mandragola*, I believe, than in either Plautus or Terence. Its action is single, simple and straightforward in its development. The plot proceeds from a total combination of created interests to which the vehemence of Callimaco's love and the astuteness of Ligurio (in a kind of valet rôle of later comedy) are as the precipitating agent. In fact, the *Mandragola*, in the unilinear quality of its action, is outstanding among contemporary plays. The simplest of Ariosto's comedies seems complex in comparison, as does Bibbiena's; and Aretino's beside it seem a maze of actions and fragments of actions.

Moreover, in spite of a long tradition in the criticism of the *Mandragola*, praising it as a "comedy of character," the play clearly follows another famous "rule":

¹ In discussing the play with me, Prof. Leo Spitzer noted that throughout it is the Friar who most observes the passing of time, when, being a Friar, he should be the one most unconcerned with just that; also that he is emphatically shown to be always with women—two observations that seem to have an importance which cannot here be explored.

The Plot then is the first principle . . . Character holds the second place.²

Throughout this "comedy of character" Machiavelli has given first place to first things: to action. Nor is this surprising when one remembers the double parentage of this *commedia erudita*: a kind of comedy which, however erudite its memory of Latin comic structure may have been, never forgot that its other parent was Boccaccio and his offspring *novellistica*. So, even if this paternity were not a familiar historical fact, an attentive reader of the play, knowing Boccaccio, could not fail to sense its novella inheritance. We have no particular novella source for the plot of the *Mandragola*. Yet the outline of its action is so clearly a pattern created mainly by Boccaccio that one feels the order of its composition must have been, first *novella*, then *commedia*. Narrative structure is quite naturally its first principle.

On the other hand it is easy, aesthetically and historically, to understand the terms of Goldoni's remembered enthusiasm for Machiavelli's comedy:

Ce n'étoit pas le style libre ni l'intrigue scandaleuse de la pièce qui me la faisoient trouver bonne . . . mais c'étoit la première pièce de caractère qui m'étoit tombée sous les yeux et j'en étois enchanté.³

With Goldoni, of course, *pièce de caractère* does not mean that the "psychology" of characters in the play directs the construction of its plot. This would be to attribute to the eighteenth-century playwright that excess of our modern psychological critic whose damage Prof. E. E. Stoll has been at such pains to correct in Shakespearean criticism—and which has not been absent from the criticism of the *Mandragola*. Goldoni meant what any understanding reader of the play should mean today: that plot is a first principle, but that upon the plot (in the sense of argument or thread of action) is built a display of character in various *personae* which makes the play something more than the representation of a narration—that its dramatic dimension, in short, exceeds narration in the direction of "character." This, too, was perfectly *en règle* for the Aristotelian critic. Here again he could only praise the comedy.

As a matter of fact, the comedy received little attention from the critics of the second half of the century. It is interesting, however, to speculate a bit further and to wonder what such criticism would

² Aristotle's *Poetics*, VI (Butcher translation).

³ *Mémoires* (Florence, 1907, vol. I, p. 67).

have said of *one* character, at least, in the play, a character in whom plot does not seem to be recognized as a first principle. This is a woman in the third scene of the third act, a completely unattached figure in the play, known simply as *una donna*, in whom we shall here be chiefly interested.

It should be said at once that neither classical nor neo-classical dramatic criticism made any provision for such a character as this. The only incidental or unattached character for which there seems to have been any attempt at justification was what Corneille⁴ (and critics of antiquity) called the *personnage protatique*. But such a personage had a perfectly good *raison d'être* in service to *plot*, and this was all that was needed to justify him in neo-classical criticism. Thus, if Siro in the opening scene of the *Mandragola* had not appeared again in the play, he would have made a very good example of the *protatique*.

But as we shall see, the unattached character of Act III, sc. 3, cannot be reckoned with in terms of plot. She is not sub-narrative. She is, in fact, opposed to narration and outside of it. For this reason, chiefly, she interests us. She is the definition of a quality in the play, a quality by virtue of which the play is great, a quality which we might call its "local texture."⁵

⁴I have Professor Lancaster to thank for pointing this out to me. Corneille's remarks will be found in the *Discours du poème dramatique*, *Œuvres* (Grands Écrivains), t. I, p. 46.

⁵This is to borrow a term and a view from Mr. John Crowe Ransom's brilliant essay "Criticism as Pure Speculation" in the recent volume of essays by several entitled *The Intent of the Critic* (Princeton, 1941, pp. 91 ff.). Mr. Ransom is there concerned with poetic discourse while my present concern is with the structure of a particular play. With all apologies in advance to Mr. Ransom for any violations of his theory in the present appropriation of it, it does seem that his terminology of *logical structure* and *local texture* is capable of a wide application in critical discourse and that it can serve to give a name to things which older criticism fails to distinguish or account for. The present essay draws mainly from those parts of Mr. Ransom's essay where he speaks of *local texture* as "additions to the argument both energetic and irrelevant" which "give, in spite of the argument, which would seem to be perfectly self-sufficient, a sense of the real density and contingency of the world in which arguments and plans have to be pursued." "This character spreads out in planes at right angles to the course of the argument and in effect gives to the discourse another dimension not present in perfectly logical prose." As for this view directed specifically at dramatic discourse, Professor Stoll seems very close

The first form (the "prose" form) of the *Mandragola*, that is, the *favola* which is its first principle, is clearly that of a *novella*. But what *local texture* does this structure bear? As a *pièce de caractère* it readily provides scenes which "spread out in planes at right angles to the course of the argument." That is, they are scenes which are witness to much more of an incidental display of "character" than is demanded by the *favola* in even its broadest sense. Old Nicia walks toward home with Siro, going for a *segno* from his young wife (Act II, sc. 3), but his talk is of other matters—matters which do not act *in plot* at all. Rather do they exhibit a concern for local texture as *opposed* to plot in the play. This is true of several scenes centered on Nicia and Callimaco or on the Friar alone. In fact, the local display of this other dimension seems to be what has earned praise (in varying terminology) for the *Mandragola*. Of course, the mere quantity of it would not make it a great comedy nor distinguish it from much contemporary production. But the quality of it does. Aretino has an abundance of the incidental, although it could be shown that what in his work is *incidental* is simply *incidental action* (forming little epicycles on the main action) rather than a display of condition or texture. Bibbiena's *Calandria* has considerable side-play away from the main line of the argument—but it is side-play into the farcical and into the *facezia*. One may recall many more comedies of the century including the *Candelaio*, only to return to a quickened appreciation of precisely the quality of this other dimension in the *Mandragola*—as something which is, by contrast, synthetic and three-dimensional.

Our woman of Act III, sc. 3, is almost completely contained within her dimension of local texture. In fact, she is such a pure case of it that she can stand, I think, as a kind of sign of the nature of the comic vision which gave life to the whole *Mandragola*.

In the scene in question, our eyes are focused on two figures standing on the steps of the Church: a friar and a woman. We see them both for the first time. The Friar is certainly that Confessor of Lucrezia whom we have been expecting because the argu-

to it when he speaks of "those imaginative and emotional comprehensions and interrelations, rather independent of the strictly narrative or narrowly dramatic, the probable or logical, the purposive or causal . . . transverse or radial instead of longitudinal." (*Dramatic texture in Shakespeare* in his volume *Shakespeare and Other Masters*, 1940, p. 36.)

ment has called for him. But the woman? Nothing has called for her. She is simply *una donna* to us and to the play. This is her first appearance and her last. For one brief scene she is before us, an entirely unattached figure, but one which completely dominates this scene. The naturalness of the idle chatter which flows from this woman's mouth as she talks with her confessor is astounding. It can only be appreciated in the Italian—or better, in the Florentine that it is. The Friar invites her to confession. Her reply, from her first words, makes the scene hers:

Non per oggi; io sono aspettata; e' mi basta essermi sfogata un poco così ritta ritta. Avete voi dette quelle messe della Nostra Donna? . . . Togliete ora questo fiorino, e direte dua mesi ogni lunedì la messa de' morti per l'anima del mio marito. E ancora che fussi uno omaccio, pure le carne tirono; io non posso fare non mi risenta quando io me ne ricordo. Ma credete voi che sia in purgatorio? . . . Io non so già cotesto. Voi sapete pure quello che mi faceva qualche volta. Oh, quanto me ne dolsi io con esso voi! Io me ne discostavo quanto io potevo; ma egli era sì importuno! Uh, Nostro Signore!

The other side of this dialogue to this point is so slight, the Friar has so little to say, that it is interesting to omit his remarks as above and contemplate the words of this woman as sufficient unto themselves. The Friar at this point barely has time to put in a few words when she is off again:

Credete voi che'l Turco passi questo anno in Italia? . . . Naffe! Dio ci aiuti con queste diavolerie! Io ho una gran paura di quello impalare. Ma io veggo qua in chiesa una donna che ha certa accia di mio; io vo' ire a trovarla. Fate col buon di!

And she is gone from the play for good.

This woman, we have suggested, now standing there with her flow of chatter and now gone from the play quickly and finally, is a kind of sign of the quality by which the whole play has greatness. She can stand as that sign and be herself at the same time because she has all the appearance of being unnecessary to the play. It might be claimed that she and the scene serve to display Friar Timoteo in a certain light. Nor can this be wholly denied. They provide material for the Friar's opening soliloquy of the following scene. They help place him by giving him ambience. Yet Timoteo receives much "character" exhibition in other scenes better planned to this purpose. Moreover, the accent in this scene is not on Timoteo. It is on the woman and very much on her.

Henry James, reporting an exciting conversation with Turgeneff, mentions "the intensity of suggestion that may reside in the stray figure, the unattached character . . . the trick of investing some conceived or encountered individual with the germinal property and authority."⁶ One is tempted to claim such "germinal property" for this figure of a woman in the play, so perfectly does she seem to be the revealing *macchia* for the whole; but, in this, not much speculative certainty is possible. One can, however, claim for her a kind of authority, as a sign. I mean that this wholly stray figure is a kind of pure manifestation of the quality of local texture which runs through the whole play, as well as a sample of the comic vision which rounds its little world. To this effect it seems significant that the figure and the scene have validity only within the play in the appointed order. It is no good to turn to this woman directly. She must be come upon within the play.

Such unattached figures are rare enough in the novella, but they can be found there. They are always a kind of measure of quality. When a story has them, it has body. Boccaccio has given us the husband of Monna Belcolore and a few others, but none so useless to plot, I believe, as is this woman. How useless she is to the *favola che Mandragola si chiama* the reader can test for himself by trying to translate the play back into its novella conception. This scene and this woman would have to be eliminated. Thus her absolute freedom from any contribution to narrative structure, her complete existence in a dimension at right angles to plot, is her claim to our interest. The play would be great without her. But it could offer from within itself no better sign of its greatness than what we find in her.

This woman has a meaning which can go beyond the play and touch the complete figure of the author. Viewed in the original Florentine garb of her language, she becomes more and more surprising as we study her. For, as a kind of comic vision, she stands in a pure light. I am surprised that Meredith missed her (and he noticed this very scene), but he seems to have been misled by watching the Friar and thinking the while, like so many other critics, of Tartuffe.

At the risk of seeming to overdo her importance, we must admit that there is indeed a quality to the comic vision which produces

⁶ Preface to *The Portrait of a Lady*.

her that can almost startle. For this woman is looked upon with no ridicule. Here is no farce, no caricature, no satire. There seems to be no laughter here. And it is the absolute *calm* of the gaze which takes her in and passes on to the progress of plot which can startle. Our wonder at such a quality of vision is increased when we remember the date. But regardless of the year, no one quite has looked upon humanity in just such a way. Dante might have come the nearest to it, but Dante would not accept this focus. Even in Hell our view of humanity eternally damned is framed (by the presence of Dante the onlooker) in hope and knowledge of a better fate and salvation—if not for those in Hell, then for others. But the gaze which brings this stray figure into the *Mandragola* is one which Machiavelli as artist shares with Machiavelli, author of the *Prince* and the *Discorsi*. It is an eye which can look steadily at humanity against no screen of superhuman Grace—an eye which plumbs the depths of a comic world to a point almost beyond laughter. Of this world, “dove gli uomini non sanno essere né in tutto buoni né in tutto tristi,” this woman seems an essence and a static sign.

If the spirit of comedy presiding over such a scene is almost *beyond* laughter, how is it that the *Mandragola* is so replete with laughter? If in this woman we glimpse for a moment “how men are” and if “how men are” is not “men as they are laughable,” how is this problem resolved in a play which so obviously means to provoke mirth?

Thus our stray figure has led us to what seems to be the basic critical problem of the play as comedy, and to the terms in which its “ontological locus” can perhaps be determined. The *Mandragola* would seem to be comic in the sense of laughable by the super-imposition of the ridiculous on a world which is not ridiculous. This could be followed through, for example, in the character of Messer Nicia. Nicia is not basically *marked* as a laughable character. In fact, without the rigid control of the play, he can become a pathetic one for us today. Nicia is a comic figure in the deeper sense in which the “*donna*” of Act III, sc. 3 is the sign in the play. Because of this, because he is basically beyond laughter, Nicia is made laughable through his language.⁷ By giving unusual

⁷ A passage in the prologue to the *Clizia* deserves attention for the support which it gives to this view of comic structure in Machiavelli. In

twists to his speech, by putting into his mouth idioms of such high Florentine colour that even Florentines would laugh at him—thus is he made a source of amusement. But this is a comic mask placed for the occasion upon an underlying view of human nature which, with our eyes upon our stray figure, will not escape us. Meredith should have found more in the *Mandragola* than he did. It had what he was looking for.

These are the terms, I feel, in which the proper critical measure of the play can be accomplished. When it is accomplished, our woman in pure local texture will not seem unimportant.

CHARLES S. SINGLETON

SAINTE-BEUVE ON SCIENCE AND HUMAN NATURE:
JOUFFROY, LE PLAY, PROUDHON

Théodore Jouffroy, author of the once famous *Comment les dogmes finissent* (1823), was held in affectionate esteem by Sainte-Beuve, yet the critical habits of the latter made him question what he clearly considered a *new* dogmatism of this eager reorganizer of human nature and human relations. Jouffroy is the first in date of several contemporaries scrutinized in terms of their affirmations about a scientific treatment of such problems—"scientific" connoting much more of metaphysics and of abstraction than would be acceptable today in French or in English. The critic, while following current verbal usage, had important reservations about science so conceived. The record is of interest for its bearing upon a significant trend of the last one hundred years and for what from a somewhat new angle it suggests about Sainte-Beuve.

that Prologue to a later comedy, M. is expressing more directly a theory of comedy, in no way original, but indicative of the determination to provoke laughter by making his characters ridiculous:

"Ma, volendo dilettere, è necessario muovere li spettatori a riso, il che non si può fare mantenendo il parlare grave e severo; perché le parole che fanno ridere sono, o sciocche, o iniuriose, o amorose. È necessario pertanto rappresentare persone sciocche, malediche o innamorate e perciò quelle commedie che sono piene di queste tre qualità di parole, sono piene di risa; quelle che ne mancano, non truovono chi con il ridere le accompagni."

Thus, in so far as Nicia wears a comic mask, he tends, through his language, to become the type of the *vecchio sciocco*.

The first three Jouffroy articles (1830-1831)¹ show the commentator taking the other's project for the analysis and control of humanity seriously enough to make serious objections. Fresh from his own studies as a medical student, less temperate of speech than he will become, he considers extravagant and grotesque Jouffroy's generalizations about what scientific and presumably experimental methods can do for the study and then the shaping of human destiny. Already Jouffroy is writing like a thorough determinist of the Taine school of thirty years later; already Sainte-Beuve is dubious. Partly as a physiologist perhaps and certainly in part as a moralist the young Sainte-Beuve, distrustful of abstractions, suggests already a programme that allies him both with predecessors of Descartes (compare the intuitions of Montaigne) and with the twentieth century (compare modern psychologists):

rester en plein dans le réel, dans l'unité substantielle de l'esprit et de la matière . . . vivre de la vie complète, profonde et intime, non seulement de la vie nette et claire de la conscience réfléchie et de l'acte voulu, mais de la vie multiple et convergente qui nous afflue de tous les points de notre être; que nous sentons parfois de la sensation la plus irrécusable, couler dans notre sang, frissonner dans notre moelle, frémir dans notre chair, se dresser dans nos cheveux, gémir en nos entrailles, sourdre et murmurer au sein des tissus. . . .²

The immediate alliance is no doubt, as Gustave Michaut says,³ with the Saint-Simoniens, but such passages contain in germ much of the future Sainte-Beuve soon to be free of this sect.⁴ He will become briefly but entirely explicit later about physiological developments,⁵ in subsequent writing about Jouffroy's "psychology." In these first articles he chiefly attacks habits of quick generalization. At the same time, with his own persistent humanist deductions, but also passing the centuries in review and clearly intend-

¹ *Premiers Lundis*, II, 1-49.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 40.

³ *Sainte-Beuve avant les Lundis*, p. 239.

⁴ Sainte-Beuve later said (*Mes Poisons*, p. 196) that the opportunity to observe at first-hand the Saint-Simoniens taught him much about the behavior of religious reformers and made his touch more sure (more scientific) as a historian of Port-Royal.

⁵ On the other hand in one of these early articles (p. 17) Sainte-Beuve denies the validity of any chemical investigation of, for example, the lobes of the brain; he then had no notion, and for this he can hardly be reproached, that scientists would be talking later about the "chemical core of living matter" and the secretion of neurohumors.

ing to be historical, he writes with eloquent conviction about the triumph of man, "complete" as described above, over outside nature; Apollo has conquered the Python.⁶

In the next Jouffroy article (1833)⁷ further doubts are expressed about this "dogmatique par excellence"⁸ rashly presuming to be scientific and, what in this case brings out still more the humanist and the artist in Sainte-Beuve himself, there is expression of regret that Jouffroy distrusted and suppressed his own poetic urges.⁹ Indeed under such ruthlessly self-imposed logic Sainte-Beuve senses "l'ennui de l'âme."¹⁰ Concerning those moments where Jouffroy's imagination gave him a hint of the infinite creation of which he was so slight a fragment Sainte-Beuve writes with particular sympathy and once in a deeply personal tone: he too has had, for a brief instant, his Sinaitic vision.¹¹ The work of fiction that Jouffroy might have composed—and he did contemplate a novel—might well have been a psychological treasure-house; not for any systematization but for genuine insight into particular cases. Sainte-Beuve was writing this in December, 1833; his own novel, *Volupté*, on which he had been working intermittently since 1831, was published in July, 1834; again one may suspect an autobiographical note, less deliberate this time—and be reminded of Valéry analyzing himself in the person of Leonardo da Vinci.

Sainte-Beuve continued all his life, as passing references show, to be drawn to Jouffroy¹² and returned to the author formally in 1853 when he discussed Mignet's eulogy of the deceased member before the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*.¹³ He has always wished, he says again, that Jouffroy had not limited himself

⁶ P. 46.

⁷ *Portraits littéraires*, I, 296-324.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 319. Sainte-Beuve seems not to have been struck by the paradox that Jouffroy is particularly known as the author of *Comment les dogmes finissent*.

⁹ Sainte-Beuve mentions in a note two poems in *Joseph Delorme* which are about *Jouffroy* although the latter is not named.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 312. Cf. the Sainte-Beuve who writes later with admiration of the *Somnium Scipionis* and disparagingly of a near-sighted Chateaubriand (*Chateaubriand et son groupe littéraire*, II, 401-403).

¹² Jouffroy's pioneer work in esthetics (cf. H. U. Forest, "Jouffroy et le problème de l'imitation dans les arts," *PMLA*, LVI, 1095-1102, December 1941) seems not to have interested him.

¹³ *Causeries du lundi*, VIII, 291 ff.

to speculations so abstract and sterile, wearing himself out in attempts to set up a merely conjectural science—meaning psychology, as it was understood in Sainte-Beuve's day. He had already looked dubiously upon this attitude in a by-remark of the 1833 article; psychology as practiced, he ventured to assert, except for certain contributions about details, satisfied mainly the personal convictions of the observer, and as a "science" had to be started anew by each person. And Sainte-Beuve had compared this psychologist to a fisherman fishing for his own reflexion in the water.¹⁴ Now, twenty years later, he raises the same question of principle; this kind of psychologist, not a true savant, "n'a qu'une science de reflets et de miroitements";¹⁵ he wishes Jouffroy and others had not drawn so absolute a line of demarcation between their psychology and physiology. And he adds a comment, literary, intuitive, which contains a hint of the twentieth century: psychologists would do well to consider La Fontaine and how for the study of man and the workings of the human mind he by no means excluded observation of animals and comparisons based upon natural history.

In 1869, the last year of his life, the critic makes a final, brief and again consistent allusion to Jouffroy. He publishes in a new edition of his *Portraits contemporains*¹⁶ a long and picturesque letter written him in 1833 by George Sand in which she agrees to make the acquaintance of Jouffroy but in which she sets down, with an acuteness inspired perhaps by some remark of Sainte-Beuve, her conjectures as to what Jouffroy is like. She suspects he is a man of small experience and innocently narrow-minded; she uses the occasion to compare him with Sainte-Beuve to the credit of the latter's tolerance and larger discernments. Sainte-Beuve was not a vain man, and it is not likely that he finally published this letter because of its compliment to him. He simply continues to be interested in moralists—and in moralizers. He says explicitly of this incident that in recommending Jouffroy as one new acquaintance who might help George Sand's mood of the moment he was not very subtle: "J'allais donner dans le doctrinaire." The lady brought this home to him, he tells us, with a kind of graceful docility.

¹⁴ *Portraits littéraires*, I, 305, note.

¹⁵ *Causeries du lundi*, VIII, 305, note.

¹⁶ I, 510-513.

Sainte-Beuve's numerous, often favorable, certainly not docile, judgments of the great doctrinaire Taine, notably in 1857 and 1864,¹⁷ involve issues related to those that arise with Jouffroy, but these would take one deep into literary history and literary criticism.¹⁸ For the moment I am looking principally at two or three men outside the field of *belles-lettres* who interested Sainte-Beuve, even induced him more or less unconsciously to introspection, because of their ambitions to make strictly scientific investigations of human nature and human society. The formal estimates of Jouffroy provide a sample of Sainte-Beuve's views about this enterprise over a considerable part of his life (1830-1853). A study of Le Play (1864), a book on Proudhon (1865), and also, in a case where the novelist attempts to become an uncompromising scientist,¹⁹ a letter to Zola (1868), offer parallel evidence for the final decade. The letter to Zola opens up other vistas.

Le Play is praised as a Polytechnicien, a metallurgist who brings his professional training to bear, intelligently, upon the problems of human society.²⁰ The article indicates no reversal of principles as compared with the earlier comments upon Jouffroy; in the engineer's mind of Le Play the critic finds no abuse of abstractions; Le Play is a kind of Bonald²¹ rejuvenated, progressive and scien-

¹⁷ *Causeries du lundi*, XIII, 249-284; *Nouveaux Lundis*, VIII, 66-137.

¹⁸ Taine wrote extensively about the theories and abstractions of Jouffroy in *Philosophes français du dix-neuvième siècle*, Paris, 1857, pp. 197-282. Taine as usual shows his liking for neat compartments ("Je n'entends plus du tout. Il n'y a là qu'une image poétique. Cela est littéraire, non scientifique," p. 234) and for formulas: Jouffroy wavers between Aristotelian analysis and the catechism; Jouffroy was "exclu de la vérité et voisin de la vérité." As a final proof of his own distrust of theories and fidelity to record Taine plays a game he calls "changement de siècle" and proves that Jouffroy would have been happier and greater had he been born in England in 1680, educated at Cambridge, etc.

¹⁹ Zola accepts the consequences of Taine's celebrated formula about vice and virtue, as Taine himself explicitly did not. Indeed the latter said of Zola's discipleship: "C'est un fils que je renie" (as quoted by Bourget, *Les Annales*, April 1, 1928).

²⁰ "Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France déduite de l'observation comparée des peuples européens*," *Nouveaux lundis*, IX, 161-201.

²¹ Sainte-Beuve wrote an article on Bonald in 1851 (*Causeries du lundi*, IV, 426-449). He is tolerant of the intolerance of Bonald as an interesting specimen of one mood of one epoch. Bonald is not directly related to the Jouffroy, Le Play, Proudhon sequence and, of course, in many ways was their opposite.

tific (evidently to Sainte-Beuve in the proper sense of this last word).

M. Le Play est d'une génération toute nouvelle; il est l'homme de la société moderne par excellence, nourri de sa vie, élevé dans son progrès, dans ses sciences et dans leurs applications, de la lignée des fils de Monge et de Berthollet; et, s'il a conçu la pensée d'une réforme, ce n'est qu'à la suite de l'expérience et en combinant les voies et moyens qu'il propose avec toutes les forces vives de la civilisation actuelle . . . en savant, en homme pratique, muni . . . de tous les matériaux particuliers qu'il a rassemblés.²²

The details of this passage show, in fine, that Le Play is credited with exactly the skill in observation and selection which Maurras will later admire in Sainte-Beuve himself as "organizing empiricism."²³ Sainte-Beuve has recognized a companion-spirit, indeed he is not utterly remote from the psychologist who contemplates himself—but he will never claim to be exclusively scientific.

Proudhon does. In one of the long and many passages from Proudhon which Sainte-Beuve quotes in his book about the confident socialist²⁴ the latter reproaches Jouffroy for having been only a weak and lukewarm practitioner of social science who failed to grasp the simple truth that the laws of arithmetic and algebra rule over the movements of societies as over the chemical combinations of atoms, that in the moral as in the mechanical world nothing happens *sine pondere et numero et mensura*.²⁵ Sainte-Beuve is naturally full of objections to the new social mechanist yet he admires, repeatedly, the grandiose ambitions of this earnest and sincere as well as arrogant pioneer. Even to be shipwrecked on these vast seas is heroic.²⁶ The centuries may prove Proudhon a prophet. But he is naïvely impatient. Sainte-Beuve protests in terms of a long French literary and cultural tradition of delicate appraisal.²⁷ He is not persuaded that everything is already arranged and for the best "in the best of possible

²² P. 189.

²³ *Trois Idées politiques*, 1898, Chapter III.

²⁴ *P.-J. Proudhon, sa vie et sa correspondance*, 1872; first published as four articles in *La Revue contemporaine*, October-December, 1865.

²⁵ P. 58.

²⁶ P. 109.

²⁷ "Le propre de la plus haute intelligence est dans un équilibre supérieur" (p. 37).

sciences."²⁸ He quotes Molière about "reasoning that banishes reason."²⁹ With Pascal he holds, although not in verbatim reference, that *l'esprit géométrique* is not enough. He points out explicitly that Proudhon might have found wise counsel in Pascal for wrestling with the contradictions in man—but Proudhon was too loftily dedicated to his "science toute nouvelle."³⁰ Such intemperance suggests to Sainte-Beuve on the other hand certain qualities of a much more recent French literary manner with which, we know, the critic was often not in sympathy. Something defective, or excessive rather, in the conformation of Proudhon's brain made him the victim of a sort of optical illusion; he saw things as bigger, nearer, more imminent than they were. "Victor Hugo a quelque chose de ce défaut ou de cet excès cérébral dans l'ordre visuel et pour ce qui est des couleurs: il voit trop gros, trop rouge et trop saillant."³¹ There is a comparable giantism (although Sainte-Beuve does not trouble to make the comparison) in Proudhon, who likes to take all the bulls by the horns at once, who even, with a kind of Cyclopean merriment, delights in terrifying us; Sainte-Beuve suggests here that British reformers, of more human dimensions, have been wiser: Proudhon "joue de sa logique, de sa massue d'Hercule, et la promène sur les têtes comme quelqu'un qui n'a rien à ménager. . . . Et voilà une des mille raisons qui font qu'en France on n'a pas de Richard Cobden."³²

Such a passionately rectilinear science is to Sainte-Beuve not authentic science. Again he calls for more attention, on the part of

²⁸ P. 271. Cf. also a letter of Sainte-Beuve's maturity to Prosper Enfantin (9 jan. 1859) wherein likewise the critic suggests that he has reservations on this matter: "Aussi . . . ne vous ai-je jamais jugé, ni vous, cher Maître, ni Saint-Simon; juger, c'est appliquer un *criterium*, et je n'en ai pas pour la Science sociale" (*Amateur d'Autographes*, 15 avril, 1903, p. 63; also in *Livre d'or de Sainte-Beuve*, p. 241).

²⁹ P. 333.

³⁰ P. 223.

³¹ P. 342. There are of course any number of references in Sainte-Beuve to this characteristic of Hugo, from the critic's early letters directly to the poet (e.g. the letter on *Cromwell*, February 13, 1827, in *Correspondance générale*, I, 78-81) to the section on Hugo in *Mes Poisons* (pp. 36-56). Cf. in *Mes Poisons* Sainte-Beuve's allusion to an entire "génération ampoulée," his own (p. 23). Note how far all this takes one beyond the indulgence in personalities and *rancune* with which Sainte-Beuve is almost invariably charged.

³² P. 168.

these analysts of human relations, to physiology, with its laws "multiple and mysterious."³³ The epithet "mysterious" is more suggestive of *belles-lettres* than of laboratories; even so Sainte-Beuve senses modern developments, and we have just seen him writing somewhat as a modern physiologist of the brain of the social crusader he wishes to understand. He is also seen to be sufficiently aware of the ways of competent professional scientists to issue a warning about laymen who dabble; when Proudhon for example ventures into astronomy he misses vital distinctions: "les profanes devraient parler le moins possible de ces choses, sur lesquelles ils ne font que balbutier."³⁴

A layman who was soon, after his own fashion, to grow very articulate about the extension to daily human living of scientific methods, who was well aware of Proudhon, and who insisted that Sainte-Beuve notice his own work, was Emile Zola. The letter Sainte-Beuve wrote him becomes a part of this survey. The situation is at first glance slightly bewildering because Zola is convinced that Proudhon "marche en pleine erreur"³⁵ when he tries to comprehend artists and this because of his failure to realize that art is a matter of individual temperament, whereas Sainte-Beuve in turn believes that Zola "fait fausse route" because Zola would have the artist turn scientifically impersonal. The solution as regards Zola may lie in the dates, in a rapid evolution after *Mes Haines* (1866), in which he included Proudhon, toward *Le Roman expérimental* (1880). Present concern is with Sainte-Beuve's letter to Zola of June 10, 1868 wherein, yielding to the novelist's urgings, he expresses an opinion of *Thérèse Raquin*.³⁶ Your book, he says,

³³ P. 130.

³⁴ P. 200, note. There is one case where Sainte-Beuve deliberately urges close collaboration between artist and savant; in an article, of the same decade (1863), on Littré (*Nouveaux lundis*, V, 200-256), he imagines the admirable French dictionary that might result from a union of the discriminating culture of the Academy and the scientific competence, a little absolute, of a Littré.

³⁵ Zola, *Mes Haines*, 1866, article on "Proudhon et Courbet." My own art, says Zola, is outside of all rules and social necessities. Yet there would seem to be the germ of the other Zola in Proudhon when the latter says approvingly that "un philosophe expérimente sur des idées comme un physicien sur des corps" (quoted by Sainte-Beuve, *Proudhon*, p. 124).

³⁶ *Correspondance*, II, 314-317. Sainte-Beuve wrote no article on Zola and was clearly reluctant to send this letter.

is remarkable, and may mark an epoch in the evolution of the novel. But even so such a work "dépasse les limites . . . sort des conditions de l'art à quelque point de vue qu'on l'envisage; et, en réduisant l'art à n'être que la seule et simple vérité . . . me paraît hors de cette vérité." In Sainte-Beuve's opinion nothing in the novel justifies the epigraph (which he did not say and did not need to say was taken from Taine) to the effect that vice and virtue are products like vitriol and sugar. Zola is neither an authentic savant nor a true artist: "Je prétends qu'ici vous manquez à l'observation ou à la divination. C'est fait de tête et non d'après nature." Sainte-Beuve seems to find Zola making up "facts" in his head quite in the manner of Jouffroy and Proudhon.

No doubt the most vital issue here is that about Truth. Aiming so uncompromisingly at *la vérité simple*, says Sainte-Beuve, makes you miss it. This somehow recalls the Sainte-Beuve in the person of Joseph Delorme who insisted almost forty years earlier that "une vérité est toujours moins vraie exprimée que conçue."²⁷ The argument is not that one should abandon expression but that one must both seek it and distrust it. Zola, for Sainte-Beuve, is evidently oversanguine and impatient. At the same time the doubts of the critic, the artist, about "la seule et simple vérité" constitute a contrast (that is something of a shock) to the frequently quoted remark of Sainte-Beuve: "Si j'avais une devise, ce serait le *vrai*, le *vrai* seul.—Et que le beau et le bien s'en tirent ensuite comme ils pourront!"²⁸ Jean Bonnerot, of whom it is said that he knows more about Sainte-Beuve than did Sainte-Beuve himself, insists upon this remark when stressing the scientific character of the critic's work in an article relative to the *Musée de la littérature* of the Paris Exposition of 1937.²⁹ And in the Sainte-Beuve *Tableau* which Bonnerot prepared for this occasion he quoted another statement wherein Sainte-Beuve declared himself to be as fanatical a truth-seeker as the most extreme scientist: "J'irais au bout du

²⁷ "Pensées de Joseph Delorme," *Poésies*, I, 180. Cf. Baudelaire, Sainte-Beuve's disciple in some ways, on indispensable obscurity.

²⁸ Letter to Victor Duroy, 9 December 1865. *Correspondance*, II, 41.

²⁹ *Ebauche et premiers éléments d'un musée de littérature*, Paris, Denoël, 1938. "Sainte-Beuve," pp. 20-24. Taine would have been fascinated by this exhibit (cf. Taine, *Philosophie de l'art*, II, 1: "nos musées sont des muséums").

monde pour une minutie comme un géologue maniaque pour un caillou." May it not be, with all deference to Jean Bonnerot, that Sainte-Beuve's talk of a *devise* had in it a touch of *boutade* or counter-*boutade*? He was looking here at the "belle devise et surtout spécieuse" of Cousin: *le beau, le bien, le vrai*. He never cared for such systematization; moreover he was dubious about Cousin, not a really great man,⁴⁰ and he was dubious of *idées reçues* about the good and the beautiful or anything else. He immediately proceeds in this letter to attack the stultifying and devitalizing notion of examining current literature from the point of view of a tradition, a code.⁴¹ The protest, in favor of *le vrai seul* may be as much the reaction of the supple and imaginative man of letters against a certain formalism as that of the fact seeker. No doubt, as is commonly repeated, Sainte-Beuve's critical works "gave a scientific foundation to literary analysis"—but the artist persists.

The present record shows for one thing an artist holding out steadily for more of finesse, notably in reference to Jouffroy and Proudhon. Sainte-Beuve has a reputation, supported indeed by the most commonly cited of his own self-analyses, for being the least persistent of men, a sort of intellectual chameleon ("Je suis l'esprit le plus brisé et le plus rompu aux métamorphoses," etc.); it is often forgotten that in this same passage he insists that he

⁴⁰ Cf. "Pensées de Joseph Delorme," *Poésies*, I, 181, note: Cousin "joue . . . le génie." In the second of these "Pensées" Sainte-Beuve cites Cousin's quip: "Il y a toujours les trois quarts d'absurde dans tout ce que nous disons"—which is probably related to the first "Pensée," about attempts to express the truth one conceives, but which likewise provides opportunity for counter-boutades. Sainte-Beuve's four articles about Cousin have slight relation to the present science problem; he notes that Cousin's eclecticism was acceptable neither to the orthodox believers nor to the physiologists.

⁴¹ At the end of the *Proudhon* are published a few notes and fragments which the critic seems to have written at the same time and in the same year, 1865. He engages in speculation about the future of literature, and he sees no reason why literature should not move forward as science is expected to do. The persistent pioneer in him comes out in a glance towards the new world, which he considers crude perhaps but vigorous, and he indulges (p. 349) in a "coup d'oeil sur la littérature américaine . . . qui a . . . depuis Franklin jusqu'à Emerson son cachet original et qui peut l'avoir de plus en plus.—Dans toute cette littérature, comme on se passe de la littérature, des vieilles idées reçues!"

never abdicated will or judgment.⁴² The present record also shows this artist deeply interested in a scientific attitude towards human relations,⁴³ more comprehending of its potentialities than a psychologist like Joubert or a socialist like Proudhon, thoroughly sympathetic with the engineer's mind of a Le Play; the moralist in Sainte-Beuve while attached in tradition and in practice to Montaigne and others of a noble line had glimpses of a future alliance of the methods of a delicate art and an authentic science. This is the man who wanted in criticism at once more *charm* and more *reality*, "de la poésie à la fois et quelque physiologie."⁴⁴

Columbia University

HORATIO SMITH

ENG. DISMAL = O. F. *DISM-AL

The generally accepted opinion about the etymology of this English word is that which is reflected in the *NED* and which is in essence identical with the commentary to lines 1206-07 of the *Book of the Duchess* (*I trowe hit was in the dismal, That was the ten woundes of Egipte*) given by Skeat in his edition of Chaucer:

Dismal. In this particular passage the phrase *in the dismal* means 'on an unlucky day,' with reference to an etymology which connected *dismal* with the Latin *dies malus*. Though we cannot derive *dismal* immediately from the Lat. *dies malus*, it is now known that there was an Anglo-French phrase *dis mal* (= Lat. *dies mali*, plural); whence the M. E. phrase *in the dismal*, 'in the evil days,' or (more loosely), 'on an

⁴² *Portraits littéraires*, I, 545 ("Pensées," xv).

⁴³ In a brief address to medical students in 1868 Sainte-Beuve stresses, as he naturally would to them, the physiological side: "la seule garantie de l'avenir, d'un avenir de progrès, de vigueur et d'honneur pour notre nation est dans l'étude,—et surtout dans l'étude des sciences naturelles, physiques, chimiques, et de la physiologie. C'est par là que bien des idées vagues ou fausses s'éclaircissent ou se rectifient. . . . Ce n'est pas seulement l'hygiène physique de l'humanité qui y gagnera, c'est son hygiène morale. . . . Etudiez, travaillez, messieurs, travaillez à guérir un jour nos malades de corps et d'esprit." (*Lettres à la princesse*, pp. 336, note).

A comprehensive study should be made of Sainte-Beuve and the physical sciences.

⁴⁴ *Portraits littéraires*, I, 546 ("Pensées," xix). Sainte-Beuve added in another version of this *Pensée* (*Mes Poisons*, p. 120): "La physiologie gagne avec les années."

evil day.' When the exact sense was lost, the suffix *-al* seemed to be adjectival, and the word *dismal* became at last an adjective. The A. F. form *dismal*, explained as *les mal jours* (evil days), was discovered by M. Paul Meyer in a Glasgow MS. (marked Q. 9.13, fol. 100, back), in a poem dated 1256; which settles the question. Dr. Chance notes that Chaucer probably took *dis-mal* to be derived from O. F. *dis mal*, i. e. 'ten evils'; see l. 1207.

We can now see the connexion with the next line. The whole sentence means: 'I think it must have been in the evil days (i. e. on an unlucky day), such as were the days of the ten plagues of Egypt'; and the allusion is clearly to the so-called *dies Ægyptiaci*, or unlucky days; and *woundes* is merely a rather too literal translation of Lat. *plaga*, which we generally translate by *plague*. In Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum Naturale*, lib. xv. c. 83, we find:—'In quolibet mense sunt duo dies, qui dicuntur *Ægyptiaci*, quorum unus est a principio mensis, alter a fine.' He goes on to show how they are calculated, and says that, in January, the Egyptian days are the 1st, and the 7th from the end, i. e. the 25th; and he expressly refers the name *Ægyptiaci* to the plagues of Egypt, which (as some said) took place on Egyptian days; for it was asserted that there were minor plagues besides the ten. See also Brand's *Pop. Antiquities*, ed. Ellis, from which I extract the following. Barnabe Googe thus translates the remarks of Naogeorgus on this subject [of days]:—

'But some of them Egyptian are, and full of jeoparddee,
And some again, beside the rest, both good and luckie bee.'

Brand (as above), ii. 45.

'The Christian faith is violated when, so like a pagan and apostate, any man doth observe those days which are called *Ægyptiaci*,' etc.—Melton's *Astrologaster*, p. 56; in Brand, ii. 47. 'If his Journey began unawares on the *dismal day*, he feares a mischiefe'; Bp. Hall, *Characters of Virtues and Vices*; in Brand, ii. 48. 'Alle that take hede to *dysmal dayes*, or use nyce observaunces in the newe moone,' etc.; *Dialogue of Dives and Pauper* (1493); in Brand, i. 9. 'A *dismol day*'; *Tale of Beryn*, 650. Compare also the following:—

'Her *disemale daies*, and her fatal houres';

Lydgate, *Storie of Thebes*, pt. iii. (ed. 1561, fol. 370).

In the *Pistil of Swete Susan* (Laing's *Anc. Pop. Poetry of Scotland*), l. 305, Daniel reproves one of the elders in these terms:—

'Thou hast i-be presedent, the people to steere,

Thou dotest now on thin olde tos, in the *dismale*.'

In *Langtoft's Chronicle*, l. 477 (in *Wright's Polit. Songs*, p. 303), John Balliol is attacked in some derisive verses, which conclude with:—'Rede him at ride in the *dismale*'; i. e. advise him to ride on an unlucky day. Cf. *The Academy*, Nov. 28, 1891, p. 482; etc.

The consequence of 'proposing' on an unlucky day was a refusal; see l. 1243.

The gist of Skeat's interpretation is, in turn, repeated in F. N. Robertson's edition. But Paul Meyer himself, in his original pub-

lication of the Anglo-French poet Raüf de Linham (1256), seems much less convinced of the etymology *dismal* = O. F. *dis mal*; without committing himself this editor comments merely: "Il [Raüf] donne ainsi l'explication du mot anglais *dismal*: '*Dismal* les appelent plusours, Ceo est à dire les mal jours'." And indeed, for us, no more than for Paul Meyer, should this *attempt* at an etymology by the thirteenth century poet, "settle the question." For the "Anglo-French *dis mal*" of which Skeat speaks is nowhere attested—and for several very good reasons: in the first place a Lat. *dies mali*¹ could give in Old French only **di mal* (or, in the oblique case of the plural, **dis maus*): no such hybrid combination as **dis mal*, with the noun in the oblique, the adjective in the nominative form, could exist. Secondly, the adjective *mal*, used with emotive force, generally precedes the noun (as is evidenced by the phrase in our own passage *mal jours*, and in Godefroy, s. v. *mal*, by the attestations of *maujour*²; cf. also in Godefroy *mal tems*, *male semaine* etc.). Finally, the substantive *di* is scarcely to be found in O. F. except in stereotyped phrases (*puissedi* = *puis cel di*, Alexius) or as an element of petrified compounds such as *lunsdi*, *midi*; the explanation *les maljours*, given by Raüf de Linham, suggests by it what must have been the normal way of expressing in O. F. the idea 'dies nefasti.' Moreover, as regards English usage, the expression 'dismal *days*' is attested only a little later than is the original phrase 'in the dismal'; the addition of the word 'day' to a word itself suggesting the idea 'day' is rather surprising. In the French sentence of R. de Linham *dismal les*

¹ *dies mali* is likewise unattested in Classical Latin as a stock-phrase, so far as I have been able to determine; we find, however, in Petronius a [*dies*] *incomodi* (as opposed to *dies boni*), and it is possible that this may represent a euphemism for a **dies mali* that was current. For late Latin, the ThLL (s. v. *dies* col. 1057) attests the singular *dies mala* (e. g. Vulg. Ps. 40, 2: *in die mala*), but I was able to find traces of the plural *dies mali* only as late as Ugutio (Du Cange s. v. *dies aegyptiacus*).

The only possible way of retaining the etymology *dies mali* would be to assume that the French word represents a vulgar adaptation from a (late) Latin phrase which would have become common: that is, O. F. *dismal* would be, not a compound of two French words, but could only come directly from the Latin *di(e)s mal(i)* > *dismal*.

² In fact, *les mal jours* should have been printed in P. Meyer's text as a compound: *les maljours*; cf. the examples in Godefroy, and also *maltems*, *malesemaine* etc.

appelent plusours, *dismal* could be an adjective referring to *jours* in which there is no place for a compound with *dies*.

The etymological explanation *dismal* = O. F. *dis mali* (Lat. *dies mali*) is further invalidated by the two lines of Chaucer cited above in which, according to Dr. Chance, he identifies *dismal* with the 'ten evils' (*dis mal* = *decem mala*). No one has adopted the etymology of Chaucer; why should we then adopt that of the other medieval poet? In fact we know today that to medieval writers etymology offered an opportunity, not only of punning and amplification (cf. A. Schiaffini, *Tradizione e poesia*, p. 96) but of developing the ample possibilities of symbolism latent in language: various phonetic associations could be used to clarify the *res* referred to by a particular word. Isidore in his collection of various etymologies started this 'poly-etymological' approach by putting side by side different traditional explanations with no attempt to decide between them. Compare:

(Origines V, 30-31) *Mane lux natura et plena, nec iam crepusculum. Et dictum mane a mano; manum enim antiqui bonum dicebant. Quid enim melius luce? Alii mane aestimant vocari a Manibus, quorum conversatio a luna ad terram est. Alii putant ab aere, quia manus, id est rarus, est atque perspicuus.*

In St. Bernard of Clairvaux we find in full development that medieval conception of etymology "che . . . analizza i vocaboli al fine di dar sviluppo e decoro al discorso, di gettar luce sulla cosa e sul nome descritti, di cavar dal nome, con avveduta opportunità, applicazioni morali a beneficio degli uditori" (thus the name of the Virgin Mary is developed in St. Bernard's sermons according to the 'interpretio nominis' *Maris stella* and *Mater Virgo*). I may be allowed to quote here a series of etymologies³ used to this same moralistico-exegetic purpose by Gautier de Coincy (cf. E. Lommatzsch, "Gautier de Coincy als Satiriker" p. 119):

Beguin, ce dient, sont benigne, . . .
Beguin, ce dient, se derive
E vient a benignite.
Ha! ha! larron, quel barat, é!

³ The series of word etymologies that purported to teach the reality of the *res* expressed by the word, is a parallel to the series of moral interpretations ('moralizations') given to 'things' by medieval commentators on animals, stones, ancient legends: in either case the *res* is approached from different angles.

Je i sai autre derivoison,
 A la milleur des deus voise on.
 Beguin certes ne sont pas doz,
 Ja soit ce qu'aient symples voz;
 Ainz sont poignant plus que fregon.
 Beguin se viennent de *begon*,
 Et de beguin viennent begarz,
 Et ce voit bien nés uns soz garz
 Que de begart vient *brais* et *boe*
 Qui tot conchie et tout emboe.

Thus it would not be in the least surprising to find in *one* medieval text the *two* etymologies of *dismal* above mentioned (= *dies mali* and *decem mala*), in the manner of St. Bernard and Gautier de Coincy: etymologies of this nature are applications of the etymological principle of the Middle Ages *nomina sunt consequentia rerum*; accordingly they must be considered as 'pseudo-etymologies' by us modern scholars, who do not look for the 'etymon' as a possible hint, one among many, to the *real* nature of things, but as *the* historically true word out of which the word in question has *in fact* developed. Moreover the 'poly-etymologies' of the medieval writers do not concord even with the naive feeling of the speaking community of their own time, which would accept only *one* explanation, provided the word is etymologically transparent.

The procedure of the ancients, who had not found the principle of derivation, to see compounds everywhere (thus Varro explained *vineta* by *vite multa*, *quaerere* = *quae res*, cf. H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern*, p. 344) was continued by Isidore and the mediaeval scholars,⁴ who

⁴ . . . and also by the mediaeval preachers. E. Gilson, *Les idées et les lettres*, p. 129, commenting on what appears to our eye as puns in Menot: *mutuum dicitur quasi de meo tuum; civitas dicitur quasi civium unitas; mulier dicitur quasi mollis aer*, writes:

"Il s'agit . . . du plus sérieux des procédés de développement, dont Isidore de Séville fait généralement les frais, et qui se fonde sur cette conviction, que l'analyse de la structure des mots révèle, par les parties composantes du mot, les parties composantes de l'idée . . . Guillaume d'Auvergne est fort clair sur ce point: "Hoc autem genus loquendi (*scil.* derivatio et compositio) vocant grammatici ethimologiam, quando scilicet alicujus vocabuli virtus et ratio per suam compositionem declaratur, ut *magnanimus*, *magnum habens animum*; et *justus*, *juri stans*; et *humilis*, *humi labilis*; et *lapis*, *ledens pedem*; et *superbus* *super bonos* dominari cupiens, aut *superans* et *suppeditans bonos* quia etiam bonos preesse cupit. Sic *mansuctus*, *manu*

were thereby prevented from analyzing our word into radical + suffix: they divided it *dis-mal* instead of *dism-al*. The principle which was thus violated is one which I have enunciated several times (e. g. in my article on '*bigot*,' *ZRPh* LXIV, 189, where it is shown that the right division of this word is not *bi-got* but *big-ot*) and which I have since found expressed, most felicitously, as early as the eighteenth century: cf. Turgot's article on *étymologie* in the *Encyclopédie* (*Oeuvres*, ed. Echelle I, 478 and 491):

Il est naturel de ne pas chercher d'abord loin de soi ce qu'on peut trouver sous la main. L'examen attentif du mot dont on cherche l'étymologie, et de tout ce qu'il emprunte, si j'ose ainsi parler, de l'analogie propre de sa langue, est donc le premier pas à faire. Si c'est un *dérivé*, il faut le ramener à sa *racine*, en le dépouillant de cet appareil de terminaisons, et d'inflexions grammaticales qui le déguisent. . . .

Thus the modern etymologists who have failed to subtract the current suffix *-al* from *dismal*, have acted in subservience to medieval prescientific practices. This would not be the first time that our scholars have gullibly identified their own endeavors with the rambling etymologies of the Middle Ages.

But what is the radical *dism-*? I assume that it is the O. F. *disme* (= Lat. *decima* [sc. *pars*]) 'tithe';⁵ the suffix *-al*, a learned

assuetus; et *dominus*, dans *minas*; et *superbia*, *superbiens*; et *mulier*, *molliens herum*, conformiter et apte componuntur."

Similarly the appellation *li margariz* (> *μαργαρίτζ*), epithet of Isembard, is analyzed by Philippe Mousket as a compound: *mar-gariz* 'ill-saved.' It is perhaps the same sort of analysis which accounts for the number of Sarracen names (i. e. names bestowed upon Sarracens by Christians) such as *Margariz*, *Marganice*, *Marsilie*, and many other similar appellatives with a *mal-* prefix (v. the index of the Bédier-Foulet edition of the *Roland*).—In the *Donat proençal* the word *gollarz* ('goliard') is analyzed 'ardens in gula' (= *goll-* + *art* = *ardet*); and in the *Carmina burana* we find the etymological pun *Roma manus rodit* (*Ro-ma* = *rodit manus*), cf. Crescini, *Románica fragmenta* (1932), p. 215 and 213 f. Rabelais' pseudo-etymological explanations of proper names are based on the assumption of compounds: *Beauce* = [je trouve] *beau ce*, *Paris* = [baigné] *par ris*, *Gargantua* = *que grand tu as* [le gosier]. Cf. Cervantes' *Rocinante* = *rocín* + *antes*. The technique of the *rime équivoquée* as found with the *rhétoriciens* is another outgrowth of the medieval etymological thinking in terms of compounds. And P. Claudel's punning equation *connaissance* = *co-naissance* is medieval in the assumption of a (historically impossible) compound.

⁵ Eng. *dime* in fact originally meant 'tithe'—a meaning which has now become obsolete. In M. E. there were also forms with *-s* (v. *NED: dysme*); as regards the fact that the *-s* has been preserved in *dismal*, while it has

variant of the popular *-el*, = Lat. *-alis* as found in O. F. (*di*) *festal* (cf. for the variant *-el*, *le caresmel* = *quadragesimalis* [*dies*]). A *dies decimales* > O. F. (*di*) *dism-al* (or a *decimale* [*tempus*]) would account for Eng. *in the dismal*, as well as for the later *dismal day(s)*.⁶

As concerns the connection of the idea of a 'tithe' with a calendar period,⁷ one may consult the note to a passage of the O. Prov. Sermons (*Ara es lo terminis que nos maiorment devem nostras carns amermer e devem las desmar*) which Chabaneau published in *Revue des langues romanes* XXII, 173:

Le passage suivant de saint Grégoire le Grand (Homélie XVI) expliquera l'emploi de ce terme: "Quia ergo per carnis desideria Decalogi mandata contempsimus, dignum est ut eandem carnem quaterdecies affligamus. Quam-

disappeared in *dime* (as it has likewise in *blame*, *aim* < *esmer* etc.: O. F. *-s-* is regularly maintained only before surds [*beast*, *host* etc.], cf. Miss Pope, *From Latin to Mod. French*, 377), I would explain this by reference to a learned form (cf. *baptism*, *schism*)—which supposition is consonant with the learned form of the suffix *-al*.

⁶ The connection of *dismal* with *decima* has already been proposed by Skeat in the first edition of his etymological dictionary (he found the semantic link in the heavy taxes or 'tithes' imposed during the Middle Ages by lay suzerains on their vassals); later, however, he rejected this explanation in favor of the etymology *dies mali*. I am retaining his original etymology, while suggesting another semantic development.

⁷ It would be erroneous to believe that the idea of 'unlucky day(s)' which came to be suggested by *dies decimales*, has anything to do with the number 10 in itself: to the contrary 10 (and 100, 1000) is, in medieval number symbolism, indicative of perfection and would not lend itself to interpretation as a bad omen. The custom of tithing itself (cf. the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, s.v. *tithes*) has its origin, with various peoples, in the mystical significance given to the number 10 which is supposed to represent totality (all the ciphers of the numeric system being contained therein)—the totality, therefore, of the goods given to man by God.

Perfection and completion could also be symbolized, however, by the number of days in the year (365 or 366), as may be seen from the *Chevalier as deus espees* (cf. Wendelin Foerster in his edition, p. 384): in the *Perlesvaus* (ed. Nitze II, 204) we find a reference to the 366 knights belonging to King Arthur's Round Table (each one of whom was probably on watch for one day out of the year). And when we read in the *Mort de Garin le Loherain: Et de ses homes ont ocis trente et six* (Rauschmaier, *Über den figürlichen Gebrauch der Zahlen im Altfranz.*, p. 106) it would seem that we have clearly the proportions of a 'tithe.' (For medieval number symbolism in general, cf. the latest contribution of Curtius, *Rom. Forsch.* LIV, 141).

vis de hoc quadragesimae tempore est adhuc aliud quod possit intelligi. A praesenti etenim die (*les Cendres*) usque ad paschalis solemnitatis gaudia sex hebdomadae veniunt: quarum videlicet dies quadraginta duo fiunt. Ex quibus dum sex dies dominici ab abstinencia subtrahuntur, non plus in abstinencia quam triginta et sex dies remanent. Dum vero per trecentos et sexaginta quinque dies annus ducitur, nos autem per triginta et sex dies affligimur, quasi anni nostri decimas Deo damus; ut qui nobis metipsis per acceptum annum viximus auctori nostro nos in ejus decimis per abstinenciam mortificemus. Unde, fratres carissimi, sicut offerre in lege jubemini decimas rerum, ita ei offerre contendite et decimas dierum." Un auteur grec du même temps ou un peu antérieur, l'archimandrite Dorothee, traitant ce même sujet, montre, par un calcul très précis, que la dîme en question est bien en effet le dixième, et le dixième mathématique des 365 jours de l'année, soit 36 jours 1/2. (*Bibliotheca maxima patrum*, V, 933). Pour plus de détails, voyez le *Rationale divinorum officiorum* de Durand.* lib VI, cap. 28.

* I have not been able to consult Durand, but one may note the remarks of Dom Prosper Guéranger, "The Liturgical Year," in the volume entitled "Septuagesima" (Eng. translation by Dom Laur. Shephard, 1892), concerning "the history of Septuagesima" (the three weeks immediately preceding Lent or *Quadragesima*):

"This prelude to the holy Season of Lent was not known in the early ages of Christianity: its institution would seem to have originated in the Greek Church. Besides the six *Sundays* of Lent, on which by universal custom, the Faithful never fasted, the practice of this Church prohibited fasting on the *Saturdays* likewise, consequently their Lent was short, by twelve days, of the *Forty* spent by our Savior doing penance in the Desert. To make up the deficiency, they were obliged to begin their Lent so many days earlier. . . . The Church of Rome had no such motive for anticipating the season of those privations, which belong to Lent; for, from the earliest antiquity, she kept the *Saturdays* of Lent . . . as fasting days. At the close of the 6th century, Saint Gregory the Great alludes, in one of his homilies [the 16th on the Gospels—the text quoted above], to the fast of Lent being less than *Forty Days*, owing to the *Sundays* which come during that holy season. . . . It was, therefore, after the pontificate of Saint Gregory, that the last four days of *Quinquagesima* week [the third week of *Septuagesima*, immediately preceding Lent] were added to Lent, in order that the number of Fasting days might be exactly *Forty*. As early, however, as the 9th century, the custom of beginning Lent on Ash Wednesday was of obligation in the whole Latin Church."

The name of *Septuagesima* which substituted the round figure for—in reality—the 63 days from *Septuagesima Sunday* to Easter, according to Guéranger ib. p. 7 seq., symbolizes the 70 years of exile of the Israelites from Zion which represents to the view of the Church the captivity of man in *this* existence, the existence 'before Easter' (= before the Redemption). Caught between two symbolisms the Church definitely opted for contempt of reality.

Thus our **dies decimales* (cf. the *decimae dierum*⁹ of Gregory) would correspond with the idea of giving a 'tithe' of our time to God. The line of the Provençal Sermons, *Ara es lo terminis* . . .

⁹ It seems significant that in the Umbrian confession formula of the 11th century (Monaci, *Crest. Ital.* n° 4) the two self-accusations of not paying the tithe and of not observing the fastings, are found together: "me accuso de la decema e de laprimizia e de offertione, ke nno la dei siccome far dibbi, me accuso de le sancte quadragesime e de le vigile de l'apostoli et de le jejunia .IIII. tempora, k'io noll' osservai."

The following passage has perhaps no bearing on the problem of *decima dierum*, but serves to cast a light upon medieval symbolism concerning dates; it is taken from *La vie de Saint Thomas Becket* of Guernes de Pont-Sainte-Maxence, an author well-known for this type of symbolism: * after relating the martyrdom of St. Thomas à Becket, and the depredation of the church which ensued, the passage continues:

Einsi fu sainte iglise hunie e violee.
Ne matines ne vespres, messe n'i fu chantee,
Ne Deus n'i fu serviz, ne chandoille alumee.
Li uis furent fermé, al pueple fu vee;
Tut l'an fu sainte eglise ainsi emprisunee.
Fors sulement dis jours en failli de l'anee;
Quint jour apres Noël fu en prison getee,
Quint jour devant Noël refu reconfermee;
5699 *Et del pueple e des jours fu la disme salvee*
Et des clers e del rei [Henry] la bataille finee.

Walberg in his greater edition confesses that he does not understand line 5699; the Tobler-Lommatzsch dictionary lists the line s. v. *disme* under the heading 'tenth part,' but adds in parenthesis "Sinn?" One should note that *del pueple et des jours la disme* echoes the *al pueple . . . tut l'an* of v. 5694-95; here again we have a zeugmatic construction of 'people'

* For example, v. 5685, where, because of the fact that his protagonist St. Thomas à Becket was born on St. Thomas' Day, December 21st, 5 days before Christmas, and died 5 days after Christmas, December 29, he argues that the two saints of the Occident and Orient have divided among themselves 'Jerusalem [=the militant Church] and Christmas': *Noël et Jursalem unt parti equalment* (cf. E. Walberg, *ZRPh* LI, 558).

Such parallel references to time and place follow the harmonizing habit of thought characteristic of the Fathers: "The Church . . . often speaks to us of two *places*, which correspond with the two *times* of Saint Augustine [the time 'before Easter' = before the Redemption, and 'after Easter' = the Christian age]. These two places are *Babylon* and *Jerusalem*. *Babylon* is the image of this world of sin, in the midst whereof the Christian has to spend his years of probation; *Jerusalem* is the heavenly country where he is to repose after all his privations" (Dom Guéranger, *loc. cit.*, p. 7).

is obviously written under the inspiration of Gregory's idea that Christians should spend a tenth part of the year in fasting and mortification of the flesh. Levy, it is true, is inclined to doubt the pertinence of Chabaneau's remarks (v. *Suppl.-Wb.* s. v. *desmar*): because in the particular phrase in our sentence, *desmar las carns*, the verb *desmar* is used to refer, not to time, but to the flesh, he would translate it simply by 'amoindrir': 'to decimate, to diminish' (Mistral gives for Mod. Prov. *deima* the meanings 'dîner, décimer,' 'amoindrir'). But in this way he disregards the underlying idea: "*now is the time*—to 'tax' the flesh." The phrase **decimare carnem* is but a variant of the phrase *exuere carnem* which, according to Saint Augustine (ep. 149, 26), expresses the duty of the christian who wants to follow Christ.

Christ sacrificed 40 days when fasting in the desert, and this is the origin of the *quadragesima* (> *carême*): the Lent during which Christianity fasts.¹⁸ And one may explain the infrequency of the

and '[a section of] time' on one level—no more startling than that of 'Jerusalem and Christmas' of v. 5685. But it cannot be denied that the meaning of the word *disme* in the double reference of 5699 is puzzling. *Del pueple . . . la disme* is in itself rather understandable: after the detailed statements about the lack of services in the violated church, of lighted candles and of open doors, then one could naturally expect, as a contrast in the re-opened church, the re-establishment of the payment of the 'tithe.' The best explanation of *des jours . . . la disme* seems to me perhaps that of a 'decade' of days (from the 5th day before Christmas to the 5th day after). At any rate, *disme* can hardly be 'the tenth part' as Tobler-Lommatzsch would propose. Since we have to cope with a zeugmatic trend of thought as well as with zeugmatic construction, we cannot expect that one translation of *disme* will suffice for this line.

¹⁸ According to Dom Guéranger, *loc. cit.*, vol. "Lent," p. 31, there is a mountain named *Quarantina* where Christ retired during the fast. Saint Francis fasted 40 days and 40 nights like Christ (*Fioretti*, ch. vii).

References to the *quadragesima* abound in O. F. texts; cf. such a passage as *de la quarantaine jeuner nos done dex essample*; the frequent oaths of the type: *chil Sires t'aidera qui fist la quarantaine*, and, especially the lines 6051 seq. in Guernes' *Vie de St. Thomas Becket*, where we find the formal declaration: *par quaranteines sont li pechié espeldri* (King Henry must expiate his crime of murder for 40 months + 40 weeks + 40 days); cf. E. Walberg's greater edition, p. 312, and Tobler-Lommatzsch s. v. *carantaine*.

A close parallel to the development of *dismal days* is to be found in the passage of the *Roman d'Alizandre* which this last-named dictionary quotes: "*en peneuse semaine Entrent li douze per et en fort quaranteine*"; here the *quaranteine* is obviously identified with *peneuse semaine*: it should not have been translated simply by 'Frist, Zeit.'

term **dies decimales* as due precisely to the standardization of *quadragesima*; since the same lapse of time is referred to by the two terms they are practically synonymous. Thus, for **dies decimales* there remained only a secondary usage.

Accordingly a *dies decimalis* > *dis* (*jours*) *dismals*, or perhaps a neuter *decimale* (sc. *tempus* or *vectigal*: cf. in O. F. and in Mod. Swiss dialects a masculine *disme* = *decimus*), involving the idea of a 'tithe of time,' must have involved the idea of a 'time of self-mortification'; this could apply specifically, not only to the Easter fasting period, but to any of the three *quadragesimae* usual in the Middle Ages (cf. H. Rheinfelder, *Kultsprache u. Profansprache*, p. 145: *quadragesima S. Martini*, *S. Joannis Baptistae* and *Quadragesima maior*); from the general idea of 'time of affliction,' one comes easily to that of 'gloomy, unhappy time, day(s)', which is the meaning of Eng. *in the dismal*.

Indeed, already in the O. F. text of 1256 where *dismal* is first attested,¹⁰ as well as in the O. Norse text of 1363 quoted by the *NED*, one may note an alteration of the first, religious meaning. As for the Chaucerian lines, these illustrate a confusion with the concept of the 'Egyptian days' (cf. Du Cange) that augur ill-luck. Since this tradition was of pagan origin, it was forbidden to the Christian; we may note, however, that P. Meyer, after publishing the lines on *jours denietz* (*dies nefasti*) and *dismal*, adds the comment:

Ce n'est pas qu'il [Raüf] paraisse bien persuadé de l'influence pernicieuse des jours néfastes, toutefois il ne laissera pas de les énumérer:

E sachetz que seint Augustin¹¹
 Qui fust mult de clergie fin
 En ses livres defent
 Ke garde ne preignent la gent.
 Ceo, dit il, ja ne gardez,
 Ne calende ne jour deniez.
 Ne purquant je les voil nomer
 Ke les lais ne me puissent blamer

Thus it would seem that, in 'lay' usage, the confusion of the *dies*

¹⁰ And here, in Raüf de Linham's text, we must count with an O. F. word—not with a "mot anglais," as Paul Meyer would have it.

¹¹ The actual text of Augustine may be found in Du Cange s. v. *dies aegyptiaci*.

Aegyptiaci (> Sp. *día aziago*, *REW* s. v. *aegyptiacus*)¹² with the *dies decimales* had perhaps already taken place: even by this time there prevailed the pagan idea of the 'unlucky day' preordained by some unchristian Fate—in contrast to the original meaning of a day or period of days given as a 'tithe of time' to God. It is possible that the 'etymology' *dies mali* may have been accepted by the community and have played its part in fixing the meaning of *dismal* in this direction—the pseudo-etymology thus becoming a linguistic reality with which, ultimately, the modern scholar must count. But this secondary influence should not obscure the primordial Christian idea of the **dies decimales*.¹³

LEO SPITZER

¹² Moreover the idea of 'Egyptian darkness' (*dies aegyptiaci* = *dies tenebrosi*) may have reinforced the suggestion of 'gloom' in *dismal*.—The plural in the dialectal phrases *to be in the dismals*, *a fit of the dismals* (Wright, *Engl. Dial. Dict.*: low temper, melancholy, despondency) points to the presence of the idea of 'days' in the popular mind.

¹³ Unfortunately I have not been able to attest *dies decimales* in any text. But, then, the O. F. text of 1256 is relatively late.

NEW COLUMBIA BOOKS

RELIGIOUS TRENDS IN ENGLISH POETRY

Volume II: 1740-1780
Religious Sentimentalism in the
Age of Johnson

By Hoxie N. Fairchild \$5.00

090

THOMAS MANN'S WORLD

By Joseph Gerard Brennan \$2.50

090

GEORGE WHETSTONE

Mid-Elizabethan Gentleman of
Letters

By Thomas C. Izard \$3.75

090

THE CLUBS OF THE GEORGIAN RAKES

By Louis C. Jones \$2.75

090

WHAT'S IN A NOVEL

By Helen E. Haines \$2.75

ENGLISH BARDS & GRÆCIAN MARBLES

The Relationship between Sculpture and Poetry, Especially in the Romantic Period

By Stephen A. Larrabee \$3.50

090

THE ART OF DYING WELL

The Development of the Ars Moriendi

By Sister Mary Catharine O'Connor \$2.50

090

THE ANGLO-SAXON MINOR POEMS

Edited by Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie \$4.50

090

BAUDELAIRE THE CRITIC

By Margaret Gilman \$3.00

090

ENGLISH INSTITUTE ANNUAL, 1941

\$2.50

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

JONES AND BARR'S
UN VERANO EN MÉXICO

- *A review grammar and composition with strong emphasis on conversation. For intermediate classes.*

-
- Spanish models portray the life and customs of Mexico and present typical Mexican scenes and ideas.
 - Exercises give a basic practical vocabulary useful to the prospective traveler both in Mexico and in other Spanish American countries.

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY



BOSTON NEW YORK CHICAGO ATLANTA
SAN FRANCISCO DALLAS LONDON

To be released in December

GERMAN IN REVIEW

ROBERT O. RÖSELER

University of Wisconsin

A THOROUGH, BUT CONCISE REVIEW OF THE ESSENTIALS OF GERMAN GRAMMAR. EACH LESSON OPENS WITH A CLEAR, GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF THE TOPIC COVERED AND A BRIEF, SUCCINCT STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED. THE TEXT IS SO CONSTRUCTED THAT THE STUDENT, IN WORKING THE DRILLS, MAY MAKE CONSTANT, EASY REFERENCE TO THE RULES AND CHARTS.

Probably \$1.45

HOLT

257 Fourth Avenue

New York